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Regional Security Studies Center

Technical Report  
RSSC-TR 7675-1

THAI-LAO COMMUNIST SUPPRESSION OPERATIONS COMMAND

**EVALUATION OF CSOC OPERATIONS  
PLAN NO. 9 (U)**

By: G. L. WILLIAMS and P. B. G. WALLER

Prepared for:

U.S. ARMY MISSILE COMMAND  
REDSTONE ARSENAL, ALABAMA

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DECEMBER 1970

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# EVALUATION OF CSOC OPERATIONS PLAN NO. 9 (U)

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30 July 1992

By

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Prepared for:

U.S. ARMY MISSILE COMMAND  
REDSTONE ARSENAL, ALABAMA

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PREFACE

(U) The research accomplished by Stanford Research Institute under the terms of ARPA Contract DAAH01-69-C0919 is presented in four separate reports, as described below:

1. Evaluation of CSOC Operations Plan No. 9 (U)

(U) (C) This, the present report, is limited to an assessment of one of the Royal Thai Government's programs under CSOC (Communist Suppression Operations Command) for improving control of insurgent activities in border areas. The specific program evaluated is one carried out in a small border zone at the eastern end of Changwat (Province) Nong Khai, utilizing selected personnel from the local populace to serve as informants and as reinforcements to police-led strike forces. SRI employed Thai researchers to collect the data, make observations, and report their findings on the efforts of the local Thai officials to implement this operational plan. Limited field tests were designed by SRI to collect additional data needed to estimate the potential of this RTG concept. The evaluation covers the time period from January 1969 through June 1970; it is incomplete in the sense that the implementation of Plan No. 9 was just approaching the operational phase at the end of this evaluation period provided under SRI's contract.

2. Training for CSOC Operations Plan No. 9 (U)\*

(U) (C) Supplementing the above report, this describes and evaluates in particular the training program for village informants and strike force volunteers as planned and implemented under Plan 9 during the research period. The training assessment is based on written reports made by SRI's Thai observers who monitored the instruction periods and field exercises. Also presented are specific recommendations and a suggested outline for future training of this type, as prepared by the senior SRI analyst

\* (U) Technical Report RSSC-TR-7675-2, Training for CSOC Operations Plan No. 9 (U), by P.B.G. Waller, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, December 1970. (Confidential)

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who followed the training program from its initial planning. Hereafter, this report will be referred to simply as "The Training Report."

3. A Reference Border Control System Concept for the Thai-Lao Border (U)\*

(U) This report draws on the data and findings contained in the "Evaluation of CSOC Operations Plan 9"; in addition, however, it is based on information assembled from a large field data-collection effort conducted by SRI during the period January 1969 through mid-February 1970, as well as on previous border control studies performed by SRI and on relevant data from other sources available in Bangkok. During the period of field work, SRI Thai researchers surveyed a significant sample of local conditions, records, and officials along the entire Thai-Lao border. Analyzing the data from these sources and utilizing findings in border control research conducted previously by SRI [such as the Mekong River System (MRS) study], enabled SRI's research team to develop a system concept which, as a reference, offers improved border-control operational effectiveness without adding more than an estimated 20 percent to the costs currently budgeted by the RTG for such operations along the Thai-Lao border. This report is primarily designed to assist RTG planners. It is not intended as a design for direct implementation. Herever, this report will be referred to simply as "The Reference System Report."

4. Final Summary Technical Report--Border Control Study (U)\*

(U) This summary volume has been prepared for senior official review of the overall research project. It presents the highlights of the findings and conclusions of the other three reports and emphasizes points developed which, in SRI's judgement, are worthy of command attention and decision.

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\* (U) Technical Report RSSC-TR-7675-3, A Reference Border Control System Concept for the Thai-Lao Border (U), by R.C. Boehne; Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, December 1970. (Confidential)

(U) Technical Report RSSC-TR-4923-9, Mekong River Border Control System (U), by A.G. Capps, et al.; Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, March 1969. (Confidential)

(U) Technical Report RSSC-TR-7675-4, Final Summary Technical Report--Border Control Study (U), by A.G. Capps; Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, December 1970. (Confidential)

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## GLOSSARY

Amphoe	Administrative district of a changwat (comparable to a county)
ARPA	Advanced Research Project Agency
Ban	Village
BC HQ	Border Control Headquarters
BCS	Border Control System
BMI	Battelle Memorial Institute
BPP	Border Patrol Police
Changwat	Administrative province of Thailand
C3	Command-Control-Communications
CI	Counterinsurgency
CPM	Civil-Police-Military
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CSOC	Communist Suppression Operations Command
CT	Communist Terrorist
DOLA	Department of Local Administration
EEl	Essential Elements of Information
FTX	Field Training Exercise
Kamnan	Head of a tambon
King-Amphoe	Sub-district of a changwat
LCS	Local Control Station
MP	Marine Police
MRDC	Military Research and Development Center
MRS	Mekong River (Surveillance) System
MTT	Mobile Training Team
MTX	Map Training Exercise
Nai Amphoe	District Officer
ORT	Operational Readiness Testing
Palad	Deputy (to changwat or amphoe head)
POL	Petrol, Oil, Lubricants
PP	Provincial Police
Psyops	Psychological Operations



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## GLOSSARY (Concluded)

Puyai ban	Village headman
RDC-T	Research and Development Center-Thailand
RCP	River Check Point
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
RTA	Royal Thai Army
RTG	Royal Thai Government
SAF	Special Action Force
SF	Strike Force
SOC	Special Operations Center
SOP	Standing Operating Procedures
SOT	Special Operations Team
SRI	Stanford Research Institute
TA	Target Area
Tanbon	Sub-division of an amphoe; a township
VDC	Volunteer Defense Corps
VI	Village Informant
VIST	Village Information Systems - Thailand
VPT	Village Protection Team
VPU	Village Protection Unit
VSDU	Village Security and Development Unit
VSU	Village Security Unit
VV	Village Volunteer
UTM	Universal Transverse Mercator

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SUMMARY (U)

A. Purpose of Research (U)

(U) The specific purpose of the research task undertaken by SRI and herein reported was to assist the joint U.S.-Thai Military Research and Development Center (MRDC) in evaluating Operations Plan No. 9 of the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) and the system instituted under it.

(U) The basis of this evaluation is effectiveness and costs subject to data available. The evaluation period covers the initial phases of this plan from January 1969 through June 1970, and thus addresses the Plan 9 border control system only as it had been developed and implemented by the latter date.

B. Background (U)

(U) (C) Operations Plan No. 9 was prepared by the Civil-Police-Military (CPM) command of Changwat Nong Khai in late 1968, and was approved by CSOC for implementation under that CPM. A restricted area was to be established in Amphoes Bung Kan and Seka, extending some five kilometers inland from the Mekong River border. The mission set forth was to prevent communist infiltration and provide for public safety by deterring insurgent activity within this area.

(U) (C) A novel feature of the plan was the training and use of volunteer personnel from villages within the area, some of these to serve with strike force units under police leadership and others to serve as village informants who would report CT incursions or suspect activities occurring in their village areas. A second important feature of the plan was the coordination of existing military, paramilitary, and police security units under a local Border Control Headquarters and its subordinate Local Control Stations.

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C. Approach (U)

(U) Under the constraints of project sensitivity and the time period of the research contract, direct observation by SRI project personnel was necessarily limited and evaluation of the system was confined to a broad-scale assessment of the efforts to implement the plan through June 1970.

(U) SRI Thai researchers observed the training courses and wrote individual assessments on them; their reports were then screened and evaluated by SRI analysts. To establish a data base for later system analysis and evaluation, field tests were conducted, using locally-hired villagers as simulated infiltrators, to determine the frequency of reports received by security forces and the distribution of the local population under various environmental conditions. Other field testing produced estimates of system delay times and of movement speeds on foot and by boat and bicycle. Detailed maps were also made of the trails in the restricted area and its vicinity, in order to estimate trail density parameters used in analysis of the counter-infiltration capability of the system.

D. Conclusions and Suggestions for Improvement (U)

(U) The principal conclusions from this research followed, where appropriate, by suggestions for improvement are listed hereunder; a comprehensive set of conclusions and suggestions is given in Chapter V.

1. Personnel (U)

(U) (C) Personnel in the Plan 9 system have demonstrated a wide range of capabilities. However, a higher all round standard of recruit could have been obtained by improved screening processes, requiring more time than was allowed in the plan.

- It is suggested that had the plan allowed adequate provision for screening, it could have been accomplished by pre-testing individuals in tasks related to their future basic responsibilities and by observation and evaluation during training and operational activities.

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2. Training, General (U)

(U) (C) As evidenced by the expansion of the training activity--from the originally planned one month of basic training to over thirteen months of basic training cum field training--it is clear that more advanced and detailed planning are required to effectively and economically administer this important aspect of preparing for operations. Other conclusions, relevant to both the basic and field training programs, are that an undue strain was put by them on the CPM time and personnel resources; training was not sufficiently realistic; it was held over too long a period with too many and too lengthy gaps between the various training phases; it did not succeed in training personnel in the essential requirement to locate and report sighting positions; and the overall training experience did indicate how the operational readiness of the system could be improved and maintained by occasional tests. Suggestions for improvement are:

- Increase the use of available national, regional and local RTC military and paramilitary training staff and facilities.
- Emphasize night training throughout the training program, in order to provide the realism consistent with operational requirements.
- Achieve continuity and confirmation of trainees' assimilation of instruction staging of field training exercises immediately after the basic training program.
- Substitute simple instruction in location finding, based upon natural and manmade landmarks, for formal map reading, as a more appropriate vehicle for teaching villagers this required skill.
- Institute operational readiness testing of a border security system following the training phase. Such tests can be derived from the lessons of the Nong Khai field exercises and can be achieved by occasional local and external supervisory inspections, complemented by simple additional field and command post exercises, as found necessary.

3. Basic Training (U)

(U) (C) Major conclusions on the basic training program are that it included too many trainees for efficient instruction; it could have been better structured as to training priorities; more advance planning and preparation was needed; more realism

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could have been achieved in the training process; and there was insufficient emphasis on the village informants' role and duties. Suggestions for improvement include:

- Reducing the size of classes.
- Restructuring training syllabi and work programs, with emphasis on essential subjects and priorities, to accord with operational objectives.
- Providing for more advance planning and preparation, particularly in relation to instructors, lesson plans, training aids, and other training equipment.
- Introducing realism, including maximum individual participation in practical exercises, would greatly facilitate the learning process.
- Clarifying in detail the specific role village informants are expected to discharge during the basic training. This would eliminate the need for any follow-up instruction during the field exercises.

#### 4. Field Training (U)

(U)

(S) The major conclusions from the field training program were that their staging could have been smoother and more economical with more advance planning and preparation. Insufficient trainees were included. Exercise scenarios were too complex and demanding at the beginning. The supervisory training staff were themselves insufficiently trained. And more could have been done to include the security units associated with Plan 9 in the field exercise program. Suggestions for improvement are:

- Produce detailed schedules in advance, drawing on the Nong Khai experience, in order to reduce the length of the field exercise program and to increase their effectiveness.
- Establish and test LCS staffs in their SOP as a prerequisite for an efficient field exercise program.

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(U) (S)

- Include all the village informants in the field exercises.
- Stage command post and field training exercises in simple and sequential scenarios at the beginning before complex and demanding full system exercises are attempted.
- Brief and train supervisory staff, particularly umpires, to ensure well-conducted field exercises.
- Bring operational units associated with the border security plan physically and fully into the field exercises at their outset to facilitate a speedy and complete introduction to the operational phase.

5. Logistics (U)

(U) (S) Because much of the planned equipment was either delayed or not provided, and maintenance problems not resolved, it is concluded that the system of logistics administration did not meet the Plan 9 requirements.

- The suggestion is made that the present S1/S4 staff channels be examined with a view to establishing regular facilities for supply, re-supply, preventive maintenance, and repair for the modest amount of equipment involved.

6. Operations (U)

(U) (S) a. The measured performance of village informants in an overt role indicated that they would have a positive value in an information gathering net. The covert role required of informants by the plan was, however, judged impractical.

- It is suggested, therefore, that the village informants be employed in the overt role, only, and that a major percentage, if not all, of the villagers be considered informants, since in fact they have this potential.

(U) (S) b. A satisfactory standard of nighttime information gathering could not be achieved within the resources and under the concepts of the plan.

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(U) ~~(S)~~

- Night watches and local security patrols are suggested as possible ways of overcoming, at least in part, this inadequacy. Devices, such as trail monitoring seismic detectors, might be effective in augmenting the villager nets in certain areas.

(U) ~~(S)~~ c. Preliminary evidence indicated that the LCS's and BC HQ can readily perform their information processing in situations in which response requirements are not stringent. However, the problem of information netting of the village informants, in order to get timely information to the command headquarters, was not solved.

- It is suggested that a family spokesman-to-village spokesman (normally the phuyaiban) network for each village be tried.

(U) ~~(S)~~ d. When urgent operational responses are required--e.g., reaction to immediate information of sightings--the command control through communications netting is presently inadequate.

- More and better radios are suggested, or perhaps special alarm nets as would be provided by the Village Alarm System currently under test and development in the RTG's MRDC.

(U) ~~(S)~~ e. Insufficient numbers of security force units coupled with inadequate mobility provision in the plan make intercept of infiltrators a practical improbability under all but the most favorable conditions.

- Employing reserve security forces assigned in support of Plan 9 is a possibility for improvement.
- The mobility of the local security forces could be improved by providing them with bicycles but, without also improving other aspects of the intercept capability, the value of this investment is questionable.

#### 7. Impact on Villagers (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ On the basis of the surveys made through May 1970, the Plan 9 system as implemented to that date appears to have had little impact on local villagers.

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- It is suggested that periodic, similar surveys be made and reported to CPM/CSOC. Such information should be helpful in detecting local populace attitude trends which could be considered in planning appropriate psyops and civic action measures.

8. Overall Assessment (U)

(U) (C) Finally, it is concluded that the potential of the system as a whole is quite low since the apprehension operation as planned is judged as having basic inadequacies in nighttime detection, C<sup>3</sup> response, and intercept capabilities. On the other hand, the information gathering element of the plan is judged as having potential. The foregoing conclusions concerning the overall potential of the system do not take into account the possibility that, despite probable poor actual operational effectiveness in terms of counter-ing infiltration and interdicting insurgent logistics, the system may well be worth its cost in providing the local populace with a "sense of security" as well as having a prophylactic effect by giving the restricted area the appearance of having added security strength.

- It is suggested that possible added benefits, although requiring a long-term assessment, might be considered by the RTG in its overall evaluation of the relative cost benefits of Plan 9 compared with other ways of producing these effects.

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## I INTRODUCTION (U)

### A. Background (U)

(U) (S) On 29 April 1968, the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) issued a directive entitled "Operations Concept 111" (Thai-Lao Border Area Surveillance). This directive proposed to strengthen the security of 5-km zones along the Thai side of the Mekong River in certain border changwats in which exfiltration and infiltration were known to be taking place. Specifically, the directive called for the "prevention of CT [Communist Terrorist] infiltration of manpower, equipment, and supplies, including psychological support from the CT on the Laotian side; and to search for and to destroy CTs in the areas of responsibility."

(U) (S) Subsequently, a request was made by CSOC to each of its border changwat Civil-Police-Military (CPM) commands to prepare a border control plan that would rely on the utilization of local villagers as the primary source of required manpower in an information and operational response system against infiltration. This feature offered potential advantages, in that (1) local inhabitants of border villages could more easily identify themselves with the central government in a joint effort to provide for their mutual security, (2) if proven capable, the employment of villagers offered a relatively low-cost alternative to military, police, or regular paramilitary security forces, and (3) the ensuing distribution of funds, in the form of payment and rewards, would represent direct economic assistance to the border communities.

(U) (S) In response to this request, the CPM of Changwat Nong Khai prepared a plan entitled "Operations Plan No. 9" in October 1968, the concepts of which closely paralleled those expressed in CSOC's Concept 111. Plan 9 was approved by CSOC, which subsequently directed that it be implemented by the Nong Khai CPM as a border control project. The general location of the primary operational area, called the restricted area, in which Plan 9 was implemented, is indicated in Figure 1.

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


FIG. 1 LOCATION OF PLAN 9 RESTRICTED AREA (U)

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B. Purpose and Objectives (U)

(U) The purpose of this report is to satisfy near-term RTG objectives by providing an evaluation of Plan 9, as implemented. The specific objectives of the research task\* herein reported were:

(1) To assist Thai-U.S. Joint Military Research and Development Center (MRDC) in the evaluation of the CSOC border security plans.

(2) To make recommendations for improving Plan 9 operations.

C. Scope (U)

(U) This report is confined to an evaluation of the Plan 9 system as it has been implemented from January 1969 through June 1970.\*\* Specific suggestions are offered relating to the improvement of this system and to planning for any similar future systems, on the basis of feasibility and assuming limited RTG resources.

D. Structure of the Report (U)

(U) In order to place the evaluation in proper perspective, Sections II and III provide factual detail that will permit insight into the evolving nature of the Plan 9 system. Section II summarizes the pertinent features of the operations plan on which the system is based; Section III then describes the actual implementation of the plan, noting the differences between the planned and the existing system, and, where possible, the rationale for these differences.

(U) Section IV evaluates, in turn, the system's personnel (including their training), intelligence function, operations, and logistics adequacy, as well as the impact the system has made on the villagers residing in the restricted area during the period of evaluation.

(U) ~~(C)~~ The third objective of this task, not directly relevant to this report, was "To develop data for further analysis and evaluation of adaptability of CSOC plans in border areas other than the Plan 9 area," in support of the Reference System Report as explained in the Preface.

(U) As will be explained later, psyops and civic action were the only elements of Plan 9 excluded from this evaluation. This was because other ARPA contractors had been assigned research projects in these fields.

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(U) The final section present conclusions and suggestions for improvement generated by the evaluation. The two appendixes--training and village impact--provide supporting data.

(U) This report is one of four reports produced under this contract. Their scope, purpose and interrelationships are briefly outlined in the Preface.

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## II OPERATIONS PLAN NO. 9 DESCRIPTION (U)

(U) The following sub-sections summarize the main features of the Plan 9 document itself, in order to provide the basis for an understanding of the dynamic nature of this operation as it evolved, as will be described in Section III.

### A. Situation\* (U)

(U) ~~(C)~~ The general situation with respect to CT forces is first discussed in the operations order, mentioning the aim of the communists to subvert, gain support, and set up operational bases in remote areas of Thailand, such as Phu Sing in Amphoe Bung Kan and parts of King Amphoe Sang Khom in Changwat Nong Khai. In particular, it is stated that infiltration from Laos has occurred in A. Bung Kan and A. Seka. Specific CT sightings and incidents in these amphoes are referenced in an intelligence summary annex.

(U) ~~(C)~~ The friendly forces--RTG units and agencies with security responsibilities in the area--are then listed, with a brief description of the mission of each in Plan 9.\*\* In particular, it is stated that "2nd Army conducts the suppression and defense in the Northeastern region." Other headquarters and units are given supporting roles; the Nong Khai CPM Forward and the Amphoe CPMs at Bung Kan and Seka are described as providing border control support.

### B. Mission (U)

(U) ~~(C)~~ The mission of the operations plan is described as establishing a border control headquarters, local control stations and strike forces for "countering communist infiltration from abroad along the Mekong River in A. Bung Kan and A. Seka, in order to provide public security--searching, following and eliminating CT in the area, and cutting off support and reinforcement from abroad."

\* (U) As of October 1968.

\*\* (U) A more detailed description of the operational units in support of Plan 9 and their primary missions is given in Section III A.

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C. Execution (U)

(U) ~~(C)~~ The concept of operation emphasizes that the plan will provide for public security to the border area villagers, intelligence with respect to local CT activity, psyops and civic-action, and continuous patrolling of both ground and river.

(U) ~~(C)~~ To do this, a Border Control Headquarters (BC HQ), Local Control Stations (LCS), Strike Forces(SF), and village informant personnel are established. The BC HQ, which is coordinated with and becomes a function of the Target Area Two HQ\* of the 0910 Plan, is assigned the overall supervision, direction, and coordination of all counter-infiltration activities along the border. The subordinate LCSs are assigned the command and control of the village informants and the Strike Forces, as well as those Village Protection Units, previously assigned in the 0910 Plan, that are located in the Plan 9 area of operations. The psyops support mission for Plan 9 is given to an Army Psyops team assigned to the Target Area Two HQ which was at the time also called the Nong Khai CPM Forward .

1. Phases of Accomplishment\*\* (U)

a. Phase One--Area Preparation (U)

(U) ~~(C)~~ The riverine border of A. Seka and part of A. Bung Kan to a depth of about 5-km is established as a restricted area. An overlay of the restricted area is attached to the order, and its boundaries are reproduced in Figure 2. Within this area, a census is ordered of the population in general, and of those who work or have relatives in Laos, in particular. In addition, control of the people who cross the river to work in Laos is directed. Finally, checking and screening of all restricted area residents, and the movement of CT supporters or the unreliable to resettlement areas, is ordered (together with the provision that only screened people from other areas be permitted to move into the restricted area).

(U)

\* ~~(C)~~ One of eleven "Target Areas" established (under the CSOC 0910 Plan) in the Northeast in 1967 to provide comprehensive village security, together with strike forces, in certain jungle or mountainous regions where insurgent concentrations were reportedly greatest.


\*\* (U) The extent to which these phases were actually accomplished within the time limit of this study is detailed in Section III.

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**FIG. 2 PLAN 9 RESTRICTED AREA, CONTROL CENTERS, COMMUNICATIONS AND ASSOCIATED OPERATIONAL UNITS**

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b. Phase Two--Organization Preparation (D-Day minus 30) (U)

(U) (C) The organization is described initially with the Target Area Two headquarters personnel being assigned to serve also as the staff of the BC HQ. Responsibility for staffing the LCSs in A. Bung Kan and A. Seka was given to their respective amphoe CPMs. Each of these staffs was to consist of one chief, two clerks, and four radio operators. Each Strike Force operating under the LCSs is described as being composed of one chief, a deputy, and two radio operators (from the Provincial Police--PP), and about 20 selected members of the Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) or other village volunteers. Three Village Protection Units at Ban Had Hae, Ban Lao, and Ban Tha Hai, operating under Plan 0910, were placed under the Plan 9 LCSs, as were personnel from River Check Points at Ban Bung Khla and Ban Tha Si Khai, which were controlled respectively by the Bung Kan and Seka Amphoe CPMs.\* The village informants are described as being volunteer residents of the area, 5 to 10 men from each of the 17 villages in A. Bung Kan and 12 villages in A. Seka inside the restricted area.

(U) After selection of the above personnel, Plan 9 states that at least 15 days of training, relative to the mission, chain-of-command, procedures, and weapons, should be conducted for all the personnel of the headquarters, Strike Forces and informants to be used in the Plan. In addition, during this period, preparation of arms, communications, and other equipment required for training and operations would be accomplished.

c. Phase Three--Execution Step (D-Day) (U)

(U) (C) It is stated that, on D-Day, all organic elements will be in position and will commence operations, the Marine Police of A. Bung Kan will conduct river patrols along the restricted area, and other units and RTG agencies will provide support on request.

d. Phase Four--Expanding Phase (U)

(U) (Since this phase involves restricted information and it was not implemented during the evaluation period, details are omitted here.)

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\* (U) The composition of both the Village Protection Units (VPU) and River Check Points (RCP) is similar: 10-12 strong, including 2 Provincial Police (PP) personnel, the remainder being VDC. Their basic security function was also similar except that the RCPs concentrated on the river surveillance whereas the VPUs also carried out occasional inland patrols. Hereafter, when collectively referred to, the VPUs and RCPs in the Plan 9 area will be called Village Security Units (VSU).

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2. Factors of Accomplishment (U)

(U) ~~(C)~~ The following statements in the operations order, called "factors of accomplishment," are quoted in their entirety, because they illustrate, at least in part, the methods and approach to be used in implementing the plan, and the degree to which they were fulfilled is to be assessed in this report:

- (1) "The selection of village informants should be made with care, in order to obtain valuable and timely information.
- (2) The Strike Forces in the restricted area should possess good mobility.
- (3) Communications equipment should interface as necessary and be firmly linked. The available equipments should be used properly in order to report in time.
- (4) All authorities participating should be sincere in executing the plan and cooperate mutually.
- (5) The Psyops Teams should execute [their mission] effectively in order to gain the cooperation of the populace.
- (6) The paying of per diem and rewards should be made quickly and properly."

3. Support Requirements (U)

(U) ~~(C)~~ The remainder of the Execution Section of the Plan 9 document goes into somewhat more detail with respect to the requirements on agencies and units subordinate to the Nong Khai CPM. Of importance are the following:

- (1) The LCSs are established specifically in Ban Bung Khla and Ban Lao Luang of A. Bung Khan and A. Seka, respectively.
- (2) The Nong Khai Provincial Police HQ is required to assign those police necessary to staff the three Plan 9 headquarters, as well as provide support to other units.\*

(U) \* ~~(C)~~ As mentioned in C.1.b. above, the Amphoe CPMs are given the responsibility for staffing the LCSs (with policemen). The requirement on the PP HQ was presumably to make the selected men available, and to replace them as necessary.

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(3) The 6th Sub-Division Marine Police is required to provide Marine Police force from A. Bung Kan to support the BC HQ and to provide day and night patrolling of the restricted area.

(4) All units in A. Bung Kan and A. Seka participating in the border control mission of previous CPM Operations Order No. 6 (see Section IIIA.) are ordered to continue the execution of the procedures of that plan as well as those prescribed by Plan 9.

D. Administration and Logistics (U)

1. Budget (U)

(U) ~~(C)~~ The largest portion (740,000 baht)\* of the proposed 885,000 baht budget is applied to personnel-related costs, primarily per diem. In addition to the regular per diem rates for military and police included on the Headquarters staffs, provision is made for per diem payment of 16 baht per day to Strike Force village volunteers and 20 baht per day for assigned PP personnel. Payment to the village informants is budgeted at 100 baht per month per informant. A remark associated with this budget item states that this is an estimate based on an average amount of information reported; however, the proposed basis of informant payment--whether as reward or as salary--is not specified. The budget assumes 145 village informants, an average of 5 men for each of the 29 villages, whereas the Phase Two section, relative to organization plans, envisages 5-10 informants for each village. It is not known whether this was an offhand estimate or if an originally desired strength was later constrained by budget realities. Equipment costs accounted for the balance (145,000 baht) of the budgeted items.

2. Equipment (U)

(U) ~~(C)~~ Budgeted items of equipment for the Plan 9 organization include:

(1) Construction of two LCS headquarters buildings and living quarters for Strike Force personnel.

\* (U) Unit of Thai currency. 1 baht (฿) = approximately U.S.\$ .05.

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- (2) Three motorcycles, one each for use at the LCSs and at the BC HQ.
- (3) Two large boats, powered by long-shaft propeller, for use at each LCS.
- (4) Thirty bicycles, one to be located in each of the restricted area villages.

3. Other Equipment (U)

(U) (C) The following items are not costed, CSOC being the source of supply:

- (1) Radios: 31 one-watt transceivers, one to be located in each LCS and each village in the restricted area; three five-watt transceivers, one to be located in each LCS and in the BC HQ; and ten CSOC-3 radios, five for each of the LCSs.
- (2) 145 shotguns to be used by the village informants for defensive purposes.
- (3) Ten shotguns and ten rifles to be issued to each Strike Force.
- (4) Two shotguns for each LCS.
- (5) Ammunition for the above weapons.

4. Miscellaneous Expenditures (U)

(U) (C) These include psyops, civic action, POL, maintenance, office, transport-action and travelling, sundry expenses, and so on.

E. Signal (Planned Communications Network) (U)

(U) (C) Figure 3 is a reproduction of the communications network intended for the Plan 9 system. It can be seen that it was planned that informants in every restricted area village have direct communications to their respective LCS. The LCSs, in turn, are linked to each other and to the BC HQ on a separate net. Strike Force communications are not shown in the figure, although it can be reasonably assumed that the five CSOC-3 radios allocated to each LCS were intended for LCS-Strike Force communications.

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


FIG. 3 COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK INTENDED FOR PLAN 9 (U)

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F. Intelligence Functions (U)

- (U) ~~(C)~~ Although there is no single section dealing with intelligence functions and procedures (the Intelligence Annex is confined to describing specific incidents occurring in A. Bung Kan and A. Seka in 1968), it is possible to summarize the document's references to the intelligence function, which might aid the reader in understanding the point-of-view of the Plan 9 author.
- (U) ~~(C)~~ The village informants are seen as the primary direct intelligence source for the system. In addition to being "assigned the responsibility of information collection and reporting on infiltration" (Organization Description), they will be trained and assigned in "intelligence functions against local CT activity" (Concept of Operation). Intelligence support, primarily of an advance information nature, from outside sources would be provided to the Plan 9 system through the Nong Khai CPM.

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### III PLAN 9 IMPLEMENTATION (U)

#### A. General (U)

(U) (C) The basic operations order, described in Section II, reflected the initial thinking of the CPM planners. However, as experience was gained during the initial stages of implementation, changes in approach and an evolving interpretation of its contents were to be expected. Moreover, CSOC had indicated that suggestions for improvements in the system, resulting from observations and tests as the implementation proceeded, would be welcomed from SRI. Such suggestions were made, and some were adopted. To the extent that it can be documented by SRI, this section traces the actual implementation of the Plan 9 system made by the Nong Khai CPM personnel up to 30 June, 1970.

(U) (C) To provide a backdrop for this discussion, it is necessary first to describe the RTG units associated with Plan 9 and their individual operational missions--of varying emphasis on border security--which they were still to continue to discharge. The locations and command/control/communications (C<sup>3</sup>) systems of these units are shown in Fig. 2, p. 7. The units and operations concerned are further described as follows:

- (1) The Changwat CPM 06 Plan, implemented since early 1968, set up check points on the river at Bung Khla and Tha Si Khai, staffed by police and Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) personnel.
- (2) The 2nd Army 05 Plan, implemented since early 1968, used a reinforced Special Operations Team of Special Operations Center (SOC) 21 at Tha Si Khai, supplemented by Border Patrol Police (BPP) personnel. The operational effort comprises patrols, surveillance and ambushes focussed on the Mekong river bank.

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- (3) Village Security Units (VSU) at Hat Hae, B. Lao, and Tha Hai, made up of police and VDC personnel, carry out routine village defense and patrol duties under the direction of the Target Area Two HQs.
- (4) The Special Operations Center, operating out of Bung Kan, discharges its functions of civic action, development, intelligence and security, in addition to its participation in the 05 Plan.
- (5) A BPP Line Platoon, stationed in Bung Khla, carries out its chartered functions of maintaining security and gathering intelligence in the border area, in addition to participating in the 05 Plan.
- (6) The Marine Police patrol the river in order to enforce customs, immigration and other civil laws.
- (7) Mention should also be made here of Target Area Two VSUs, centered around Phu Sing, and commanded by the Nai Amphoe of Bung Kan. Although on the periphery of the Plan 9 area, it was later envisaged that the complex of VSUs between the Phu Wua and Phu Sing plateaus may ultimately be used, together with the Target Area Strike Force, to operate against infiltrators who succeed in penetrating the border screen.

B. Overall Developments (U)

(U) (C) Activity by the CT within the restricted area from October 1968 to the time of this report diminished, at least in regard to the frequency and seriousness of reported incidents.\* A worsening situation in that part of Laos directly across from the Plan 9

(U) (C) According to official CSOC records, total incidents of all types in 1968 in the restricted area averaged one every 2.7 weeks; in 1969, there was one incident every 6.5 weeks. Both the passive and violent incident rate decreased. (This contrasts with the rest of Changwat Nong Khai, within which the incident rate has remained approximately level.

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restricted area has not yet resulted in any significant increase of reports of infiltration or exfiltration through the area. Phu Sing--mentioned in the operations order, and considered a "warm" spot at that time by virtue of its being declared the center of a Target Area--appears to have cooled off considerably. Friendly forces in the area remain unchanged, except for the introduction of the Plan 9 system. Command-control relationships were altered somewhat, however, in that the Nong Khai CPM was advised by 2nd Army Forward, in Order 1/69 issued in mid-1969, that it would have direct control over all units except the Special Operations Center, which, in the restricted area, left only the BPP affected by the order; however, even the SOC could be requested for border security operations.

(U) (S) The practical effect of this order is unknown, since the opportunity for employment of the BPP or SOC by the CPM has not yet arisen. Lack of direct communications between the field elements requires, at the present time, that the CPM go through a higher headquarters of the organization, which offsets to some extent the potential advantages offered by the order.

C. Mission and Concept of Operation (U)

(U) In the operations order, the mission and concept of operations were broadly defined, and there is no basis for saying that these have changed. As the system developed, however, specific approaches to accomplishing the mission and techniques in order to particularize the concept have developed and crystallized, and--on occasion--have been reformulated. These developments are discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

D. The Plan 9 Area of Operations and the Location of Local Control Stations (U)

(U) (S) The Plan 9 document implied, and the Nong Khai CPM initially accepted, the concept of a relatively limited "border" area. The five-kilometer restricted area was regarded, first of all, as a sanitized zone, which would deny any local assistance to CTs attempting to pass through; and, second, as an area of operations within which an effective Plan 9 system would detect and apprehend these infiltrators. This view was indirectly underlined with publication of the September 1969 CPM field training order, which, in addition to establishing the training, expanded the restricted area from five kilometers to a depth of six kilometers inland from the river. The stated reason for this

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(U) ~~(S)~~ was to include in the area of operations all of the relatively low land up to Phu Wua, a high plateau that rises sharply from the surrounding terrain and forms a natural boundary for the northern half of the restricted area. Since this expansion incorporated no new villages into the restricted area, the CPM explanation can only imply that they considered the arbitrary five-kilometer-wide zone to be an official constraint on the movement of Plan 9 apprehension forces.

(U) ~~(S)~~ At about the same time as the training order was published, a preliminary apprehension paper analysis by SRI--based on what were considered idealized conditions (high detection rate and low headquarters' response times)--indicated that actual apprehension of reasonably cautious infiltrators within the original restricted area would be very difficult. Subsequently, the CPM began to explore a concept of Plan 9 regional control near the border, rather than an arbitrary, geographically limited border control. While the restricted area, as a six-kilometer sanitized zone, would remain as defined for purposes of population control, the Plan 9 area of tactical operations would be extended 15 kms inland as far as Phu Sing in order to permit greater flexibility and effectiveness in Plan 9 operations. For example, an infiltrating group--detected in the restricted area, and moving towards Phu Sing--could be tracked by an LCS Strike Force to and through Phu Wua, with the actual apprehension being made between the two hilly plateaus by previously alerted Target Area 2 VSUs or the Target Area Strike Force. Although not appearing in any official document, in practice there is evidence that the concept has been adopted, since three Special Action Force and two PP/VDC squads assigned to Target Area Two HQ under Plan 0910 were used in the Step Three FTX training. Operational squads of both the Amphoe CPMs were also included as response elements in these exercises.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The actual decisions as to the location of the LCSs at Bung Khla and Lao Luang underwent several cycles of rethinking. In the case of A. Bung Kan, the LCS locale was changed from Ban Bung Khla, which is centrally located in the Bung Kan half of the restricted area, to Ban Hat Hae, which is located almost at the A. Seka boundary. It was stated by the Nong Khai CPM officials that the more active infiltration routes lay close to Changwat Nakon Phanom, and it was believed practical to weight the center-of-force strength towards this area. This option, of course, weakened response capability in the furthest up-stream portion of the restricted area (especially during the rainy season, when river boat would be the only means of transportation), but the risk was recognized and accepted.

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(U) (C) Before construction of the LCS building at Lao Luang, consideration was given to changing the location to Ban Dong Suang, about one kilometer away. The tambon police station is located there and co-location of the two elements was considered an advantage. In addition, the distance to the river was less than that from the site originally selected in Lao Luang. Very soon afterward, however, the decision was reversed and construction was begun on a new site at Lao Luang, which had subsequently been selected by CPM officials. The reason for this change is not known; however, the ultimate site chosen is nearer the river than either of those previously selected, and this factor may have influenced the decision.

E. Supporting Operational Units (U)

(U) (C) Although direct support on the part of the Marine Police was emphasized in several sections of Operations Plan 9, their activity does not appear to differ substantially from that before the plan was published. The Marine Police continue to patrol regularly within their entire area of operations, but they have not maintained the continuous day and night patrolling of the river adjacent to the restricted area, as required in the plan. Moreover, they have not taken part in any of the CPM training exercises to date, except as observers. Similarly, the BPP and SOC, assigned a supporting role to Plan 9, have observed but not taken active part in any operations or joint training; nor do the means exist for direct communications between them and the Plan 9 elements in the restricted area.

F. Logistics (U)

(U) (C) With respect to budgetary items, the single largest item--per diem--has been paid, as required, to the Strike Forces and LCS staffs since they reported for duty in the restricted area. Informants were paid a per diem when they reported to an LCS for any of the scheduled field training. The Marine Police have received no allocation of their budgeted per diem funds to date; as mentioned, they have not participated officially in Plan 9 activities. It is not known which of the two factors--non-allocation or non-participation--is cause and which is consequence.

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(U) (C) Although Plan 9 did not specify a method of payment for village informants, a considerable amount was set aside for their remuneration. Assuming that the intention is to make payment in the form of rewards for information, and the fact that very few reports of suspect activity have been made since informants returned to their villages after the basic training program in mid-1969, it is unlikely that much of this amount has been disbursed.

(U) (C) In regard to equipment items, some of those budgeted are in the hands of Plan 9 elements, but by no means all. The headquarters buildings and living space have been constructed; the LCS boats have been built and the engines purchased. A few bicycles, no more than one per village, have been purchased for use by the village informants. However, no motorcycles have been furnished the various headquarters. Again, the reason for this is not known.

(U) (C) Non-budget items furnished by the RTG have been distributed in part. The FM-5 command radio net linking the BC HQ and LCSs is operating. So are the LCS - Strike Force nets. The village informant communications net presently includes only nine villages and the two LCSs. The CPM has stated that more radios are available, but that many village informants are reluctant to accept them because of the possibility of exposure of their role in Plan 9. The CPM further states, however, that no informant is more than a 15-minute bicycle ride from a radio.

(U) (C) Shotguns have been issued to all Strike Force volunteers, but no rifles. (The police in the Strike Force have the standard-issue personal weapons.) Village informants have received no shotguns, which were budgeted for in the operations plan. This was by CPM decision; apparently because the desirability of arming informants came to be questioned.

G. Intelligence (U)

(U) (C) The direct intelligence function is vested by Plan 9 primarily in the village informants; however, there has been some inconsistency and changing interpretation as to the nature of their role. The inconsistencies center on the question of whether the informants should operate in a covert or overt manner. The initial official interpretation, as demonstrated by lectures during the basic training, indicated that an under-

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cover modus operandi would be adopted. This view is logical if maximum effectiveness is to be achieved toward the objective of performing "intelligence functions against local CT activity," in particular the village infrastructure.

(U) ~~(S)~~ However, as the plan was implemented there were practical difficulties in regard to informants maintaining a covert role: the radio, unexplained absences from the village during training in Nong Khai, and subsequent field training, all made concealment of a government identity virtually impossible in a gregarious and open village environment. The CPM officials recognized this at the outset, but were desirous of retaining, as far as possible, the advantage of covert informants. At the present time, it is known that many informants are associated in the minds of their fellow villagers with the government; whether some have managed to conceal this association completely is not known.

#### H. Execution of Operations Plan 9 (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ Plan 9 implied, to some extent, a sequential nature in its phases of execution; in practice, however, there was considerable overlap. Phase One began immediately on publication of the Plan with the establishment of the five-kilometer restricted area. The census was begun, after the initial training courses at Nong Khai had been completed, and was conducted initially by Plan 9 personnel. The screening of restricted area residents is taking place informally, in the sense that village informants are responsible for reporting suspicious activities of the villagers. However, there is no evidence to suggest that the remainder of the Phase One Steps listed in the operations order--such as resettlement, special controls on newcomers, etc.--have been initiated. Thus, it is considered at the time of preparing this report that Phase One is still continuing.\*

(U) ~~(S)~~ Phase Two began officially during May 1968 with the recruiting of village volunteers for the first class of village informants. Assignment of 6 of the 22 police planned for the LCSs and Strike Forces was made prior to the Strike Force training in July. Equipment preparation was possible only after the equipment became available, and, in this respect, Phase Two also continues.

\* (U) The declaration of the restricted area, including controls on newcomers, was announced in the national newspapers on 21 August 1970.

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(U) (C) The formal training schedule, underestimated considerably in the operations plan as an effort of overall duration of a minimum of 15 days and a maximum of 30 days, ultimately required more than a year to complete. The LCS staff was not included in the plans for initial training as envisaged in Phase Two. Indeed, the full complement of personnel was not assigned to the LCSs until after their housing had been built, which was much later; and thus the LCSs could not be considered "established." In the interest of expediency, however, the CPM decided to complete training of the village volunteers as soon as possible, since they felt that they did not have time to wait for the establishment of the LCSs. Even so, there was a considerable delay, after approval of the operations plan, in obtaining the release of budgeted funds, with the result that work on the Nong Khai classroom and living facilities did not begin until April, 1969.

(U) (C) Basic training finally took place from mid-May through July 1969. Two sessions of three weeks' duration each were held for 140 village informants (70 in each session), followed by a four-week course for 40 Strike Force volunteers. In addition to the large classroom in a disused school next door to the CPM office and living quarters for the trainees, the facilities included an ample exercise yard, mess hall, and terrain suitable for field exercises adjoining a nearby airfield. The Changwat CPM officials carried a major portion of the training load, including the planning and supervision. Other instructors, all experienced in their subjects but not necessarily experienced as teachers, were drawn from police, paramilitary, and civil service personnel.

(U) (C) Prior to the completion of the scheduled basic training sessions, however, the CPM recognized the need for training in the field, and CSOC concurred. Major reasons for this decision were that the LCSs had not yet been built, the communications systems had not been established, the headquarters' staff assignments had not been completed, and it was felt that the practical exercise included in the Nong Khai basic training had been insufficient to make the village informant and Strike Force trainees proficient in their respective duties. In addition, other operational units to be employed under Plan 9--the Marine Police, BPP, SOC, and VSU--had received no training in tactics for border security operations, and it was felt that some form of joint training exercises was required to efficiently employ this support. Thus, in September of 1969 an operations order was issued by the Nong Khai CPM, which called for this additional training.

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(U) (C) The order envisaged three training steps. The purpose of Step One was intended to be a review of basic training for village informant, Strike Force, and LCS staffs, but in a field context, with emphasis on practical demonstrations. Step Two was conceived as a command post exercise (CPX), using headquarters staffs at the BC HQ and LCSs to improve their command-control communications performance in the solution of administrative and operational problems. Reference was also made to the inclusion of the supporting BPP, VSU, PP,\* and SOC command elements in the exercises. Step Three describes initial field training exercises (FTX), designed to improve movement and tactical capabilities of Strike Forces and supporting reaction forces, followed by full-scale, combined CPX and FTX for the entire Plan 9 system.

(U) (C) The schedule as presented by the operations order was:

Step One	15 October - 15 November, 1969
Step Two	1 December, 1969 - 31 January, 1970
Step Three	10 February - 30 April, 1970

(U) (C) It was recognized, however, that field training of this type had never before been attempted outside major RTA formations, and the CPM decided that the Plan 9 trainees should be given elementary practice in field training procedures. Therefore, after publication of the field training order, Step Zero was added to the training activities to ensure a good start to Step One; it was scheduled for a two-week period just prior to Step One. As actually implemented, however, only three days of training took place at each LCS. Participation was limited to a very small number of trainees, including the Strike Force and informants (the few police who were on hand had not yet been assigned specific responsibilities). The course of instruction consisted entirely of a review of basic training subjects.

(U) (C) Step One training actually began in November 1969, with a ten-day course at the LCSs at Lao Luang. A second week of Step One training, at the Hat Hae LCS, took place in late December. Like Step Zero, Step One again emphasized the review and augmentation of certain elements of the basic training program, with the only change being the inclusion of newly-formed skeletonized LCS staffs.

(U) (C) \* Despite this reference in the training order, the only PP unit in the Plan 9 area-- the Tambon Police Station at Dong Suang which was built and staffed during 1969-- was not included in the field exercises, and there has never been any other evidence to infer that it was intended to contribute to Plan 9, other than the fact that its commander became the Lao Luang LCS commander, while still retaining his police responsibility.

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(U) (C) Since the CPM did not feel that the system personnel were sufficiently prepared to engage in CPX training, another addition to the training plans outlined in Plan 9, called Step One-and-a-Half, was scheduled for January 1970. The purpose of this training was to outline standing operating procedures (SOP) and familiarize the trainees with the procedures of a CPX. The training course, which included practice CPX scenarios, was implemented in February 1970.

(U) (C) The Step Two CPX, as finally formulated, provided a training period of only one week at each of the LCSs. Of this period, only three days were devoted to actual CPX activities. The first CPX, at Ban Lao Luang, took place the last week in March; the second at Ban Hat Hae, previously scheduled for early April, was ultimately postponed until early June. Finally, a one-week Step Three combined CPX and FTX was accomplished the last week in June. On the first of July, the Plan 9 system was considered to have entered Phase Three and the system was regarded as operational.

(U) (C) No formal steps were taken to enter Phase Four during the period of field observation, ending 30 June, 1970. However, in July the Nong Khai CPM was making plans for a special three-week training course scheduled to be conducted at Nong Khai in August, indicating the beginning of this phase.

I. Overall Plan 9 Schedule Changes (U)

(U) (C) At this stage it is appropriate to review the actual implementation of the four operational phases of Plan 9 in conjunction with the original and adjusted schedules, which have been explained in Section D, and to outline the concurrent SRI evaluation activities which were necessarily paced by the rate at which the operation progressed.

(U) (C) The planned, adjusted and actual dates of these four phases are shown in summary form at Table 1. From this it will be seen that D-Day--the commencement of field operations--was ultimately postponed by twelve and a half months, from mid-June 1969 to 1 July 1970. The basic reason for this slippage was the enlargement of the basic training schedule and the introduction of a comprehensive field training program, other contributory factors being the delays in building and staffing the Local Control Stations, as explained in Section D. Moreover, except for a limited amount of census activity, Phase Two was not implemented until after the completion of Phase One.


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Table 1  
PLANNED VERSUS ACTUAL IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASES OF PLAN 9 IN CONJUNCTION WITH SRI EVALUATION



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(v) (c) Since the SRI field evaluation program under the BCS contract was terminated on 30 June 1970, this had to be related essentially with the framework of the Phase Two implementation of Plan 9. The evaluation activities carried out by SRI are summarized at the bottom of Table 1. These will be explained in detail in the next chapter, but it is to be noted here that it ultimately proved impossible to undertake the operational tests required for analysis because Phase Three of Plan 9 was not initiated during the evaluation period. Thus, the comprehensive program of operational tests of the surveillance, CPX and Strike Force response times, planned from April through June 1970, had to be curtailed to coincide with the latter stages of field training under Phase Two; i.e., before Plan 9 became operational, rather than afterwards as planned, and required.

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#### IV PLAN 9 EVALUATION (U)

##### A. Introduction (U)

###### 1. Objective (U)

(U) (C) The primary objective of this evaluation is to specify and document estimates of the effectiveness and costs of the Plan 9 system in relation to its mission and objectives subject to data that could be acquired through tests and observation. Suggestions for system effectiveness improvements are also to be provided, to assist operational staff involved in implementation of the plan.

###### 2. Scope (U)

(U) (C) The preceding two sections have described, first, Operations Plan 9 itself as written, and, second, the configuration of the plan as of June 1970. The evaluation presented in this section, it must be stressed, applies only to the development and operations of Plan 9 to that date.

(U) (C) This evaluation is drawn from a large body of material, both qualitative and quantitative, which has been collected since the beginning of SRI's association with the Plan 9 system. The qualitative source material is in the form of many trip reports, logs, journals, interview narratives, and standardized reporting forms used in the field. The quantitative material is drawn from data collected over the evaluation period consisting of performance tests and environmental descriptions and from the analyses of these data. Quantifiable source material within the aforementioned qualitative reports was also numerically processed and analyzed.

###### 3. Approach and Methodology (U)

(U) (C) From the outset it was intended that the research effort would be limited to an evaluation of the degree to which the stated Plan 9 operational missions and objectives were met, or appeared likely to be met, based upon tests and observations during both the training and operational phases. However, as stated in the preceding chapter, Phases Three and Four--the operational phases--of Plan 9 were not achieved during

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(U) (C) the period of SRI's data collection and observations. Therefore, the research objective could only partially be met.

(U) (C) The missions, operational concepts and accompanying factors of accomplishment as stated in the Plan 9 document, including factors implicit in the plan, are summarized at Table 2 together with an outline of the SRI research methodology. The latter consists of two parts:

a. Evaluation Factors (U)

(U) (C) This part is an itemization of those factors considered feasible for evaluation through tests and observation within the framework of the original Plan 9 operations order, and which would yield necessary and sufficient data for a comprehensive assessment of the plan in relation to its given missions, objectives, and factors of accomplishment.

b. Basis of Evaluation (U)

(U) (C) This part identifies the methods of evaluating these factors, first as "planned"-- which was to be a succession of tests and observation progressing through training and operations of separate functional small units to the full integrated operation--and, second, as the evaluation was actually carried out. As given in Table 2, the evaluations reported herein are based necessarily and largely upon experienced judgement together with whatever quantitative data gathered during the training phase that could be extrapolated to the operational phase, since the latter phase was not reached during the evaluation period.

(U) (C) The sections that follow discuss in detail the assessment of Plan 9 in relation to the factors actually evaluated through 30 June 1970.

B. Operational Readiness (U)

1. Personnel (U)

a. Recruitment (U)

(U) (C) Full evaluation of the procedures of selecting and recruiting village volunteers is difficult, inasmuch as this activity was not observed.\* However, based on discussions with

\* (U) See Appendix A, page A-2, for description of trainees' backgrounds.

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**Table 7**  
**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CSOC OPERATIONS PLAN 9 AND SRI PLANNED AND ACTUAL EVALUATIONS (U)**  
**SRI RESEARCH PLAN 9 EVALUATION TASK**

Objects	Factor of Accomplishment	Evaluations	Planned	Actual
<p><b>A. Missions</b>                      Counter-intel                      Public security                      External logistics interdiction</p> <p><b>3. Operational Concepts</b>                      Local intelligence                      Continuous patrolling                      Psyops and civic action*</p>	<p><b>Factor of Accomplishment</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Careful informant selection</li> <li>2. Strict force mobility</li> <li>3. Compatible communications</li> <li>4. Inter-agency cooperation</li> <li>5. Effective psyops</li> <li>6. Prompt payment of emoluments</li> <li>7. Training**</li> <li>8. Equipment**</li> <li>9. Operational tactics*</li> <li>10. Cash</li> </ol>	<p><b>Evaluations</b></p> <p><b>A. Operational Readiness</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Personnel                             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Recruitment</li> <li>b. Training</li> </ol> </li> <li>2. Logistics</li> </ol> <p><b>B. Operational Effectiveness</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Early Warning (Intelligence)                             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Surveillance</li> <li>b. Command/control/communications</li> </ol> </li> <li>2. Apprehension (Interdiction)                             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Detection</li> <li>b. Command/control communications</li> <li>c. Intercept</li> </ol> </li> </ol> <p><b>C. Village Impact of Plan 9</b></p> <p><b>D. Cash</b></p> <p><b>E. Cost Effectiveness Comparison and System Potential</b></p>	<p><b>Planned</b></p> <p>Records, questionnaire                      Observation, experienced judgment                      Operational record as to adequacy</p> <p>Individual field tests during training and operational phases. Comparison with field data from other similar tests, e.g. MGS, and with pre-Plan 9 test data. Full system tests during operational phase</p> <p>Field surveys of village attitudes in Plan 9 area compared with a control area</p> <p>Comparison of actual Plan 9 training and operational costs with current costs of border security</p> <p>Individual field test data to be compared with full system tests, and with current non-Plan 9 capabilities and costs</p>	<p><b>Actual</b></p> <p>As planned                      As planned                      No operational data - judgment based on training phase data</p> <p>Tests carried out during training phase produced data of limited direct applicability to operating effectiveness, and were considered insufficient for comparison with other similar tests. Experienced judgment based on test data gathered during training phase compared with similar pre-Plan 9 test data</p> <p>Surveys limited to impact during training phase only</p> <p>Comparison of cost data based only on training costs and assumptions of operational costs</p> <p>No full system tests conducted during contract period. Cost comparisons and estimates of system potential based on judgment of limited test data only.</p>

\* (U) SRI did not plan to evaluate psyops and civic action because other ARPA contractors had been assigned research projects in these fields.

\*\* (U) Mentioned under "Factor of Accomplishment" in Plan 9 order and implicit in missions.

• (U) Not specifically listed in Plan 9 but implied in mission and operational concepts.

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the Nong Khai CPM officials before and after the selection of volunteers, and on written responses from the selectees themselves, the following comments can be made:

- (1) The concept of the covert village informant constrained considerably the selection and recruiting of this group of village volunteers. Contact with the potential selectee had to be made with discretion and was conditioned by a high chance of his accepting. Recognizing this, the responsibility for recruiting was delegated eventually to the kamnan or puyaiban\* who could be expected to have personal knowledge of the potential selectees. Once trainees had been recruited, there was no evidence to indicate that any of them were dropped from the system because of low performance.
- (2) Selection and recruiting, particularly before the first basic training course (only one week), was handicapped by the limited time available. Some of the recruits for the first course were not volunteers, but were virtually drafted. This was not the case for the second informant course, and the general motivational level of these trainees was considered to be higher.
- (3) For the Strike Force there were more volunteers than openings, but despite this there were no standardized screening processes with respect to the physical, mental and moral standards necessary for the trainee to carry out his responsibilities. The level of recruit obtained, however, was relatively high compared with the informants.

\* (U) A kamnan is a tambon leader; a puyaiban is a village headman.

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(U) (C) In summary, recruiting was carried out reasonably satisfactorily under the constraints of time and concept. However, village volunteer selectees did include some of lower caliber who might otherwise have been eliminated with the use of screening measures.

b. Training\* (U)

(1) General (U)

(U) (C) It was recognized from the start that the Plan 9 system training function was to play an important role. The Plan 9 document contained nothing specific about training activities other than that they would be accomplished within a 15 to 30-day period, nor was a training program included in the published plan. When the first training order was issued, some seven months later, no real progress had been made toward developing specific objectives and tactics suitable for border security operations. Consequently, it was left to the training instructors to formulate, as best they could, the objectives and tactics as they went along.

(U) (C) As detailed in Appendix 'A' and the Training Report, this put a great strain on the CPM time and personnel resources, especially since construction of an adequate training program proved much more difficult than anticipated. Generally, the training activities were not adequately prepared in advance; there were not enough instructors; the planned dates for initiating training periods were always slipped; and their planned duration was invariably shortened. This is not to say that the personnel responsible for the training were indifferent or unmotivated; on the contrary, they were extremely interested and dedicated. However, there were a number of limitations beyond their control accounting for results that were less than expected or desired. There was little, if any, precedent for the operations plan and the training program, and, further, the Plan 9 organizers were generally inexperienced in the planning of training. Everyone associated with Plan 9 had at least one other full-time responsibility. Administrative support of the CPM also left much to be desired; for example, training aid requests through normal RTG channels met with long delays and many requested items did not arrive in time for use.

\* (U) A complete description of the development and conduct of the Plan 9 training program is presented in The Training Report, together with a detailed critique and suggestions for future improvement. The evaluation presented here summarizes the major findings and conclusions. Supplementary material to this evaluation is contained in Appendix 'A'.

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(2) Basic Training (U)

(U) ~~(C)~~ Training objectives were set forth in the CPM basic training order covering the use of weapons; tactical operations; C<sup>3</sup> system; protection of local stations, villages, and village informants; psychological operations techniques; intelligence; and knowledge of insurgent activities.\*

(U) ~~(C)~~ The syllabi developed to accomplish the objectives lacked balance as to instructional priorities. The attempt was to cover too much ground, leaving insufficient time for training in core subjects essential to the discharge of the trainees' responsibilities. In the informant courses, very little instruction on observation and reporting SOP was included; in the Strike Force course, a great deal of time was devoted to formation drills and not nearly enough to ambush tactics and procedures.

(U) ~~(C)~~ The arrangement of the instructional hours over the training period presented obstacles to learning. These timetables did not have the proper sequence and tempo necessary to keep trainees motivated and eager to learn; at times they became saturated.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Instructors were difficult to find; in the informant courses, many were inexperienced and made no advance preparation of their lesson. The Strike Force instructors, on the other hand, were quite competent, the BPP instructors in particular being of high professional standard. The ratio of trainees to instructors was generally far too high.

(U) ~~(C)~~ The training facilities themselves were quite satisfactory. There was adequate classroom and living space prepared for them in Nong Khai, and a short distance away a demonstration and practical exercise area was readily available.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Training aids were inadequate; the training syllabi did suggest particular aids but few were actually used except blackboard and chalk. Even this was not exploited to full effect by all instructors. Radios and weapons were made available for demonstrations, but no training ammunition was available, a particular deficiency in the Strike Force course. This was primarily a logistical support problem; requests for aids and ammunition were initiated in the planning stages by the CPM, but were not satisfied.

\* (U) See Appendix 'A', page A-4, for details.

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(U) (C) Results of the first village informant course left much room for improvement. It was estimated at the end of this training period that only approximately two out of five trainees understood enough about what had been taught to enable them to carry out their Plan 9 responsibilities on return to their villages. It was estimated that about 60% of the second-course trainees absorbed enough, however, to carry out their responsibilities with some degree of competence.

(U) (C) Aside from the syllabus and scheduling deficiencies which were general to all courses, the Strike Force course was relatively well conducted. This was primarily because of more-professional instructors, and higher-caliber, more strongly motivated volunteers. It is estimated by observers of the SF training that fully 90% of this group returned to the LCS with an understanding of the essentials necessary to carry out their responsibilities, insofar as these had been covered. (An exception to this generalization was their inability to properly read a map.)

(U) (C) During the training program the village informant did learn, often indirectly, some idea of the Plan 9 concept and the fact that he was to observe and report suspicious movements and activity in his village area, but there was insufficient emphasis or clarification in the training program on the specific role of trainees in gathering information when they returned to their village. It was not made clear to them whether they should remain within their village, obtaining information as they went about their normal routine, or leave the village to seek information; whether they should establish a local informant network; or whether they should maintain occasional routine surveillance in and around their villages. The division of responsibility between the five informants in each village and their co-operation or coordination was not explained.

(U) (C) A final, and perhaps most important, point was that although most infiltration and exfiltration takes place during the night, and this presents special problems to both village informants and Strike Forces in carrying out their responsibilities, night training was neither scheduled nor implemented.



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(3) Field Training (U)

(a) Objectives (U)

(U) (C) The objectives of the field training exercises, according to the CPM training order, were as follows: development of operational techniques, SOP, and tactics; familiarization with operational areas; follow-up training on tactics and procedures; improving the technical proficiency of informants and personnel in the Strike Forces and other operational units; group training; providing a foundation for advanced recurrent unit training; and, finally, producing a body of written doctrine for application to other border areas.\* The overall mission stated in the field training order was "to have all integral and associated elements of Plan 9 tactically proficient and operationally ready for full-scale border control operations by 1 May 1970."

(b) Program (U)

(U) The field training was scheduled to be carried out in three phases, later extended to five, as detailed in Chapter III H. above, including a brief description of how this training was carried out. A more detailed description is given in Appendix A. An evaluation of the training results achieved follows.

(c) Evaluation (U)

(U) (C) The method adopted to assess the Plan 9 field training program, with its five rather complex and sometimes overlapping stages, is to compare the overall results achieved with the mission and objectives summarized at 3 (a) above and spelled out individually in the paragraphs that follow.

(U) (C) a. Objective No. 1--development of operational techniques, communications and SOP for the LCSs and BC HQ--was largely realized, although further training was necessary, particularly in the decision-making, response and reporting functions.

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\* (U) The detailed objectives are given in Appendix A, pp. A-28 and A-29.

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b. (C) Little headway had been made toward meeting Objectives Two and Three--border operational tactics, designation of operational areas and establishment of preselected ambush points within those areas. Although it was intended to pursue these goals after the Step Three exercises, the problem of control over or coordination with the VSUs, BPP and SOC units in the Plan 9 area had not been resolved and specific boundaries could not, therefore, be established. Attempts were made during Steps Two and Three to cover the area ambush principles enunciated in the training order annex. Since specific points had not been established, the vectoring of forces in exercises had to concentrate on obvious landmarks such as villages or road and river intersections. Failing these, UTM coordinates were used, which were meaningless as none of the units participating could read a map with such precision. In regard to other tactics, considerable effort was devoted in the exercises to ambushes on advance information, with good results, although there was not enough emphasis on night operations. No attempt was made, however to establish and test systems of area information, external information and calling for external assistance. These again were still considered to be desirable objectives for future planning and training.

(U)  
c. (C) Objectives 4, 6 and 7--follow-up to the basic training, and individual and team training--were partially realized in regard to the Strike Forces. In particular, their knowledge and practice of ambush procedures were augmented and improved, but their map-reading capability never approached the required standard. Another point to be made is that about two weeks' training in what was really revision or augmentation of basic subjects was given to the SFs during field training, thus supporting the original inference that the four-week basic program was inadequate. The performance of the Strike Force PP leaders, as revealed from the exercises, was that one was good (Hat Hae), whereas the other was poor. (This was also the opinion expressed by responsible CPM officials, although not specifically mentioned during the Step Three debriefing.) Careful selection of leaders is an obvious requirement in the formation of any further Strike Forces.

(U)  
d. (C) The development of informants' technical proficiency in observation and reporting--Objective 5--did not receive much attention. After a short reiteration to about a half of the informants in Steps Zero and One on the map reading, radio procedure and elementary surveillance subjects already given in the basic training program, the informants were thenceforth somewhat neglected--no more than ten of them being

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used in the subsequent three training steps. In general, the informants' proficiency in using a radio remained low, and their ability to find and report a location on a map was virtually zero. The informants who took part in the field training showed that they had not assimilated or retained their basic training sufficiently, a contributory cause apparently being the long break in momentum between the basic and field training sessions. In addition, it was impossible for the small staff available to supervise them properly, raising once again the unwieldiness of the informant concept as implemented. In retrospect, in any similar border security training programs it would appear better to stage the informant basic training after that of the SF in order to ensure continuity and thus, to a certain extent, motivation.

e. (u) (S) The field exercises did not reveal flaws in the operational concepts-- Objective 8--since these concepts were not really practiced or tested.

f. (u) (S) It was the consensus of the CPM officials and SRI observers that the field exercises had produced a foundation for advanced, recurrent unit training-- Objective 9; also that there was a need for such further training to correct the mistakes and omissions noted from the field training experience.

g. (u) (S) In regard to Objective 10--written tactical doctrine--it is not yet known if the CPM or CSOC will produce a written appreciation of the Plan 9 operation for application to other border areas. It is hoped that The Training Report will be considered useful for this purpose.

h. (u) (S) The overall mission--to have all integral and associated elements of Plan 9 tactically proficient and operationally ready for full-scale border security operations by 1 May 1970--was partially realized by 1 July 1970 with respect to the integral elements, namely, the LCSs, SFs, BC HQ and, to a lesser extent, the village informants. The associated elements--BPP, VSUs, SOC, and Marine Police--were not exercised or tested in the field training, nor were any specific C<sup>3</sup> arrangements made to facilitate coordination of their operations with Plan 9 units. It is still the intention of the CPM to integrate all operational assets into a single border security system--covering perhaps a greater area and more units than originally envisaged in the Plan 9 order. When this will be done is not known. Until then, Plan 9 and its implementation must be regarded as yet another addition to the several border security operations conducted separately by

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the BPP, SOC, Marine Police and VSUs--all in the same area. Orders have been given, and often repeated--ever since the 2nd Army Operation Order No. 5 of December 1967--that unified border security operations should be carried out. None of these orders have been properly enforced, nor can they be until compatible communications are provided and a strong, well-supported, and well-supervised command/control system firmly established and maintained. Plan 9 provides a base upon which to build such a system, but it requires the participation of the other RTG units in its operational area, i.e., those shown as support units in Fig. 2.

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i. In summary, it can be stated that the field training program did not fully meet its mission and objectives. This was not so much because the 20 to 24 weeks of planned training had to be reduced to 12 weeks in practice, but because of the facts that:

- (1) The plans for basic training were not as well thought out or developed as they should have been. As a result, execution of the plans was ragged and could not be rectified for more than a relatively few trainees during the field exercises.
- (2) The local operational staff were inexperienced in planning and implementing CPX and FTX.
- (3) The innovation of training and organizing villagers as informants, linked with an operational response system, was bound to require much experimentation and correction before it could be made to work.
- (4) Other RTG units in the Plan 9 operational area did not participate in the field training as planned.

Despite these shortcomings, it is not suggested that the field training was a failure. In hindsight, the mission and objectives were clearly too ambitious for accomplishment in view of the time allowed, the facilities and staff available and, above all, the experimental nature of the plan itself. As matters stand, these objectives can be accomplished, based upon the valuable experience of the field exercises, if the CPM (and CSOC) persists

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with whatever further training is necessary, followed by occasional operational readiness testing to maintain alertness and response. To produce a fully integrated system of all operational assets, however, the Nong Khai CPM will have to be given sufficient muscle, in the form of very specific and comprehensive orders, and equipment (communications), to enforce its writ among all the units separately and variously involved in border security operations at the present time in the changwat area.

i. (U) (S) A final point to be stressed in regard to the field training program is the long delay in building the LCSs and establishing fully their staffs. This caused the overall training period to be extended by at least four months. In addition, the LCS staffs had no chance of acquainting themselves with the majority of informants they were to handle. The lesson for the future is that the LCS buildings should be constructed at the beginning (if no other building is available) and the staff formed up in time to take part in all training with the informants in order to develop the intimate personal relationships necessary for effective operation.

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2. Logistics (U)

(U) (C) Provision of equipment required by the Plan 9 field elements remains a problem. There is no doubt that a large part of the difficulties in logistical support lies outside the Plan 9 system: response to requests by the CPM has ranged from slow to no response at all. It is less clear to what extent these channels have been stimulated, or even whether such stimulation is productive in terms of faster response. To be sure, some of the equipment originally budgeted has not been distributed because of command decisions. For example, as the village informant concept firmed up, arming the informants came to be considered not only unnecessary but quite probably undesirable, and the proposed shotguns were never delivered. As for tactical operations, some items deemed necessary to equip the field units (such as motorcycles for the LCS and BC HQ and compatible radios for communications with supporting security forces) are not yet in the hands of these units. Whether of internal or external origin, somewhere in the logistical chain there remains a problem of support for the Plan 9 operation.

(U) (C) Maintenance of equipment already on hand is another serious problem for the Plan 9 system. For example, the engines on both the LCS motor launches were unusable for at least two months--during the May field testing and June training periods. It is not known when the engines initially required repairs. However, they were inoperative at the start of the rainy season, and without boats the Strike Forces can move only slowly, if at all. Reports have also been made of village informants' radios that are inoperative because of run-down batteries. Each LCS and the Border Control Headquarters has an S1/S4, as does the Nong Khai CPM, and although the reasons for these difficulties are not known, the system as a whole suffers from lack of maintenance on equipment items necessary to operations.

(U) (C) Budgeted per diem payment to the Headquarters staff and Strike Forces has been generally satisfactory, although there have been a few complaints of late per diem payments. It is judged that the situation for Plan 9, in this respect, is little different from that of other military and paramilitary units.

(U) (C) Payment to the village informant is another matter. Although Plan 9 did not specify that the money budgeted for payment to the village informants would be a monthly retainer, it is apparent that at the outset the informants had expected that this would be

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the case. However, the CPM has always stated that rewards for information were to be the basis for payment; a lecture to this effect was included in the basic training. One or two payments were made to some informants soon after they returned from their basic training; whether these were made as salary or as reward is unknown. No payments have been made since. This, coupled with the fact that the apparently low present infiltration rate has provided virtually no opportunity for any informant to receive payment for valuable information, has created a morale problem. Whether the informant's initial expectation of receiving a regular remuneration was authorized or unauthorized has little to do with the problem at hand. The fact remains that when recruited, he did expect to receive regular salary; he has not received it and is disappointed; and this can hardly increase his motivation to do an effective job.

C. Operational Effectiveness (U)

(U) (C) As indicated in Tables 1 and 2, an initial estimate of the effectiveness of the Plan 9 system was planned to be accomplished through performance tests and observations of the system elements as they were being exercised in their separate functions during the training phase. This series of tests was then to be followed by another series of tests of the partially, then fully, integrated system during the final field training exercises, and of the full system during the operational phase of this Plan. The full system tests were intended for the purpose of obtaining data on the degree to which the system elements actually operate in concert and to see if the individual element performances changed as the result of interaction between functions, especially those of command and control.

(U) (C) The required Plan 9 operations, explicitly stated under the Plan 9 Operational Concept, were the collection of information (called local intelligence in the Plan), patrolling, and psyops and civic action. The plan's mission statement implies operations to counter infiltration, provide public security, and interdict external logistics of the insurgents. These explicit and implicit operations (except psyops and civic action) were structured by the SRI analysts into a set of sequenced, conditionally-related functions describing the way in which the system was visualized to operate. These were:

- (1) Surveillance - to be performed by a network of village informants in order to provide general alerting information to local security force commanders on local activities suspected of being insurgent related.

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- (2) Detection - to be performed again by the village informants but also by patrolling security forces to provide specific reports of infiltration sightings or sightings of other insurgent movements as these are occurring.
- (3) Command-Control-Communications (C<sup>3</sup>) - to be exercised by command elements of the system in order to receive the surveillance and detection reports, evaluate them, and direct the ensuing interdiction operations.
- (4) Intercept - to be performed by the security force units on command in order to counter infiltration attempts and interdict insurgent logistics.

(U)(S) By grouping these functions in the way in which they are integrated operationally it is possible to analytically assess the system effectiveness through combining the results of individual function tests and sub-function tests. The results of these analytical assessments can then be compared with results from overall system operational tests as data from such tests become available.

(U)(S) The two groupings of the above functions which describe the Plan 9 operations (except for psyops and civic action) are called for purposes of this study "Early Warning" and "Apprehension".

(U)(S) Early warning is the combination of surveillance and C<sup>3</sup> functions, namely the collection, transmission and assessment of information, relative to insurgent movement and activity in the area, so that the command element can learn of potential trouble spots in order to make timely response, including tactical deployment and redeployment. Apprehension involves the detection, C<sup>3</sup> and intercept response to suspicious movements and activities, that leads to the interdiction of insurgents. In the absence of actual infiltration information, the discussion in this section will be based on data obtained from field testing conducted in association with Plan 9, as well as observation of the training activity.

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1. Early Warning (U)

(U) (C) The Plan 9 system's early warning capability is defined as its ability to make reports of (1) detected targets, and (2) the beginning or growing of an infrastructure within the villages. Infrastructure reporting performance was not tested as the very nature of the problem, and the administrative difficulties involved, made such testing unfeasible. Extensive field testing was carried out to obtain estimates of the capability of villagers as inhabitants of the area to fulfill the surveillance function and to make reports concerning infiltration attempts under various conditions. The procedures and results of the tests used to estimate the early warning effectiveness are given below.

a. Surveillance (U)

(U) (C) Surveillance and reporting tests were conducted during three periods:

(1) The first tests took place within the restricted area during the summer of 1969 before the LCSs had been established. Their purpose was to establish a reference base of reporting capability in a representative security force environment, without an operational Plan 9 system.

(2) The second tests, occurring in March and April 1970, were conducted outside the restricted area in amphoes Phon Pi Si and Bung Kan, of C. Nong Khai, and attempted to obtain reference estimates with respect to variables not included in the first phase.

(3) The third and final tests were conducted in May 1970, inside the restricted area, and with the Plan 9 system elements in position.

(U) (C) Test methodology consisted of using groups of simulated infiltrators, who were strangers to the area, to traverse typical infiltration routes. Trips began aboard a boat, which travelled downstream to a disembarkation point; on leaving the boat, groups continued by foot on an inland route, to an objective about 5 kilometers inland. A data collector travelled with each group, recording the number of people within his view along the way (the assumption being that this would be a reasonable estimate of the number of persons who could see the simulated infiltrators). Additional data collectors were posted with selected security units to record sighting reports that might be received there. The number of reports received by security units to number of persons seen was defined as the reporting ratio.

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(U) (S) Table 3 summarizes the overall reporting data for small, inconspicuous infiltration groups travelling during the day and generally avoiding villages. A comparison of Test Period 3 results with the other two indicates that the Plan 9 reporting ratio is considerably higher than that obtained from the same or different areas without Plan 9.\*

(U) (S) Night trials were also conducted during test periods 1 and 3 for the small groups. Table 4 summarizes these data; it can be seen that no reports have ever been received at night, before or after Plan 9.

(U) (S) Table 3  
**DAYTIME INFILTRATION REPORTING RATIOS (U)**  
(Small, inconspicuous groups)

Test Period	Kilometers Travelled	Persons Encountered	Reports Received	Reporting Ratio**
1. Restricted area before Plan 9	712	3,422	5*	0.0015
2. Outside restricted area	58	238	1	0.0042
3. Restricted area after Plan 9	86	261	4	0.0153

(U) \* (S) Due to an incorrect initial assumption that all security units would forward sighting reports to higher headquarters and because data collection personnel were limited, test results were recorded only at these headquarters--and only one report was received there. After Phase 1 was completed, security units were canvassed, and four additional reports were known to have been received that might be attributed to the simulated infiltration teams. There may have been other reports, but it is unlikely that these were of sufficient number to raise the reporting rate high enough to change the inference to be drawn from the table.

\*\* (U) Reporting ratio is defined as number of reports received by security units divided by local inhabitants encountered by simulated infiltrators.

\* (U) However, the difference in reporting ratios presented is not statistically significant. It could be just a fortuitous outcome.

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(U)  
(C) NIGHTTIME INFILTRATION REPORTING RATIOS (U)  
(Small, inconspicuous groups)

Test Period	Kilometers Travelled	Persons Encountered	Reports Received	Reporting Ratio
1. Restricted area before Plan 9	313.6	110	0	0
3. Restricted area after Plan 9	64.9	11	0	0

(U)  
(C) A large 20-man group, carrying arms and equipment to represent an obvious, incursive group, was also tested during Test Period 2. Day and night reporting ratios for these tests are presented in Table 5. The daytime non-Plan 9 reporting rate for the incursive group is an order of magnitude greater than for the small infiltration group, which, considering the expected number of people to be encountered, assures that a very high proportion of such groups would be reported. (It was assumed that the hypothesized additional Plan 9 capability would not degrade this high reporting rate in the restricted area; for this reason, 20-man daytime tests were not conducted during Test Period 3.)

(U)  
(C) INFILTRATION REPORTING RATIOS FOR LARGE GROUPS (U)  
(Large, obvious incursive groups, outside restricted area)

	Kilometers Travelled	Persons Encountered	Reports Received	Reporting Ratio
Day	61.3	113	11	0.097
Night	86.9	44*	1	0.023

(U)\* (C) This figure includes several large villager groups encountered by the simulated infiltrators. One group in particular, comprised of 26 people, is suspect data, in that there is reason to believe that a real incursive group could probably have avoided these people; eliminating this count would more than double the night reporting rate estimate indicated above.

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(U) (C) Contents of reports received by the security forces were examined to determine the accuracy of two important infiltrator group characteristics--number in the group and number of weapons. Table 6 summarizes these data for daytime sightings. Most of the group size estimates were within one of the true number. Weapon counts were not reported most of the time but, when they were, the estimate was within one of the actual number.

(U) (C) Table 6  
INFILTRATION REPORT ACCURACY (U)  
(Daytime sightings)

	Large, Incurive Group	Small Group
Number of reports	12	5
Number of reports containing group size estimate	11*	5
Average number actually in group	19.5	4
Average number reported	19.0	4
Range of numbers reported	10-30	3-6
Number of reports containing weapon count	4**	3
Number of actual weapons	2	0
Average number weapons reported	2.5	.7
Range of numbers reported	2-3	0-1

\* (U) The twelfth report said "10 or more people."

\*\* (U) In one additional report, the observer said he "saw weapons, but couldn't count them."

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b. Command/Control/Communications - C<sup>3</sup> (U)

(U) (C) No direct tests or observations of the C<sup>3</sup> function in the operational phase were made. The command echelon personnel were heavily involved in unit training and field exercises during the majority of the evaluation period. The limited full system field training and research exercises, commencing at the end of evaluation period, provided a few observations made by SRI's Thai research assistant observers. Solely on the basis of these observations reported to SRI's analysts, a preliminary assessment is made that considerably more training and operational exercises are needed before the Plan 9 operational staffs could be considered proficient at assessing surveillance reports and deciding appropriate responses such as tactical redeployment of patrols to enhance the probability of subsequent apprehensions. It is believed that a basic understanding of their roles has been gained by the LCS staffs as evidenced by their performance reported during the field training and research exercises conducted from late March through June 1970. The mission and structure of the LCSs and the BC HQ appear satisfactory.

(U) (C) Communications were judged adequate between the command echelons. But communications netting of the village informants was not fully implemented and, at best, was marginal for reasons of transmission and maintenance problems. Delay times, although not critical for the Early Warning operation, are considered excessive (see Table 8 following under Apprehension where they contribute significantly to poor performance of this operation).

c. Overall Early Warning Effectiveness (U)

(U) (C) An objective evaluation of the early warning effectiveness of Plan 9 can not be made because of incomplete data. However, two important judgements can be made concerning observed inherent deficiencies of the present system as follows:

- Night time surveillance capability for small incursive groups can be expected to be nil.
- Village informant communications nets must be improved to encourage informants to report fully.

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2. Apprehension (U)

(U) (C) The measure of apprehension effectiveness employed is the probability of intercepting an infiltrating group, given that the response stimulus is an immediate sighting (or target detection). The overall probability of apprehension is equivalent to the product of the probability of detection and the conditional probability of intercept, given that detection has taken place. The latter two probabilities will be discussed and assessed, in turn, as they apply to the Plan 9 area. In all cases, the infiltrating groups will be assumed to be using reasonably cautious tactics. They will move through the area as quickly as possible, avoiding villages, but following trails, particularly in forested areas. It is also assumed that large incursive groups will attempt to avoid villagers, while small inconspicuous groups will not deem this necessary.

a. Probability of Detection (U)

(U) (C) Detection probabilities can be based on reporting ratios, derived from the surveillance testing and expected values as to numbers of people to be encountered on the infiltration path.

(U) (C) Table 7 summarizes these derived detection and reporting probabilities as they apply to a 5.5-km-long average path in the restricted area. Assumed values derived from Table 5 are used for large groups, since they were not tested in that area; the small group nighttime reporting ratio is also assumed since testing yielded statistically insufficient data. The basis for the two reporting ratio assumptions were made: (1) in the restricted area, day and night reporting ratios should be the same for similar group types, and (2) since the small group reporting ratio apparently is higher in the Plan 9 area than outside it, so should be the rate for the large group. Finally, the number of persons per kilometer encountered by the large group was scaled down from Table 5 to reflect the smaller average population density of the restricted area. If the results are in error, it is felt that they overstate the true detect/report probabilities.

b. False Alarm Rate (U)

(U) (C) False alarms are reports of supposed infiltration or suspicious activities that, in reality, are "innocent." Response to these reports by a security unit represents an expenditure of resources with no possible insurgent apprehension return. When the rate of false alarms is low and the actual infiltration or the reporting rate is low, response to false alarms has little impact on the effectiveness of the security forces in the area.

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Table 7

(U)  
(C) PROBABILITY OF DETECTION AND REPORT OF AN INFILTRATING GROUP (U)

	Large Incurive Group		Small Group	
	Day	Night	Day	Night
Reporting ratio	0.15*	0.15*	0.0153	0.0153*
Average number of persons encountered	7.5*	0.9*	16.7	0.9
Probability of detection (one or more reports)	0.68	0.13	0.22	0.014

\* Assumed value--see text.

(U) (C) An estimate of the false alarm rate within the area where testing was conducted was obtained during the test program. Data collectors spent 129.5 man-days with various security units monitoring all sighting reports. Those reports not the result of test stimulation were assumed to be false reports. Four were counted. On the average, this amounts to 11.2 false alarms per year per security unit. (Actually, this figure represents an upper bound on the estimate, since it is possible that one or more reports concerned actual infiltration.) In any case, if the estimate of false alarms is close to reality, it would impose little on the security force to employ an SOP of responding to all sighting reports. False alarms can therefore be ignored in further analysis.

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c. Probability of Intercept given a Detection Report (U)

(U) An estimate of this probability is based solely on the overall response time. This, in turn, is composed of three major delays--reporting, headquarters planning and preparations, and Strike Force movement. Test results for these delays are summarized in Table 8.

(1) Reporting Delay (U)

(U) (C) Test data yield extremely long delays for the original observer to make his report. Average delay is 5 hours, 10 minutes. (The median delay is 1 hour, 20 minutes.) The range of delays varies from 10 minutes to 21 hours.

(2) Headquarters Delay (U)

(U) (C) CPX testing produced estimates of total headquarters delays (from the time that the LCS receives the report until the Strike Forces are under way) for sighting reports. These delays were relatively consistent and average 1 hour, 8.7 minutes with a range of from 30.4 minutes to 1 hour, 38 minutes.

(3) Movement (U)

(U) (C) During surveillance tests, speeds of movement on foot were estimated. The overall average, during the day, was 3.3 km/hr. A map study of many possible infiltration routes indicated a typical distance of 7.5 km to be travelled by reaction forces to intercept an infiltrating group--this distance for security forces deployed in villages along the river, as is presently the case in the restricted area. At the estimated speed of 3.3 km/hr the time required to go this distance is 2 hours, 15 minutes. Assuming that no group would come closer than 500 meters to a village, as part of their cautious tactics, the minimum travel time for the reaction force would be 9 minutes. The maximum distance from any security unit to any arrest point would be travelled in 3 hours, 9 minutes.



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(U) Table 8  
~~(C)~~ DELAY TIMES (U)

	Average (hours)	Range (hours)	
		Quickest Response	Slowest Response
Reporting delay*	5.17	0.16	21.0
Headquarters delay*	1.15	0.51	1.63
Movement delay**	2.25	0.15	3.15
Total response time	8.57	0.82	25.78

\* (U) From test results

\*\* (U) From map analysis

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(U) (C) Bicycle speed tests were conducted representative of the conditions likely to be encountered during their tactical employment. These tests determined the effect of type of terrain, load, distance, and degree of route familiarity on speed of movement.

(U) (C) On the assumption that LCSs might use their boats for Strike Force deployment or intercept operations, boat speed tests were conducted, using the actual LCS boats. Passenger loading and upstream/downstream tests were conducted. The results showed that with average loading of a 10-man squad, an average speed through the water of approximately 25 km/hour was achieved.

(4) Overall Response Time (U)

(U) (C) The average overall response time is the sum of the three component delays, a total of 8 hours, 34 minutes. For comparison purposes, the minimum total time, using the shortest of each of the component delays, is 49 minutes.


(5) Conversion to Conditional Intercept Probability (U)

(U) (C) Results of a simulation model, designed to convert overall response time for the assumed conditions to intercept probability, given a detection, is shown in graph form in Figure 4. From this plot the conditional intercept probability for the average total response delays from the test data is seen to be virtually zero. Even the quickest total delay results in a conditional intercept probability of about 0.35.

(6) Overall Apprehension Effectiveness (U)

(U) (C) Table 9 is constructed from the daytime detection and reporting probabilities of Table 7, multiplied by the conditional intercept probabilities from Figure 4 to yield estimated Plan 9 apprehension probabilities. The nighttime detection probabilities shown in Table 5 are so low that multiplying these figures by nighttime conditional intercept probabilities, which were also extremely low, yielded infinitesimal results. Nighttime figures are therefore not included in Table 7.

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FIG. 4 INTERCEPT PROBABILITY, GIVEN A DETECTED TARGET, AS A FUNCTION OF TOTAL RESPONSE TIME (U)

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Table 9

(U) (C) PROBABILITY OF DAYTIME APPREHENSION OF INFILTRATING GROUPS (U)

Condition		Probability of Detection	Conditional Intercept Probability	Apprehension Probability
Large, Incurative Group	Average Response (8.57 hrs)	0.68	0	0
	Quickest Response (0.82 hrs)	0.68	0.35	0.24
Small Group	Average Response (8.57 hrs)	0.22	0	0
	Quickest Response (0.82 hrs)	0.22	0.35	0.08

(U) (C) From this analysis it is concluded that the apprehension effectiveness of Plan 9, even under the most optimistic conditions postulated (i.e., daytime, large group, shortest response delay), can be expected to be slightly better than .20—a value generally judged by Vietnam U.S. advisor standards as "Satisfactory." Under more likely operating conditions, however, the apprehension effectiveness is virtually zero. On this basis, the overall rating given the apprehension operations of Plan 9 is decidedly "unsatisfactory."

D. Village Impact\* (U)

(U) (C) The villager living within the Plan 9 restricted area typically has the impression that Plan 9 personnel are part of a security unit not unlike the VDC (indeed, some villagers refer to the Strike Forces as VDC), although he does not know their specific objectives or responsibilities. Thus, his attitude toward their presence is not unlike that toward other security units with which he might be in contact. There is no evidence to suggest that the Plan 9 system, as implemented, has any generally negative effects on his attitude. On the contrary, when his opinions relative to security force presence are expressed one way or the other, they tend towards approval, on the grounds that his sense of security is strengthened. The negative impressions almost always are in terms of personalities rather than generalized feelings about security units.

\*(U) Details of the village impact survey will be found in Appendix B.

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(U) (C) The villagers consistently hold military and paramilitary units in higher regard than police--as might be expected, since the latter, in addition to their security mission, are also responsible for enforcing local laws, which, from time to time, causes resentment on the part of at least some of the villagers. The informants and Strike Forces are seen to be in the paramilitary category, and, thus, are not subject to the resentment that some villagers hold for the police.

(U) (C) The villagers surveyed state positively their approval of security units that engage in local civic action projects. Since the Plan 9 forces have not as yet implemented this part of their mission, they have not realized the potentially higher degree of positive reaction from actively pursuing such projects on an organized basis.

E. Costs (U)

(U) (C) Costs of the basic security forces in the restricted area (i.e., the total of all military, paramilitary, and police costs, allocated to security, excluding the Plan 9 system) and of the Plan 9 elements are summarized in Table 10 for purposes of comparison. Adding Plan 9 elements to the basic security forces in the restricted area adds 45.3% to the annual security costs for this area.

F. Cost Effectiveness Comparisons and System Potential (U)

(U) (C) In view of the questionable adequacy of Plan 9 operational effectiveness as judged in the foregoing evaluations of two of its intended major operations\*--early warning and apprehension--no cost/effectiveness comparison studies were attempted. Some comments are offered, however, on the value Plan 9 might have relative to the present system.

(U) (C) There is evidence that the presence of the system has resulted in slightly increased capability for providing early warning relative to small infiltrating groups which travel during the day and this should improve with more experience. There is no evidence however, to demonstrate that early warning of nighttime infiltration is better than before Plan 9, such operations being judged inadequate in either case.

\* (U) Other operations not included in this research are psyops and civic action.

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(U)  
(C) **Table 10**  
**SUMMARY OF RESTRICTED AREA SECURITY FORCES COSTS\* (U)**  
(in baht to nearest hundred)

	Initial Cost	5-Year Operation Cost	Total 5-Year System Cost	Annual Cost
<b>Basic Security Forces</b>				
River Check Points (2)	63,700	1,109,300	1,173,000	234,600
Village Protection Units (3)	74,100	1,875,400	1,949,500	389,900
BPP Line Platoon (1)	444,300	4,125,700	4,570,100	914,000
Tambon Police Station (1)	81,900	1,260,800	1,342,700	268,500
Rainforced SOT (1)	698,800	4,173,100	4,871,900	974,400
<b>TOTAL</b>				<b>2,781,400</b>
<b>Plan 9 Elements**</b>				
Local Control Stations (2)	177,200	2,045,100	2,222,300	444,500
Strike Force Units (2)	277,800	2,669,100	2,945,900	589,200
Village Informants (140)	86,500	1,050,000	1,136,500	227,300
<b>TOTAL</b>				<b>1,261,000</b>

\* (U) See Appendix C (Cost Analysis) of the Reference System Report.

\*\* (U) BC HQ costs are considered sunk costs.

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(U) (C) Probability of apprehension of infiltrators is considered almost nil, with or without Plan 9, unless the group is a large, conspicuous one and response delays are smaller than any observed to date. In general, from this and other border control studies performed by SRI, it appears that apprehension capability is a basic weakness in the current Thai-Lao border control arrangements, and Plan 9 does not seem to promise any worthwhile added capability to "search, follow, and eliminate CT in the area," nor does it have the capability to cut off "support and reinforcement from abroad."

(U) (C) The system, however, appears to have potential in the early warning operation. It has been demonstrated that villagers--properly selected and given good instruction--can be trained in most of their required duties as information sources; and in spite of current weaknesses, the informant net concept appears to be a viable basis for low-cost additional early warning capability.\*

G. Plan 9 Performance in Relation to its Stated Factors of Accomplishment (U)

(U) (C) From another viewpoint, it should be useful to summarize SRI's observations in terms of the "factors of accomplishment" set forth in the Plan 9 document:

(1) (U) (C) "The selection of village informants should be made with care in order to obtain valuable and timely information."

(U) (C) The informants were chosen with reasonable care, considering two handicaps. The first was the short time available for recruiting and selection. The second was the lack of indoctrination and orientation of the Plan 9 recruiters; they obtained their volunteers, by and large, without a clear idea as to what specific duties and responsibilities would be required.

\* (U) Judgements here are based on cost comparisons between early warning concepts of various similar systems as developed in the companion report "A Reference Border Control System concept for the Thai-Lao Border."

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- (U) (S) (2) "The Strike Forces in the restricted area should possess good mobility."

During the time of observation, the mobility of the Strike Forces was greatly hampered by the continuous disablement of their boats, their only organic means of transport. They were forced to requisition other transportation.

- (U) (S) (3) "Communication equipment should interface as necessary and be firmly linked; the available equipment should be used properly in order to report in time."

(U) (S) The communications plan for the organic Plan 9 elements has been partially implemented. The three major headquarters maintain good communications with each other. The informant radio net, however, is incomplete and even those radios which are installed are not always reliable because of transmission and maintenance problems. In addition, the communications between LCSs and Strike Forces had not been established effectively at the end of the evaluation. The interface between organic Plan 9 elements and other security forces acting in support has not yet been introduced. Communications with these units can be accomplished with existing radio networks, but in many instances it is an indirect and less effective route.

- (U) (S) (4) "All authorities participating should be sincere in executing the plan and cooperate mutually."

(U) (S) There is no basis to assume insincerity on the part of any of the authorities. However, mutual cooperation has yet to be tested, at least with those organizations not under the direct control of the CPM.



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- (U) (S) "The Psyops teams should execute their mission effectively in order to gain the cooperation of the populace."
- (U) (S) The Psyops teams were not subjects for observation in this study and cannot be included in this evaluation. Reportedly, however, there have been no changes in the routine of the Psyops teams attributable to the initiation of Operations Plan 9.
- (U) (S) "The paying of per diem and rewards should be made quickly and properly."
- (U) (S) So far as known, per diem has been paid quickly. In general, there is no basis for evaluating the promptness of reward payments, since it appears that there have been no recognized claims for rewards for almost one year.

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V CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT (U)

(U) (C) This chapter contains conclusions on the system performance, separately followed, where appropriate, by suggestions for improvement. These conclusions are derived from the evaluations in Chapter IV and are presented in the same sequence for ease of reference.

A. Operational Readiness (U)

(U) (C) In general, with the exception of logistics, the activities contributing to operational readiness, although delayed in implementation, are judged to have achieved the objectives of the plan. The specific activities as evaluated produced the conclusions that follow.

1. Personnel (U)

a. Recruitment (U)

(U) (C) Personnel in the Plan 9 system have demonstrated a wide range of capabilities. However, a higher all round standard of recruit could have been obtained by improved screening processes, requiring more time than was allowed in the plan.

- It is suggested that had the plan allowed adequate provision for screening, it could have been accomplished by pre-testing individuals in tasks related to their future basic responsibilities and by observation and evaluation during training and operational activities. (Suggested criteria for the selection of village personnel are given in Appendix 8 to the companion report: "Training for CSOC Operations Plan No. 9").

(U) b. Training (U)

(U) (C) As evidenced by the expansion of the training activity--from the originally planned one month of basic training to over thirteen months of basic training cum field training--it is clear that more advanced and detailed planning are required to effectively and economically administer this important aspect of preparing for operations. The intrinsically empirical nature of Plan 9 as instituted in Nong Khai with few, if any

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(S) precedents, almost inevitably caused many delays in implementation but the whole experience did provide valuable lessons which, if properly recognized and acted upon, can improve and shorten training programs for future Plan 9-type operations.

(U)  
(S) Analysis of the training program is given at Appendix 'A' and, further, in much more detail in the technical report "Training for CSOC Operations Plan No. 9", Chapter VII (An Outline Plan) of which is particularly relevant to future training. Major suggestions for specific improvements in future programs, based upon the evaluations made in the preceding chapter and drawing from the Nong Khai experience, in regard to both basic and field training programs, are listed hereunder.

(U) (1) General (U)  
(S) The following suggestions apply to both the basic and the field training programs:

- Better use can be made of available national, regional and local RTG military and paramilitary training staff and facilities, in order to lighten the training load on the changwat operational and administrative staff.
- Night training needs to be emphasized throughout the training program, in order to provide the realism consistent with border security operational requirements.
- Staging of field training exercises immediately after the basic training program will realize continuity and confirmation of trainees' assimilation of instruction, and will obviate time and money wasting repetition.
- Operational readiness testing of a border security system following the training phase, derived from the lessons of the Nong Khai field exercises, can be achieved by occasional local and external supervisory inspections, complemented by simple additional field and command post

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exercises, as found necessary. This suggestion is, of course, also relevant to the present Plan 9 system.

- Simple instruction in location finding based upon natural and manmade landmarks promises a much more effective method of teaching villagers to report sightings than any attempt at formal map reading instruction.

(2) Basic Training (U)

(U) ~~SECRET~~ Suggestions for improvement are:

- Reducing the size of classes--by reducing the number of informants per village and increasing the training staff--will produce much higher standards of instruction.
- A better standard of operating efficiency can be achieved among villager personnel by restructuring of training syllabi and work programs, with emphasis on essential subjects and priorities, to accord with operational objectives.

The overall basic training program can be much improved by more advance planning and preparation, particularly in relation to instructors, lesson plans, training aids, and other training equipment.

- More realism, including maximum individual participation, would greatly facilitate the learning process.
- Detailed clarification of the specific role village informants are expected to discharge during the basic training would eliminate any follow-up instruction during the field exercises.

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(3) Field Training (U)

(U) (C) Suggestions for improving field training are:

- The effectiveness of field training exercises would be considerably improved and shortened by producing detailed schedules in advance, drawing on the Nang Khai experience.
- The establishment and preliminary testing of LCS staffs and their SOP should be essential prerequisites for a smooth and efficient field exercise program.
- To ensure the comprehensive operation of the whole system, all the village informants need to be included in the field exercises.
- Staging of command post and field training exercises in simple and sequential scenarios at the beginning is needed before complex and demanding full system exercises are attempted.
- The learning and correction of field exercise lessons would require well-briefed and trained supervisory staff, particularly umpires.
- Bringing operational units associated with the border security plan physically and fully into the field exercises at their outset will facilitate a speedy and complete introduction to the operational phase.

2. Logistics (U)

(U) (C) Because the provision of planned equipment was not as scheduled, and maintenance problems not resolved, it is concluded that the system of logistics administration was inadequate for Plan 9 requirements. Equipment and logistical facilities were not introduced according to plan, some items not being issued during the period of evaluation,

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and this restricted the opportunities to assess adequacy of the equipment and its maintenance. However, the maintenance of boats and radios, which was observed, was insufficient to ensure their intended operational use.

- It is suggested that the present S1/S4 staff channels should be examined with a view to establishing regular facilities for supply, re-supply, preventive maintenance, and repair for the modest amount of equipment involved.

B. Operational Effectiveness (U)

(U) (S) Although the tests and observations forming the basis of SRI's evaluation of the system were made before Plan 9 was fully operational, they provided convincing evidence that, even when operational, the system's counter-infiltration effectiveness will be practically nil. Local intelligence gathering capability, on the other hand, appeared promising--judged from tests of surveillance and C<sup>3</sup> functions. Specific conclusions and some suggestions for improvement are made below under each of the functions as employed in the plan's required operations of early warning and apprehension.

1. Early Warning (U)

a. Surveillance (U)

(U) (S) Despite confusion as to whether the village informants were to serve in covert or overt roles, their measured performance in the overt role indicated a positive value of employing local villagers in an information gathering net. It was concluded that covert operations by the number of informants necessary to provide adequate coverage through covert surveillance operations is infeasible. It is suggested, therefore, that the village informants be employed in the overt role, only, and that a major percentage, if not all, of the villagers be considered informants, since in fact they have this potential.

(U) (S) As tested, arrangements for nighttime surveillance were inadequate. Night watches and local security patrols are suggested as possible ways of overcoming, at least in part, this inadequacy. Devices, such as trail monitoring seismic detectors, might be effective in augmenting the villager nets in certain areas.

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b. Command-Control-Communications (C<sup>3</sup>) (U)

(U) (S) Non-availability of complete data on the performance of the command structure prevented full evaluation of this function as it would be performed in early warning operations. Preliminary evidence, however, has indicated that the LCS's and BC HQ can readily perform their early warning information processing assignments-- in which the delay time requirements are not stringent--provided that the problem of communications netting with the village informants is solved. Aside from the communications equipment problems discussed above, responsibility and authority among the villagers for transmitting information need to be clarified.

- It is suggested that a family spokesman-to-village spokesman (normally the phuyaiban) network for each village be tried. This is in line with the suggestion above that the village informant role be entirely overt and that the number be increased significantly above the present ratio of approximately one informant to each sixty or seventy villagers.

2. Apprehension (U)

a. Detection (U)

(U) (S) The important difference between the performance of the surveillance function by village informants and their performance of the more urgent reporting requirements of the detection function is not identified in the Plan. Reporting delay test data derived from sighting reports indicated on the average totally unacceptable reporting delays. This, coupled with the demonstrated nighttime detection inadequacies of the village informants, leads to the conclusion that only under very unlikely conditions - daytime, large group, quickest response - can this detection function be adequately performed in Plan 9.

- In view of the real-time response requirements for detection, no simple and inexpensive device is known that can augment the village informant net. Under some conditions and in selected areas of the river border, bank or river patrols could conceivably add to the system detection capability, but at the expense of

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adding communications netting difficulties. In view of the other functional difficulties, discussed below, in performing the apprehension operation, efforts to increase the detection capability by adding expensive schemes do not at this time appear warranted.

b. Command-Control-Communications (C<sup>3</sup>) (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ In apprehension operations the C<sup>3</sup> response performance must be significantly higher than in the early warning operation. With additional experience, particularly of SOP, it is possible that the delays inherent in the command function could be performed within acceptably short time-spans. However, with inadequate communications netting [e.g. with patrols], reduction of the information processing delays would not contribute significantly to overall apprehension performance. Tests indicate that reporting delays make up more than half of the total delay time. Special efforts to reduce the reporting delays are indicated. More and better radios are suggested, or perhaps special alarm nets as would be provided by the Village Alarm System currently under test and development in the RTG's MRDC.

c. Intercept (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ Insufficient numbers of security force units coupled with inadequate mobility provision in the plan make intercept of infiltrators a practical improbability under all but the most favorable conditions (i.e. daytime, large groups, passing near or encountering a security force unit by chance). Employing assigned reserve security forces in support of Plan 9 is a possibility for improvement. But routine assignments of such forces on other missions would make their timely availability questionable.

(U) ~~(S)~~ The mobility of the local security forces would significantly improve by providing them with bicycles--tests indicate an average doubling of their speed of movement over walking. Although improved mobility should enhance the probability of intercept, the movement delays contribute only roughly 1/4 to the total response delays. A decision to provide bicycles might be worthwhile, but only if significant reduction can first be made in reporting delay times.



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## C. Village Impact of Plan 9 (U)

(U) (C) On the basis of the surveys made through May 1970, the Plan 9 system as implemented to that date appears to have had little impact on local villagers.

- It is suggested that periodic, similar surveys be made and reported to CPM/CSOC. Such information should be helpful in detecting local populace attitude trends which could be considered in planning psyops and civic action measures in order to improve the value of the present Plan 9 and in designing programs to accompany security-related operational programs such as Plan 9.

## D. Costs (U)

(U) (C) Estimates of Plan 9 costs, although made solely on the basis of planning data and assumptions of operational costs, are probably a fair representation of actual costs, the original planning estimates being adjusted to the training schedule as implemented. However, the field exercises, which were not originally included in the plan but introduced as the result of experience, may add to the costs of the operational phase if they are conducted occasionally for the purpose of exercising the system - a recommendation left with the CPM military advisor which, it is understood, he intends to implement.

- It is suggested that actual cost records be examined for validating the estimates contained herein.

## E. Cost-Effectiveness Comparisons and System Potential (U)

(U) (C) Lacking sufficient data to make meaningful trade-off analyses, practical conclusions cannot be drawn concerning cost effectiveness.\* Judgments made of the effectiveness of the early warning and apprehension operations and their included functions were not considered an adequately valid basis for the purpose of making sensitivity studies, hence none were attempted.

(U) (C) It is concluded that the potential of the system as a whole is quite low since the apprehension operation as planned is judged as having basic inadequacies in night-time detection, C<sup>3</sup> response, and intercept capabilities. No feasible suggestions can be offered which might improve these functions sufficiently to make Plan 9 apprehension operationally effective.

\* (U) Trade-off comparisons are discussed in The Reference System Report

(U) (S) On the other hand, the early warning operation of the Plan is judged as having potential. It is suggested that further investigations be made into trail monitoring devices as a means of improving the villager informant net.

(U) (S) The foregoing conclusions concerning the overall potential of the system do not take into account the possibility that despite probable poor actual operational effectiveness in terms of countering infiltration and interdicting insurgent logistics, the system may well be worth its cost in providing the local populace with a "sense of security" as well as having a prophylactic effect by giving the restricted area the appearance of having added security strength. These possible added benefits would be difficult to evaluate over a short time base but might be considered by the RTG in its overall evaluation of the relative cost benefits of Plan 9 compared with other ways of producing these effects.

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**Appendix A**

**TRAINING EVALUATION (U)**

[ (U) This appendix contains supporting material for those aspects of the training program that are included in the overall evaluation of Plan 9. It concentrates on a description of training activities relevant to this evaluation in regard to the basic training program held in Nong Khai for local volunteer personnel from 19 May to 31 July 1969, and the field training and command post exercises for all Plan 9 elements from 1 October 1969 to 26 June 1970. For full details, including recommendations, see the separate companion report, "Training for CSOC Operations Plan No. 9" ].

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I BASIC TRAINING - VILLAGE INFORMANTS AND STRIKE FORCES (U)

A. Training Schedule (U)

(U) (C) Phase Two of Plan 9, as amended, called for three weeks' training of 140 villagers selected to become informants for the 28 villages in the 5 km-deep restricted areas of Amphoes Bung Kan and Seka, where the border control operation was to be mounted. Two groups of 70 villagers were to be trained consecutively and this was to be followed immediately by four weeks' paramilitary training of the two 20-man Strike Forces to be used in the restricted areas.

(U) (C) On 18 May 1969, the day before the first training course actually started, the Nong Khai CPM issued order 134/2512, which scheduled the village informant courses and the Strike Force course as shown in the first column below. Subsequently, all courses were shortened and the actual dates fell as indicated.

	<u>Schedule per Order</u>	<u>Actual Schedule</u>
First Informant Course:	17 May-6 June, 21 days	19 May-4 June, 17 days
Second Informant Course:	7 June-27 June, 21 days	16 June-3 July, 18 days
Strike Force Course:	28 June-26 July, 29 days	7 July-31 July, 25 days

The reason for courses being shortened was unavailability of scheduled instructors, and the gap between the first and second informant courses was caused by the difficulties of recruiting villagers during the wet (paddy planting) season, which broke in late May. All together, various postponements caused a slippage of nearly 12 weeks beyond the originally projected completion date of mid-May. Table A-1 illustrates the successive schedule revisions.

(U)  
~~(S)~~ Table A-1  
~~(S)~~ TRAINING SCHEDULE CHANGES (U)

Course	(1969) March	April	May	June	July
	6 12 18 24	6 12 18 24	6 12 18 24	6 12 18 24	6 12 18 24
First Informant Course	.....		-----		
Second Informant Course		.....		-----	
Strike Force Course		.....			-----

- ..... Originally projected dates
- Dates scheduled in training order 134/2512
- Actual dates

(U) It will be noted that the planned courses were considerably longer than the 15-day minimum laid down in the Plan 9 order and that the aggregate training period for the three courses was more than double the 30 days allowed for Phase Two in the plan. The individual durations of the courses were determined entirely pragmatically, according to the CPM training supervisor, based upon (a) training funds available, (b) the operational requirements, and (c), in the case of the Strike Force, by paramilitary training experience, e.g., the VDC basic training program.

**B. Trainees' Backgrounds (U)**

(U) ~~(S)~~ Table A-2 summarizes the backgrounds of trainees, as derived from questionnaires the trainees filled in during their training period. The statistics show that the





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majority of trainees had received education up to Prathom 4 level (i.e. four years of village elementary education); they were practically all rice growers; their ages ranged from 17 to 60 with 80% under 40; and they had mostly had a lifelong acquaintance with the villages from which they were recruited. Although some of the informants had more or less been conscripted into service (the completed questionnaires are too obscure for an accurate number), they were almost all keen to learn initially. However, their motivation dropped off considerably when they were told that they would be rewarded only for specific information, rather than be given a small monthly retainer in addition to rewards, as they had been led to believe when recruited.

C. Training Objectives (U)

(U) (S) The objectives, common to the informant and Strike Force courses, were laid down in Nong Khai CPM order 134/2512 as follows:

"Purpose of Training

1. To handle and maintain weapons for fighting and self-defense.
2. To learn basic tactical operations.
3. To understand operational orders and the command-control system.
4. To carry out tactical patrolling, and searching for and destroying insurgents in the area of responsibility.
5. To assist in the protection of local stations [LCS], villages and village informants in the assigned operational areas, when harrassment and terrorism are carried out by the insurgents.
6. To understand government propoganda and psychological operations techniques.
7. To be responsible for assigned duties and to understand the democratic administration of the country.
8. To learn about intelligence and reporting both inside and outside the country.

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9. To have a knowledge of insurgent tactical operations."

(U)  
(S) Although these objectives were somewhat ambitious in view of the short duration of the training courses and are unspecific in nature, they do accord generally with the concepts in Plan 9 of counter-infiltration, public security, intelligence, psychological operations, civic action, and patrolling. A point to be noted is that although the objectives of the village informant and Strike Force training were lumped together, the informants were never expected to carry out the offensive and defensive functions implied in objectives 2, 3 and 5.

D. Course Preparation (U)

1. Training Facilities (U)

(U) For classroom and trainee accommodation, a disused school adjoining the Nong Khai CPM office was cleaned out, the building was wired for electricity, piped water was laid on and temporary bathrooms built--all for a few hundred baht. The classroom, which was large enough for 70 trainees, was equipped with borrowed modern desks, a blackboard and lecturer's podium, and much effort went into adorning the walls with well-prepared motivational and security slogans. The trainees' accommodations, next door to the classroom, were adequate and, after each man had been provided a mosquito net, pillow and blanket (on the third day of training during the first course), the trainees were quite comfortable. Adjoining the classroom also was a spacious yard for exercise, drill and games, with an adequate mess hall beyond. Two kilometers away was the airfield, around which there was ample space for field training, with vegetation and open areas similar to a village environment. The CPM officials responsible for arranging these facilities were justly proud of their efforts.

2. Syllabus and Timetables (U)

(U) The block syllabi for the village informant and Strike Force courses are shown at Tables A-3 and A-4 respectively. Timetables for each course are attached as Tabs 1 and 2 to this appendix.

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Table A-3

(U)  
~~(S)~~ VILLAGE INFORMANT TRAINING--BLOCK SYLLABUS (C)

	<u>Hours</u>
<b>A. <u>Subjects</u></b>	
1. Physical training and exercise	8
2. Hand combat	8
3. Weapon training (shotgun and carbine)	8
4. Communications	11
5. Intelligence and reporting	42
6. Map reading and compass using	12
7. Democratic administration	4
8. Communist administration	4
9. Comparison between democratic and communist administrations	4
10. Communist propaganda and recruitment	3
11. Psychological Operations	3
12. Rural development and public rehabilitation	4
13. Thai history	4
14. Airplanes, helicopters, weapons and uniforms of Red China, North Vietnam and Pathet Lao Leftist Lao soldiers	2
15. International laws in border crossing	2
16. Indoctrination	8
17. Tour	7
18. Commander's time	8
<b>B. <u>Process</u></b>	
1. Orientation to procedures and places	1 day
2. Opening ceremony	3 hours

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(U)  
(C)

Table A-3 (Concluded)

C. Number of Days and Hours in Training

1. Total days	21 days
2. Training days	16 days
3. Training hours	144 hours*
4. Training schedule	
0600 - 0700	Physical exercise
0900 - 1200	Class and training
1300 - 1700	
1900 - 2000	Indoctrination and entertainment

\* Excluding daily physical exercise, the actual planned lessons cover a total of 144-16 = 128 training hours (not including lesson breaks).

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(U)  
(C) STRIKE FORCE TRAINING--BLOCK SYLLABUS (U)

Table A-4

	<u>Hours</u>
A. <u>Subjects</u>	
1. Physical Exercise	10
2. Hand Combat	13
3. Foot Drill	7
4. Rifle Drill	11
5. Weapons Study	7
6. Firing and Firing Positions	7
7. Battle Drill and Combat Formations	14
8. Squad and Platoon Tactics	10
9. Patrolling	11
10. Grenade Throwing	7
11. Ambush and Counter-Ambush	7
12. Surprise Attacks and Raids	3
13. Guerrilla Capturing	8
14. Explosives and Sabotage	4
15. Map and Compass	14
16. Combat Intelligence	4
17. Communications	3
18. Psychological Operations	3
19. Nursing and Sanitation	3
20. Development and Rehabilitation	2
21. Democracy	2
22. Communism	2
23. Comparison of Democracy and Communism	2
24. History of Thailand	2
25. Firing with Live Ammunition	14
26. Tour	7
27. Motivational Training	16
28. Commander's Hours	7

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(C)

(C) Table A-4 (Concluded)

	<u>Hours</u>
<b>B. <u>Process</u></b>	
1. Introduction to places and local programs	1 day
2. Opening ceremony and orientation	3 hours
3. Closing ceremony	4 hours
<b>C. <u>Days and Hours of Training</u></b>	
1. Total days	29 days
2. Training days	23 days
3. Training hours	201 hours
4. Training schedule	
0600 - 0700	Physical Exercise
0900 - 1200	Training
1300 - 1700	
1900 - 2000	Training and Recreation

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a. Comments on Informant Syllabus (U)

(1) (U) Most of the syllabus subjects are generally in accordance with the training objectives relevant to the role of village informants as stated in Plan 9 and cover the communications function which was omitted from the list of objectives.

(2) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(C)~~ The syllabus attempts to cover too many subjects and too much matter, however, for minimally educated villagers. The selection of material and the allocation of time are common problems to all forms of training. It is better only to teach essentials thoroughly than to allot a proportion of time to every desirable subject. The essentials relevant to discharging an informant role are contained in items 3-6 and 14 of Table A-3. These subjects total 75 hours, i.e., just over 50% of the overall syllabus. Insurgent activities (item 10) are allowed a mere 3 hours, as is government psyops (item 11). Motivational training, on the other hand, which is important but incidental to the specific training objectives, is given 28 hours, or 20% of the syllabus (items 7-9, 12, 13 and 16). This is too much for a course of this duration and purpose.

(3) <sup>(U)</sup>~~(C)~~ No provision is made, moreover, for explaining the concept of Plan 9 and the role, duties and responsibilities of village informants within this concept.

b. Comments on Strike Force Syllabus (U)

<sup>(U)</sup>~~(C)~~ Comments already made on the village informant syllabus in regard to too much subject coverage and operational concept also apply to the SF syllabus. This syllabus was produced by the CPM training supervisor after studying the VDC recruit, RTA recruit, DDP (Developing Democracy Program), and Rangers' training syllabi. The course shows much more concentration on essential subjects than does the informant syllabus but, then, there were fairly ample precedents for SF-type training.

<sup>(U)</sup>~~(C)~~ It is to be noted, however, that there is no provision in the SF syllabus (nor in the informant syllabus) for insurgent tactics, which was one training objective; there is no mention of intelligence collection; and the provision of 3 hours for communications training is too little.

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(U) (C) At the outset, it was also noted that the SF course was to be shorter than other similar forms of paramilitary training. The VDC course, which is most analogous to the SF training, had been lengthened from four to six weeks, the latter period being considered the minimum necessary for imparting the basic military and paramilitary skills. Moreover, the SF role is similar to, and just as demanding as, the VDC. It would appear logical, therefore, to give the SF just as much basic training.

(U) (C) A final, and perhaps the most important, point is that much more attention should be paid to ambush and counter-ambush training. It has always been clear that physical operations for border control will need to be able to interdict, particularly at night, the passage of insurgent personnel and supplies through a narrow border belt (in which there may never have been any permanent insurgent presence). However, the syllabus concentrates on drills and tactics (items 7, 8, 12 and 13: a total of 35 lesson periods) more suited to the regular daytime counterinsurgency operations against insurgent camps and overt activities in the interior areas of Northeast Thailand. Only 7 periods are allowed for ambush training although, together with patrolling, it was to be the prime operational tactic of Plan 9.

c. Comments on Informant Timetable (U)

(U) (C) As indicated in Tab 1, the informant course timetable was produced weekly as the course progressed. The basic fault in this timetable is that the lessons are not sequential and not sufficiently graduated for trainees of this particular background. For example, ten of the eleven lessons on Communications were scheduled right at the beginning of the course before the trainees had any instruction on what their duties in observation and information gathering would be, and how they would be expected to record and relay their reports. Similarly, the basic principles of intelligence should have been taught earlier. It is not proposed to detail any more instances of sequence faults here but the interested reader can compare Tab 1 with the timetable of the outline plan in section VI of The Training Report.

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(U) With further regard to lesson programming, it is an instructional tenet that to best ensure trainees' understanding and concentration, the hardest work should be scheduled in the morning when they are at their brightest, and the more interesting and practical work reserved for the afternoon when they are more fatigued. While this tenet is observed in about a half of the timetable, there are many violations. For example, the average receptivity of the trainees to three or four solid hours each of Democratic Administration, Communist Administration, Comparison between (the two) Administrations, and History would not be as great on hot afternoons as it would be in the morning. Instructor availability may have played some part in this timing, but better planning and imagination might have avoided scheduling consecutive lessons on these comparatively dull subjects at this time of day, with their highly probable result of saturation.

(U) A working week of five and a half days is the usually accepted norm for paramilitary training, particularly if the average working day contains more than eight training hours (it was nine in all three Nong Khai courses). As far as possible, Saturday afternoons should be free as well as Sundays, in order to avoid training fatigue and to allow trainees time to shop, sightsee, and otherwise refresh themselves. Receptivity to instruction, and hence assimilation, have traditionally been enhanced by the longer weekend rests; "crash" instruction for three weeks with only two one-day breaks is usually too much for the average man. It also throws a strain on the instructional and administrative staff, particularly if they have more than one course to teach.

(U) A notable omission from the timetable is night training in the important observation and reporting subjects. Since infiltration was known to take place usually during the hours of darkness, it should have been expected that the differences between observation by day and night would be explained (in a day lesson) and practiced by night. This comment also applied to the syllabus.

(U) Finally--perhaps a minor point on the surface, but one which can cause misunderstanding and abuse--is the omission of any regular specified breaks between lessons. The usual practice is 10 minutes after 45-50 minutes' instruction, with longer breaks, say for 20 minutes, at mid-morning and mid-afternoon for refreshment. However, such breaks were taken--and often for longer than 10 or 20 minutes--in interruption of actual lesson periods. Specification of precise lesson periods and the break between each period in the timetable would have made the situation clear to both instructors and trainees.

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d. Comments on Strike Force Timetable (U)

(U) Comments made earlier on the informant course timetable regarding sequence, tempo, and rest periods also apply to the SF timetable (Tab 2). Additional comments on the latter follow.

(U) Saturation. A particular flaw in the SF timetable is the alarming amount of saturation inevitable in scheduling consecutive training on each subject in the syllabus until both it and the trainees are exhausted. For one example, all 18 actual training hours on the first three days are devoted exclusively to foot drill and weapons drill. Apart from the fact that drill is best learned in small daily doses in the coolest part of the day, and could have easily been spread evenly throughout the course because the instructors were local, nothing could have been more calculated to have put off the men, who had never been physically conditioned, than these solid, consecutive chunks of hard labor throughout the day. It is perhaps ironic that the subject of the motivational lecture on the fourth day was "Endurance."

(U) ~~(C)~~ Redundancy. Two whole days (the fourth and fifth) were given up to description, principles of aiming and firing postures for the rifle, carbine and shotgun respectively. Insofar as the shotgun was the only weapon likely to be immediately available for the VV, a day spent on describing the characteristics and name parts of other weapons was inappropriate at this time. It also took another day to go through the principles of aiming and firing postures for each weapon individually when, although aiming a shotgun is not quite the same thing as aiming a rifle or carbine, the postures are similar for all weapons.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Lack of Night Training. There is no provision in the timetable for night training on patrolling, combat tactics and ambush, in spite of the fact that this is when the SF will be expected to operate against infiltrators. The reasons why such training was omitted should be reconsidered to make the program as realistic as possible.

(U) In summary, the timetable should be reexamined and realigned as to sequence, balance and realism. The subsequent reports of evaluators that the trainees were sometimes "tired," "bored" or "saturated" stem directly from weakness in these respects.

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3. Lesson Planning (U)

(U) When, just before the beginning of the first informant course, it became apparent that no lesson plans had been produced and that the CPM was unable to obtain them, sample lesson plans were supplied from MRDC, USOM and SRI resources as follows:

- (a) English and Thai version of the PP Special Action Force basic CI training manuals in two volumes
- (b) Three copies of the Thai manual used for police Chaiya basic CI training
- (c) Selected lesson plans in English and Thai of the basic training for People's Assistance Teams (PAT)-- village security units raised in Changwats Nakhon Phanom and Sakon Nakhon, whose role emphasizes rural security, psyops and intelligence
- (d) Three copies (in Thai) of an SRI document on the fundamentals of agent recruitment, handling and training.

(U) These lesson plans were aimed at a higher level of trainee than those in Plan 9 and they by no means covered the whole of the syllabi but some of them, suitably amended, were relevant to the scheduled lessons, and they were, at least, better than nothing.

(U) (C) As already mentioned, the CPM training order was published only the day before the first informant course started and this gave little lead time for instructors in the first week to prepare properly for their lessons. It transpired during the first course that few, if any, of the instructors prepared themselves satisfactorily. Whether this was owing to lack of notice, ignorance of method and of the need to prepare lessons, or for some other reason, is not known. Instructors who also took part later in the second informant and Strike Force courses improved noticeably in their delivery and knowledge as they became more exposed to the instructional process, and those few involved in the initial phases of field training, which included reiteration of basic training lessons, became quite expert.

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E. Conduct of Training (U)

1. Planned vs Actual Instruction (U)

(U) A summary of the lessons given during each course compared with those planned is shown at Table A-5. From this it will be seen that the proportion of planned training actually carried out was: First Informant Course--76%; Second Informant Course--63%; and Strike Force Course--75%.

2. Instructors (U)

a. Instructor/Trainee Ratio (U)

(U) It will be remembered that the trainees attending the three courses were to be 70, 70, 40 in that order. In four lessons (Weapon Training and Communications) an assistant instructor was also scheduled but this did not involve splitting the class into two. Thus, throughout all courses the class size ranged from 40 to 70 trainees. This was to prove a great handicap to good instruction: military training theory commonly holds that no instructor can properly handle a class of more than 25 men. In the learning process it is commonly accepted that the maximum amount of individual practice is essential for good results, and it is obvious that the larger the class the smaller chance there is for individual participation. When classes reach fifty and hundred, military instruction becomes mass production. From the outset, therefore, the prospects of attaining the training objectives among a majority of trainees during the basic training program were handicapped.

b. Performance of Village Informant Instructors (U)

(U) Of the 19 instructors scheduled for the informant training, 3 were not available for the first course and 9 missed the second. The specific reasons for their absence are unknown, the usual response to a question on the point being that they were too busy with their duties or on leave. Occasionally, the CPM G2/3 replaced an absent instructor; more often the lesson was cancelled.

(U) There was wide variation in the experience, knowledge, and competence of instructors. An overall evaluation, based on the observers' reports, indicates that many were unpunctual, not fully prepared in their subjects, and made insufficient use

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Table A-5  
LET COMPARISON OF PLANNED AND ACTUAL LESSONS  
FOR INFORMANT AND STRIKE FORCE BASIC TRAINING COURSES (U)

Subject	1st Informant Course		2nd Informant Course		Strike Force Course	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
<b>A. Curricular</b>						
1. Weapon Training	8	8	8	7	35	21
2. Communications	11	11	11	11	3	3
3. Intelligence and Reporting	42	41	55	36	4	4
4. Map Reading and Compass	12	11	13	10	14	16
5. Political Theory and History	18	9	9	5	8	4
6. Psyops and Development	7	0	2	0	5	3
7. Aircraft and Uniforms Recognition	2	0	2	1	-	-
8. Border Laws	2	2	2	2	-	-
9. Motivational Lectures	8	8	8	2	16	4
10. Commander's Hour	8	0	8	0	7	0
11. Foot Drill	-	-	-	-	7	7
12. Rifle Drill	-	-	-	-	11	10
13. Battle Drills	-	-	-	-	14	14
14. Squad and Platoon Tactics	-	-	-	-	10	8
15. Patrolling	-	-	-	-	11	16
16. Surprise Attacks	-	-	-	-	3	3
17. Anti-Guerrilla Operations	-	-	-	-	8	1
18. Ambush and Counter-Ambush	-	-	-	-	7	8
19. Explosives and Sabotage	-	-	-	-	4	5
20. First Aid and Sanitation	-	-	-	-	3	1
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>170</b>	<b>127</b>
<b>B. Extra-curricular</b>						
1. Physical Exercise & Games	8	8	8	8	10	10
2. Unarmed Combat	8	0	8	0	13	0
3. Tour	7	-	7	-	7	-
4. Opening Ceremony	3	3	3	2	3	1
5. Closing Ceremony	0	2	0	2	4	0
<b>GRAND TOTALS</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>103</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>207</b>	<b>138</b>

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of visual aids. In no case was a lesson handout (text) given to the trainees and, except for the manuals on paramilitary subjects, no instructor had a full lesson plan prepared by himself. Most had made short notes of lesson topics and a few had nothing to refer to. At least half of the instructors spoke too fast for the students and they either could not or did not try to speak the Northeast dialect. There was a tendency for instructors to cover too much ground in the period allotted to them (a common instructional fault), and thus there was little or no time for question-and-answer. When questions were asked, instructors were often either unable or unwilling to answer them, and so the vital instructional aspects of trainees' reception and assimilation of knowledge were not tested; nor were written tests conducted except for a few message reports.

(U) (C) There was a noticeable improvement in the standard of instruction during the second informant course. All the instructors had taken part in the first course and had benefited from the experience. Those who also instructed in the Strike Force program improved even further, thus supporting the previous inference that lack of instructing experience and preparation was the initial handicap.

## c. Performance of Strike Force Instructors (U)

(U) (C) RTA instructors from the 1/13 RCT in Udorn undertook the instruction in map reading and explosives and sabotage subjects. They did this competently in the time at their disposal, the map training being deficient in practical exercise, and the explosives/sabotage instruction hardly relevant to the expected functions and activities of a locally-raised paramilitary unit. The BPP instructors from the 4th Area Hq in Udorn were responsible for training in battle drills, formations, tactics, patrolling, ambush, and grenade throwing (items 7-12 in Table A-4, preceding) and they gave a total of 49 lesson hours out of the 52 scheduled for them.

(U) The reports on the BPP instructional periods read very much as from a manual on good instruction. The instructors were consistently keen, enthusiastic and punctilious; their lessons were well-prepared; they ensured 10 minute breaks at the end of each 50-minute period of instruction; they brought useful charts of sufficient quantity and size to illustrate each lesson; their speech was slow and precise (most of them could use the Northeast dialect with telling effect); their blackboard technique was excellent;

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they had few distracting personal mannerisms; they punctuated their lessons with apt summaries and recapitulation; and they never lost sight of the lesson themes. In fact, the only single area seen for improvement in this thoroughly professional performance was that the instructors, probably through wanting to cover as much ground as possible, left insufficient time to question and be questioned at the end of a lesson--the ubiquitous bugaboo for all instruction.

(U) The method invariably used by BPP instructors for all their subjects was to give lectures, interlarded with demonstrations, in the morning, and then exercises practicing the trainees--preceded and succeeded by further demonstrations as necessary--in the afternoon. The method of practical exercise used was to split the class into three groups; one group being exercised at a time, often with another group acting as the enemy or as targets. If an exercise was not carried out to the instructor's satisfaction, it was repeated until the required standard was reached. Practical exercises in one subject were constantly used to confirm instruction previously given in another. For example, when practicing lessons in reconnaissance and tracking, opportunity was taken to introduce surprise, immediate contact and stand-to actions.

(U) Such efficiency and expertise inevitably evoked a strong response from the trainees themselves, who, according to the evaluators, showed marked keenness despite extreme heat and tiredness--in contrast with the general standard of their performance at other times. Perhaps the major lesson learned for future Plan 9 training from this BPP contribution was that training efficiency can be vastly increased, for both SF and village informant courses, by the provision of a small expert training element on temporary loan to take on the important subjects.

(U) (C) Foot and arms drill and weapon training, including range firing, were undertaken by the same SAF personnel who had taught the informant courses. Their performance was adequate, but paled in comparison with the BPP example.

### 3. Instructional Techniques (U)

(U) (C) Specific reference to lesson methods was not made either in the village informant or Strike Force syllabi and timetables. In early discussions with CPM officials it was learned that the emphasis of training was to be on the lecture, which, although it has the

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advantage of handling easily the large number of trainees involved, is the instructional technique least likely to impart knowledge, especially to men of low educational background. In fact, all standard military training manuals emphasize the need to exploit as many of man's five senses as possible during the training process, with emphasis on trainee participation in this process. Training manuals commonly show approximately the following proportions as desirable for teaching most skills\*:

Explanation ("Tell")	10%
Demonstration ("Show")	25%
Practice ("Do")	65%

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The overall ratios for lectures, demonstrations and practical exercises are shown in Fig. A-1, together with the commonly recommended standard for comparison. As the chart illustrates, there was an increasing accent on demonstrations and trainee participation as the courses progressed. The main reason for the considerable difference between the two informant courses was that two days of practical field exercises on observation, memory training, recording, communications and reporting were staged at the end of the second informant course. The practical work on the Strike Force course was very good: morning lectures on weapon training, tactics, and map reading, particularly, were accompanied by many demonstrations and then followed by afternoon practical exercises to drive the lessons home.

#### 4. Training Aids (U)

(U) The timetables for all three courses indicate an impressive range of visual and other training aids. Except for the blackboard, pointer, chalk, weapons and radios, however, they did not exist. Again, the CPM was unable to obtain any assistance through its administrative channels, the weakness of which was underlined by the fact that the Military Advisor, a full Colonel of the RTA, himself had to visit the RTA film laboratory in Bangkok in order to obtain appropriate training films.

(U) Other urgently required items were projection equipment, compasses and maps. When it became clear that these would not be forthcoming from any regular source, the following items were issued by MRDC on temporary loan:


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\* (U) FM 21-6, Techniques of Military Instruction, page 63, gives this ratio. So does the British War Office Manual on Good Instruction (Part One), at page 19.

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FIG. A-1 COMPARISON OF RECOMMENDED INSTRUCTIONAL TECHNIQUES AND THOSE USED IN BASIC TRAINING COURSES (U)

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16 mm film projector (sound) and screen	- 1
35 mm slide projector	- 1
Tape recorder	- 1
Public address system	- 1
Lensatic compasses	- 12
1:50,000 maps of Plan 9 area (sets)	- 20

(U) Training aids actually used consisted largely of obvious items such as weapons, radios, maps and compasses. Diagrams, charts and pictures were seldom used, except for the SF course, and those used were generally too small and few for a large class. Much more should be done by instructors to stimulate trainee interest, by preparing simple charts and diagrams to illustrate their texts, if only to highlight the major themes of the lesson. More extensive use of the blackboard, always available in the classroom, should be made. The instructors should be given more thorough training in blackboard writing technique: e.g., letters and figures were often either badly written or too small to be seen at the back of the class, some instructors had the habit of talking to the blackboard, and none used the effective technique of uncovering prepared blackboard diagrams at the appropriate point in a lesson. Only one instructional film (on map reading) was screened, and the slide projector was not used at all.

#### 5. Technical Subjects (U)

(U) There was too much time emphasis on technical detail in all courses. For example, a lot of time was spent in explaining the theory of radio and the propagation of radio waves, and much of the weapon instruction was devoted to the students learning the sizes, weights and part names of various weapons. Many of these technical details were given in English, which was of no practical use to the trainees whatsoever, and the time spent on them detracted from the more important aspects of handling, use, and maintenance of these items.

(U) (C) Similarly, the repeated attempts to instruct untrained villagers in the principles of map reading and compass were very unproductive. Subsequent efforts made to teach map reading to selected informants and Strike Force personnel during field training exercises were also to no avail. The Plan 9 training experience suggest that instructions might better be concentrated on natural direction-finding and distance-judging in

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relation to well defined natural and man-made landmarks. This would not only meet the plan requirements but would produce far more useful results than attempting to grapple with the complexities of the Universal Transverse Mercator, map symbols and compass variations--all of the which few even highly-trained military personnel ever master, particularly in the rural Northeast Thailand environment.

F. Training Results (U)

1. Assessment of Informant Training (U)

a. First Informant Course (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ The CPM training supervisor was unable to make an assessment of the trainees on the first course. The SRI observers' rating of the first course was:

- 30-40% of the students had understood most of the instruction.
- A further 40-50% had gained a fair knowledge but needed more instruction.
- 20% had learned very little, owing mainly to poor intellect, lack of education, inability to understand the instructors, and, in some cases, disinterest.

b. Second Informant Course (C)

(U) The quality of instruction improved during the second course, for which three reasons can be adduced: (1) There was much more individual participation than on the first course; (2) The instructors had benefitted from their experience of the first course; and (3) The trainees were generally of a higher caliber.

(U) ~~(S)~~ At the end of the second course, the CPM supervising instructor gave his estimate of the proportion of trainees capable of producing useful information, based mainly on the results of the terminal field exercises, as follows:

- 60% were good material, subject to further training and experience.
- About 5% were totally useless (in part because they could not write).
- The remaining 35% were unassessable.

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(U) (C) The consensus of subjective assessments by SRI observers was that about 50% of the trainees had responded well to the instruction, 40% needed further instruction, and 10% were virtually untrainable.

c. Overall Assessment, Informant Training (C)

(U) (C) Based on such assessments, at least 2 out of 5 trainees on the first informant course and 3 out of 5 on the second course were able to understand this type of instruction. If these were spread evenly among the villages and if the training content had been comprehensive to informants' duties, the courses would have been highly successful, since two or three well-trained government agents in every village of an operational area represent a comparatively very high coverage in any counterinsurgency experience.

(U) (C) There was no breakdown of trainee performance by village; however, few, if any, villages are likely to have all five of their informants in the "totally useless" category--or even within or below the "unassessable/fair knowledge" middle range. The one positive conclusion was that although the courses demonstrated that villagers could be trained as informants, they had not been trained enough for the Plan 9 requirements; this owing to insufficiency of training content, quality of instruction, and the absence of clear-cut operational concepts and tactics--hence training objectives--from the start of the program. It was this major conclusion that persuaded CPM officials towards the end of the second course that further training of informants would be necessary.

(U) (C) There was insufficient emphasis or clarification in the basic training program on the specific role of trainees in gathering information when they returned to their villages. It was not made clear to them whether they should go outside their village areas to seek information, whether they should establish a local informant network, or whether they should maintain occasional surveillance in and around their villages. The division of responsibility between the five informants to be used in each village, and their cooperation or coordination, was also not explained. Neither the Plan 9 concept nor the training objectives were specific about the role of informants and the basic training did not cover the subject satisfactorily. The underlying reason for this deficiency was that both the plan and the training started before the basic functions and operational tactics of a border control system had been formulated. A doctrine did evolve, concurrently with the training process, and this was to prove a serendipitous and most fruitful result of the whole experiment.

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2. Assessment of Strike Force Training (U)

(U) (C) Because of the individual participation of all trainees in practical exercises in the BPP subjects it was possible for the evaluators to keep a rough score card on the competence of trainees as displayed in their activities. Overall, the average assessment was that some 90%, or 36 out of the 40 trainees, had learned their lessons well and could do what was expected of them. Often, groups were taken through an exercise as much as three times, the score card for one lesson reading:

	<u>1st Group</u>	<u>2nd Group</u>
1st Run	60% (24 men)	65%
2nd Run	75%	80%
3rd Run	90%	97%

It thus appears that trainees reached a high level of performance in the battle drills, tactics and patrolling taught in the program.

(U) (C) However, as mentioned before, there was not enough provision in the syllabus for intelligence collection, communications, and ambush tactics and procedures; and insurgent tactics and night training were not even included. Only the linear type of ambush was taught; the multiple and area ambushes--which are usually more effective although more complex--were ignored for lack of time. On the other hand, just about every combat platoon and squad formation in the military textbook was taught to a unit which will never need more than three or four elementary formations in its operations under Plan 9. The men were, if anything, confused by the multiplicity and could not absorb it all in such a short training period. Future training of this type can easily be amended to focus on more ambush, insurgent tactics, communications, and intelligence training, at the expense of the battle formations, etc., without lengthening the training period.

(U) (C) Perhaps the greatest deficiency in the Strike Force course was the lack of musketry training. Unfortunately, as with the informant courses, no ammunition was available for range practice for the Strike Force. Responsible CPM officials stated that they had done their best to obtain training ammunition, but without avail. It was not possible, however, to pin down the administrative responsibility for this deficiency, the official response being "lack of support," presumably at higher levels-- a complaint voiced quite frequently particularly in the later field training phase.

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(U)  
(C) As it was, some of the SF personnel had individually used shotguns or cap guns previously in hunting expeditions around their villages, but none had any experience of firing rifled weapons, and none had any experience whatsoever in firing as a group. Without any individual or group live-firing experience, the personnel could hardly be expected to realize the first, and probably the most important, objective-- "To handle and maintain weapons for fighting and self-defense."

(U)  
(C) Their performance in map reading is difficult to assess as they were not tested and it is unlikely that any of them gained more than a rudimentary knowledge, and certainly not enough to pinpoint locations on a map. In regard to map reading, and also communications, it is not necessary that all of the personnel should be trained. Two to three trained men in each squad would be adequate for all foreseeable operational requirements, and these could best be discharged by the two PP personnel in each squad, who are, presumably, well trained in such subjects.

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## II FIELD TRAINING EXERCISES (U)

### A. Background (U)

#### 1. Reasons for Field Training (U)

(U) (C) Before the Plan 9 basic training program was completed in July 1969, the Nong Khai CPM, supported by CSOC, had decided that field training was necessary for the reasons below.

a. (U) (C) The initial training period had not included sufficient instruction, particularly practical exercise, to make the village informant trainees and SF trainees proficient in the operational tactics needed for successful surveillance and interdiction operations respectively.

b. (U) (C) The other operational units to be employed under Plan 9--Marine Police, Border Patrol Police (BPP), Special Operations Center (SOC), and Village Security Units (VSU)--had received no training in tactics designed for border control operations; nor had the Plan 9 command/control centers and their staffs, or communications systems, been established or tested.

c. (U) (C) It was necessary to exercise and test all Plan 9 elements in the feasibility and application of a tactical doctrine for border control operations which had been formulated concurrently with, and largely as a result of, the basic training experience.

#### 2. The Field Training Plan (U)

##### a. Operational Order (U)

(U) (C) On 26 September 1969 the Nong Khai CPM issued Order No. 271/2512, headed "Additional Exercise of Plan 9," in which a border control mission, objectives and tactics were clearly spelled out for the first time. The whole was to be achieved in three sequential stages, called Step One, Step Two, and Step Three.

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b. Training Mission (U)

(U) (C) The mission set forth in this training order was to have all integral and associated elements of Plan 9 tactically proficient and operationally ready for full-scale border control operations by 1 May 1970. This was to be achieved by procedural and tactical training exercises in the field that would develop and prescribe the administration, policies, tactics, and procedures of border area security organizations and related personnel in an effective operational system designed to prevent the passage of suspicious persons and supplies within (initially) a 6-km belt along a specified border area.

c. Training Objectives (U)

(U) (C) The objectives of this order were:

- (1) To develop operational techniques, communications, and procedures (SOP) for the Plan 9 command/control centers and their staff.
- (2) To develop operational tactics designed to detect and interdict insurgent movements.
- (3) To familiarize all operational units with their operational areas and, specifically, with preselected rendezvous and ambush points within those areas.
- (4) To provide follow-up training on tactics and procedures not covered in basic training.
- (5) To develop the technical proficiency of informants in observation and reporting so that they are effectively capable of performing operational missions.
- (6) To improve the technical proficiency of individuals in the Strike Forces and other operational units through on-the-job training.
- (7) To integrate the skills developed during individual training into the operation of teams.

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- (8) To reveal flaws, if any, in the current border security operational concepts and to point up appropriate solutions.
- (9) To provide a foundation, through training, for advanced, recurrent unit training.
- (10) To provide a body of doctrine in written form for application to other areas of the border.

d. Training Schedule (U)

(U) ~~(S)~~ The phasing of this field training was laid down as follows:

(1) Step One

Training review for informants, strike forces and LCS staffs. Two-week field training sessions to be concentrated in and around the two LCSs consecutively. Exercises to include information transfers from informants by radio and personal reporting. The Strike Forces and local VSUs and PP units to participate. Communications with the BC HQ also to be exercised.

Duration: Two weeks at each LCS--15 October to 15 November 1969.

(2) Step Two

Familiarization, briefing, and command post exercises (CPX)\* of the whole command and control system, to include local VSUs, Marine Police, BPP and SOC units. Joint skeleton and communications exercises between the BC HQ and two LCSs to be staged after the LCSs have been practiced individually in their ability to resolve operational problems.

Duration: Six to eight weeks--scheduled tentatively from 1 December 1969 to 31 January 1970.

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\* (U) A CPX (command post exercise) is defined as an exercise involving the commander, his staff and communications within and between headquarters. It exercises the planning, preparation, decision-making, and execution functions of an operational system. It does not involve the movement of troops in the field.

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(3) Step Three

Full system tests involving all detection, command, and tactical elements. This step to start with field training exercises (FTX)\* on deployment, mobility, and tactics, working up to full-scale CPX and FTX.

Duration: Ten to twelve weeks--tentative dates, 10 February to 30 April 1970.

(4) Additional Phases

Step Zero

It was recognized from the start, however, that field training of this nature had never been attempted outside major RTA formations and that CPM/BC HQ/LCS structures and the villager elements of Plan 9 both should be previously familiarized and given elementary practice in field training procedures. Moreover, the implementation of Step One depended upon the buildings, staff and communications of the local Control Stations becoming ready and in operational order. Since this was not due to happen until later October and it was desired to carry out whatever training was possible in the meantime, it was decided (a) that the Strike Forces and VSUs would make reconnaissance patrols of their areas and carry out simple ambush drills and patrol formation in the field, and (b) that simple information transfers would be practiced between a few selected informants and a skeleton or ad hoc (specially-formed) LCS staff. This was called "Step Zero." The particular objective of this preliminary step was to ensure a good start to Step One.

Duration: One week at each LCS--29 September to 11 October 1969.

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\* (U) An FTX (field training exercise) is an exercise conducted in the field, under actual or simulated operational conditions, in which troops are employed in tactical, maneuver and deployment operations. It is carried out for the purpose of training and evaluation. It may be a combined, unified, joint or single service exercise, depending on the participating organizations. Command, control and communications elements may also be incidentally exercised. FTXs may also include the employment of enemy troops or targets--whether imaginary, skeleton or full strength.

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Step One-and-a-Half

In practice, however, both Step Zero and Step One were essentially a review and augmentation of certain elements of the basic training program for selected village informants, the Strike Forces and, in Step One, the newly formed LCS skeleton staffs. It was thus decided to introduce a "Step One-and-a-Half" program to cover the training planned but not implemented in Step One.

Duration: One week at each LCS--4 January to 17 January 1970.

e. Operational Concepts (U)

(U) (S) It had long been recognized that the organization and tactics required for a successful border control system are difficult and complex, and particularly so in an operational environment where several different types of units, and command/control/communications systems are already deployed on various operations. The problem and suggested remedies are discussed in depth in an annex to the CPM training order. This was an attempt at a simple doctrine of border control functions, operational tactics, and field training, and it was upon this doctrine that field training exercises were to be based.

(U) (S) In brief, this annex covers the following aspects of a border control operational system:

(1) Functions:

- Alerting/detection
- Communications
- Decision
- Response
- Reporting

(2) Tactics, which concentrate on ambush and blocking techniques:

- Action on advance information
- Action on immediate information
- Area ambushing by VSUs etc at preselected points

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- Area information network
- External information system
- External assistance

(3) Evaluation and testing

(4) Field training outline

(U)  
(S) Although patrolling is not emphasized in the annex, the CPM training order specified that during Steps One and Two all operational units to be employed in Plan 9, when not specifically engaged in the scheduled exercises, would continue to patrol and reconnoiter their areas thoroughly in order to establish fixed unit operational boundaries and preselected ambush points. This was to be carried out in a series of simple map training exercises (MTX). Patrol units were also to be given further training in ambush drills and procedures.

B. Conduct of Field Training (U)

1. Implementation of Schedule (U)

(U) The dates originally laid down for the various field training steps are shown above at part A.2.d. In the event, there were many postponements in this schedule owing mainly to staff shortage, holidays, other operational and training commitments, and administrative problems, only Step Zero taking place on time. In addition, for very much the same reasons as the postponements, the actual training periods were shortened--drastically in Steps Two and Three.

(U) It is not proposed to detail the postponements at this stage, in order to avoid confusion, but it is to be noted that from Step Zero onwards there were at least one, and as many as three, new dates set for each scheduled training step. The planned and ultimate dates and durations are shown at Table 7, however, as a background for the discussion which ensues.

(U)

Table A-6  
(C) FIELD TRAINING SCHEDULE (U)

----- Planned dates  
..... Planned extension  
===== Actual dates

Phase	Oct.(1969)	Nov.	Dec.	Jan.(1970)	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May	June
<b>Step Zero</b>									
Lao Luang	=====								
Hat Hae	=====								
<b>Step One</b>									
Lao Luang	-----	=====							
Hat Hae		-----	-----						
BC HQ	-----	-----							
<b>Step One &amp; Half</b>									
Lao Luang				-----	-----				
Hat Hae				-----	-----				
BC HQ				-----	-----				
<b>Step Two</b>									
Lao Luang			-----	-----		-----			-----
Hat Hae			-----	-----		-----			-----
BC HQ			-----	-----		-----			-----
<b>Step Three</b>									
Lao Luang					-----	-----	-----		-----
Hat Hae					-----	-----	-----		-----
BC HQ					-----	-----	-----		-----

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2. Step Zero (U)

(U) (C) Step Zero training covered a three-day period (1-3 October 1969 at Lao Luang LCS and 6-8 October at Hat Hae LCS). It was an informal affair for which there was no prepared schedule, the CPM G2/3 being the principal instructor at Lao Luang and the BC HQ G2/3 (who had observed the Lao Luang training) repeating similar training at Hat Hae. The latter was not attended by SRI observers, however, owing to sickness, and this commentary will concentrate on the training at Lao Luang. A summary of what was taught there is at Table A-7.

3. Step One (U)

(U) (C) Step One, originally scheduled to begin at Lao Luang on 15 October 1969, but postponed twice owing to administrative problems, was rescheduled and implemented from 10-21 November, although the period had to be extended to 26 November because of lost time owing to sickness among the trainees. As a result, the subsequent similar training scheduled for Hat Hae LCS was postponed and, again owing to administrative problems, was further postponed, eventually starting on 15 December and ending on 26 December.

(U) (C) The Step One training carried out at Lao Luang is summarized in Table A-8. Since the essentials of the Lao Luang training were repeated at Hat Hae, involving similar numbers and types of trainees, it is necessary only to draw comparisons between the two programs. The second Step One training session did, in fact, produce a higher standard of instruction, for which the following reasons are adduced:

- More instructors were available--two at Lao Luang, seven at Hat Hae.
- The Lao Luang experience provided better preparation for the Hat Hae lessons.
- The proficiency of instructors, some of whom were giving virtually the same lessons for the fourth or fifth time, had materially improved.

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(U) Table A-7

(SF) STEP ZERO TRAINING - LAO LUANG (U)

Date	Time		Place	Trainees	Instructor	Subject	Scope	Remarks
	From	To						
1 October 1969	1120	1145	LCS Classroom	14 Informants (1 from Hat Mae) 4 Hat Mae LCS PP Personnel and 1 Lao Luang LCS LCS PP BC HQ G2/3 BC HQ G1/4	Major Vichien, G13 of CPM	Observation and Reporting	Surveillance targets, including smugglers; intelligence EEh; assistance to payabans in apprehending criminals; familiarization with terrain 8-km radius around village; reporting methods; and patrolling and tracking by informants.	This was revision of basic training, except for the designation of surveillance areas and the addition of reporting criminal activities to the informants' duties.
	1445	1525	-do-					
	1530	1610	-do-					
2 October 1969	1050	1157	LCS Classroom	BC HQ G2/3 1 LCS PP personnel 1 SF PP personnel	CPM G/3	Observation and Reporting Counter- intelligence	Occasional surveillance; principles of individual and group tracking--demon- stration and practice--in the classroom; surveillance of suspect CT village supporters; target descriptions; covert activity; protective security; and counter- intelligence	Most of the informants who attended the first day's train- ing were present. This was again basic training revision with more details in regard to tracking and surveillance. In- formants were told for the first time they were expected to patrol on orders from the LCS commander or whenever they saw anything unusual. Emphasis of lessons was on tracking, for which small classroom demonstrations and exercises were repeated twice. A third of the informant trainees demonstrated that they had understood the instruction.
	1400	1543	-do-	23 Informants				
3 October 1969	0930	1030	LCS Classroom	20 VV (Strike Force) 4 SF PP personnel	CPM G2/3	Discipline	Camp discipline; weapon security; attitude to villagers.	This was a "pop" talk emphasizing the need for SF personnel to sleep and eat in the LCS compound, to be obedient to superiors, to look after (and never fire) their weapons, and to be friendly to villagers.
	1400	1630	-do-	-do-	-do-	Patrols and ambushes	Patrol and ambush formations and drills were explained in the classroom.	This was revision of basic training lessons with some additions to ambush procedures and techniques. The SF was not exercised or tested, and most trainees were still confused over the complexities of the many drills and formations taught.

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(U)  
 (C) STEP ONE TRAINING - LAO LUANG (U)

Date	Time		Place	Trainees	Instructor	Subject	Scope	Remarks
	From	To						
Monday, Nov 10	1000	1035	LCC Classroom	34 observers 2 LCC PP personnel	Major Vichien G2/3 of CPM	Introduction	- Outline of field and command post exercises in three steps	Instructor's most pertinent statement was that "This training is to revise what has already been learned in order to understand more, because the last time [i.e. the basic training] you did not seem to understand all the instruc- tion well"
	1040	1207	LCC Classroom	-do-	Major Sanat Communications Officer of CPM	Radio communications	- Network procedure, security and discipline - Types and use of radios and antennas - Maintenance - Message and voice procedures	This was virtually the same as basic training lesson with a little more emphasis on practical aspects
	1340	1640	Field - P.E.	-do-	-do-	-do-	- Field exercise in radio use in vicinity of LCC	Three radios used. Most trainees tested. Satisfactory results. Those who had already used radios in villages voiced general complaint of interference from 1700 hours until dawn that made communication impossible
Tuesday, Nov 11	0920 1400	1150 1440	LCC Classroom	45 observers 2 LCC PP	Major Vichien	Observation and reporting techniques; observers SOPs	- Information sources and collection - CT organizations - CT recruits - CT logistics - Surveillance - Counter-intelligence - Observers' daily routine	This was straight forward revision of basic training. Observers reminded explicitly (as by the CPM military advisor on previous day) of their covert agent role
Wednesday, Nov 12								Training postponed owing to 3 trainees being sick and 3 more on leave

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Table A-8 (continued)

Date	Time		Place	Trainees	Instructor	Subject	Scope	Remarks
	From	To						
Thursday, Nov 13	0900	1155	LCC Classroom	18 Strike Force	Major Vichien	Reconnaissance	- Patrol missions - EEIs - Patrol composition - Patrol orders	This again was revision of basic training
	1310	1640		4 LCC PP				
Friday, Nov 14	0900	1215	Field	15 Strike Force	Major Vichien	Observation and reporting-- reconnaissance patrols	- Practical exercise in watching and reporting physical and human objects	Standard of reporting unsatisfactory, insufficient knowledge of EEI; Strike Force inexperienced in surveillance techniques; PP (LCC) assistant instructors performed badly as observer.  The last half of the afternoon period used for LCC base defense alarm system
	1330	1630	LCC Classroom	3 LCC PP				
Monday, Nov 17	0920	1155	Classroom and field	16 Strike Force	Major Sanat	Radio communications	- Demonstrations and exercises using three different radios, including whip antennae	Essentially the same lesson as on Nov 10 was repeated, this time with students using radios in villages as much as ten kilometers distant from the Lao Luang control
	1310	1600		4 LCC PP				
Tuesday, Nov 16								Training postponed owing to sickness (influenza) among trainees (and instructor)
Wednesday, Nov 19	1030	1145	Classroom and field	16 Strike Force	Major Vichien	Combat patrolling	- Patrol formations - Missions - Planning, preparation and orders - Equipment and rations	This instruction was a series of demonstrations and exercises covering elementary patrol formations and initial patrolling arrangements, including briefings based on scenarios
	1400	1650		3 LCC PP				
Thursday, Nov 20	0930	1150	Classroom and field	17 Strike Force	Major Vichien	Combat patrolling (continued)	- Patrol tactics, track discipline and signals - Immediate actions--attack and counter ambush - Ambush	The instructional methods were as for the previous day, ending up in a large practical exercise involving encirclement and attack of a simulated target. General standard of trainees was fair
	1400	1630		4 LCC PP				

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Table A-8 (concluded)

Date	Time		Place	Trainees	Instructor	Subject	Scope	Remarks
	From	To						
Friday, Nov 21								Training postponed owing to sickness and important religious ceremony
Sunday, Nov 23	1100		Phu Langka	16 Strike Force	Major Vichien	Field exercise -- patrolling	- Day and night combat and reconnaissance patrol exercise on Phu Langka	This was essentially a hill climb during which little training was carried out. Communications were tested frequently and successfully. Attempts (unsuccessful) were also made to discover OP positions on Phu Langka which could cover the surrounding flat land
Monday, Nov 24		0930		3 LCC PP				
	1320	1600	Classroom	-do-	-do-	Debriefing	- Patrol orders, formations and track discipline	Debriefing of field exercise--a lecture on mistakes made
Tuesday, Nov 25	1440	1640	Classroom	All available LCC personnel	Major Vichien	Command/control	- Organization and functions of: Changwat CPM BCC LCC, including staff procedures Target Area Two	Lecture included description of various permutations of Strike Force according to mission
Wednesday, Nov 26	0920	1155	Classroom	All available LCC personnel	Major Vichien	Command/control	Practical exercises on administrative (medical, logistics, discipline) and operational problems	Of eight single situations (scenarios) posed, six were on administrative matters and two on CT sightings. The latter were the only exercises which could be considered as CPX and they were only lightly covered
	1345	1430						

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- Training aids, such as charts and explosives, were available for the second session.
- There was more emphasis on field training and command post exercise procedures.
- The local influenza epidemic had subsided by the time of the Hat Ha Hat Hae session.

(U) (S) On the other hand, the Hat Hae training revealed that the LCS staff there was less competent than the one at Lao Luang. This was because the staff was newer, relatively inexperienced, and the key positions--commander and S1/4--were filled by men of apparently lower caliber.

4. Step One-and-a-Half (U)

(U) (S) Immediately after Step One training concluded at Hat Hae in December 1969, it was decided to hold this additional training at the two LCSs consecutively in January. It was eventually carried out, however, from February 2 to 6 at Lao Luang and February 23 to 27 at Hat Hae. The postponements and splitting of the training sessions were necessitated by administrative work load and sickness among the training staff, principally the G2/3 who continued to be the key organizer and instructor.

(U) (S) The actual training accomplished at Lao Luang in the Step One-and-a-Half training is summarized in Table A-9. The same basic content, with the same instructors and a similar number and type of students, was provided at Hat Hae. In both places there were only four days of training rather than the eight scheduled. The Hat Hae training was curtailed by a visit from the Changwat Governor, which required the attendance of CPM training officials to discuss the deteriorating situation in the adjoining part of Laos.

(U) (S) A day of planned map-training exercise was cut from the program at both Lao Luang and Hat Hae; three days of other field exercises were also dropped; so were information transfers from informants, and communications between the two LCSs and the BC HQ.

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Table A-9  
LCC PLAN 9 STEP ONE-AND-A-HALF TRAINING - LAO LIANG (U)

Date	Time		Place	Trainees	Instructors	Subject	Scope	Remarks
	From	To						
Monday Feb 2, 1970								No training held because 6 students were absent on administrative duties. Note, a training day was similarly lost during the subsequent Mao Tse program owing to a visit from the changing governor. In both cases, map reading subjects were dropped.
Tuesday Feb 3	1000	1125	LCC	7 LCC Staff, 3 Strike Force police (PF) personnel, 1 Village Security Unit (VSU) police commander, 1 River Check Point (RCP) police commander	Sompit Lertprasert, Chief Psyops Section, Nong Khai CPM	Psyops	- Definition and purpose of psyops - CT propaganda - Counter-propaganda - Public opinion molding - Civic action	This lesson was a good introduction to psyops and focused on the general benefits accruing to government from good security force/people relations. No attempt was made to explain the interplay of psyops with tactical intelligence which is normally a major objective.
Wednesday Feb 4	0945 1405	1055 1545	LCC Classroom	7 LCC Staff, 3 SF PP 2 VSU PP 1 RCP PP	Major Vichien Pantichai, CPM G2B3	LCC standard operating procedures (SOP)	- Explanation of Plan 9 - Mission of LCC - Relationships with BCC, VSUs, RCPs and other local security forces - Individual LCC staff functions and duties - Message procedures - Reporting requirements	Although Plan 9 organization and functions had previously been explained to some of these trainees during the Step One program, this was the first time that the specific role of the LCCs and the LCC staff functions were clearly spelled out--verbally and in writing.
Thursday Feb 5	1000 1400	1045 1630	LCC Classroom	5 LCC staff 3 SF PP 2 VSU PP 1 RCP PP	Major Vichien	Use of maps and compasses	- Types of map - Symbols - Scale and measurement - Angles and direction finding - Compass use	This was a revision lesson for the LCC and Strike Force, an introduction for the VSU and RCP commanders. The fact that it has been found necessary to revise repeatedly this lesson indicates the importance placed upon maps and, perhaps, the inadequacy of the previous training. Similar instruction given at Mao Tse was more detailed, much longer and better exercised.
Friday Feb 6	0900	1155	LCC Classroom and field	5 LCC staff 4 SF PP 2 VSU PP 1 RCP PP	Major Vichien	Command post exercises	- Message reception - Message routing - Report evaluation - Decision-making - Dissemination of orders	Four scenarios were staged and the whole LCC staff required to operate according to the SOPs given out two days earlier. The scenarios practiced staff members in all their basic functions, with emphasis on the commander and the S2 & 3. The Strike Force was also given dry runs in forming up and briefing procedures. The major benefit from these exercises was the practical familiarization of the LCC staff with their duties, although the solutions to the problems posed tended to be slow and inadequate.

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5. Interim Summary (U)

(U) (C) At the end of Step One-and-a-Half it is pertinent to review what it, together with Steps Zero and One, had achieved in relation to the requirements of the CPM training order for Step One.

(U) (C) (1) About a half of the informants had been taken again through their observation and reporting functions, more specifically than in the basic training; they also had further lessons on the use of radio; they had not been practiced, however, in information transfers or in personal reporting as required; and their map reading ability remained marginal. By the end of Step One-and-a-Half, moreover, there was a suggestion in the evaluators' reports that many of the informants had forgotten a substantial amount of the basic training lessons they had received as much as ten months before.

(U) (C) (2) The Strike Forces had been given more lessons, but little practical exercise, in patrol and ambush formations and drills, and in radio communications. They had received very little extra map reading instruction, had carried out no map training exercises, and had to depend on local knowledge to find their way around.

(U) (C) (3) The LCS staffs received their first training of any kind during this period, and this consisted of an explanation of Plan 9 C<sup>3</sup> system, the elements of psyops, an introduction to LCS SOPs and map reading, and familiarization with CPX procedures. About a half of the LCS staffs had also attended the review lessons for informants and Strike Forces during the Step One training. This did not, however, give them much insight into what the informants and SF had been taught during the basic training program. Thus, they had little knowledge of what could be expected of them, which, together with their brief acquaintanceship, particularly with the village informants, placed them under a considerable handicap. This problem could have been prevented if the LCS staffs had been fully established at the outset, as envisaged for Phase Two of Plan 9, and accompanied the informants through their basic training period. This is a particular point to be made for any future training.

(U) (C) (4) Local VSU commanders were brought into the training process during Step One-and-a-Half and instructed in the general Plan 9 outline and requirements of their units.

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(U)  
(C) (5) (U) (C) Communications with the BC HQ were not tested from either LCS during the exercises.

(U)  
(C) (6) (C) Despite these several deficiencies, the results of the exercises were encouraging and, although far too short in duration and scope, they did produce a viable structure for the singular, joint, and full system exercises planned for Steps Two and Three.

(U)  
(C) Note: That field training had not come up to expectations was fully recognized by RTG officials. At a CSOC meeting on the progress of Plan 9 held on 9 February 1970, at which the Director of the Operations and Coordination Center was present, the Nong Khai CPM Military Advisor cited the following problem areas: lack of training preparation; the limited CPM staff; inexperienced field personnel; insufficiency of umpires; and shortage of communications equipment.\*

6. Step Two (U)

a. Schedule and Program (U)

(U)  
(C) Step Two training exercises were carried out at the Lao Luang LCS and BC HQ from 23 to 27 March 1970 and at the Hat Hae LCS and BC HQ from 8 to 12 June. The reasons for the ten-week interval between the two exercises was because (1) the Nong Khai CPM had to conduct field exercises for two newly trained groups of VSDU personnel and (2) because of several national and religious holidays during that period.

(U)  
(C) A copy of the Step Two training program carried out at Lao Luang is at Table A-10. This was repeated at Hat Hae with the addition of an hour for debriefing by the umpire at the end of each day, and an additional three hours of scenario exercise on the Thursday afternoon. There were in all only three actual training days, the first and last days being reserved for briefing and debriefing at the BC HQ.

b. Scope and Comment (U)

(U)  
(C) Thirteen scenarios were staged at Lao Luang and fourteen at Hat Hae, covering practical incidents of suspected infiltration, actual infiltration and exfiltration, and base defense. The BC HQ was involved in six of the scenarios in each case and

\* (U) Memorandum to the Record, by Vanpen Narakol, SRI, 16 February 1970. (Confidential)

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(U)

Table A-10

~~(S)~~ STEP TWO TRAINING - LAO LUANG (U)

Date	Time		Place	Trainees	Umpires	Subject	Scenario	Remarks
	From	To						
Tuesday, 24 Mar 1970	0920	1500	LCS hall and in the field	7 LCS staff 4 SF (PP) and all available SF (VV) 3 Village Informants	No CPM officials present	CPX (5 scenarios)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- General background situation of Laos and Thailand.</li> <li>- An agent informed LCS about an incident on the Laos bank.</li> <li>- A VSJ informed LCS about suspect action by 2 boats in the Mekong river.</li> <li>- Investigation of the two boats.</li> <li>- An agent informed LCS about a suspect boat being found near a village.</li> <li>- A villager informed the LCS about Communist leaflets found around his village.</li> </ul>	Solutions made correctly and quickly owing to experience of the staffs especially the Commander and S2/3. Night exercise on base defense was also carried out well.
Wednesday, 25 Mar 1970	0846	2142	LCS classroom and in the field	7 LCS staff 4 SF (PP) and all available SF (VV) 3 Village Informants	No CPM officials present	CPX (6 scenarios)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- An agent informed LCS about Communist weapons hidden in the forest.</li> <li>- BC HQ gave LCS advance information on CTs crossing the river from Laos in order to get weapons.</li> <li>- SF patrol contacted CTs with casualties on both sides.</li> <li>- The captured CT disclosed a CT plan to attack LCS that night.</li> <li>- LCS base defense at night.</li> <li>- Helicopter brought in to evacuate casualties.</li> </ul>	Field ambush exercise was reasonably effected although SF patrolling and defensive tactics were poor. Another base defense exercise was carried out at night and was adequate.
Thursday, 26 Mar 70	0835	1904	LCS hall and in the field	As for 25 March	No CPM officials present	CPX (2 scenarios)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Report from Hat Hae LCS about two suspects travelling in the Lao Luang area.</li> <li>- BC HQ informed LCS about CT plan to cross from Thailand to Laos that night.</li> </ul>	Field exercises to carry out surveillance on suspects were satisfactory. A night ambush exercise was also included.

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(U)  
(C) simulated report sources were from village informants, villagers, local VSUs and the Nong Khai CPM. Umpires (CPM officials) were present at both the LCS and BC HQ during the Hut Hae exercise; at the BC HQ only during the Lao Luang exercise. SRI evaluators were present at all locations. A brief summary of their comments on the highlights of this training follows.

## (1) Lao Luang (U)

(U)  
(C) The previously prepared scenarios were simple and practical but their timing was faulty in that they overlapped too much, thereby flooding the C<sup>3</sup> system before it had a chance to be properly established.

(U)  
(C) There was too much emphasis on the commander and the S2/3. Although these are the key officials in the LCS, the others needed practice in dealing with operational problems--as they will have to when the commander and S2/3 are on leave or away from the LCS.

(U)  
(C) There was considerable confusion at the start over the implementation of SOP, particularly the message routing. This improved towards the end but problems in distinguishing between urgent and routine messages were not resolved.

(U)  
(C) The major scene of action revolved, as intended, around the LCS rather than the BC HQ. Thus, an official umpire should have been at the LCS to correct mistakes in procedures or problem-solving on the spot--at the end of each scenario or at the end of each day. Leaving all comments and criticisms until the end of the exercise meant that their impact was much reduced because they were too generalized, the LCS staff already having forgotten many of the details by that time.

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(U) (C) Overall, the whole LCS staff, the Strike Force and three or four village informants participated in Step Two at both Lao Luang and Hat Hae. Despite many faults in details, the LCS system worked well in its first tryout, and the Strike Force responded satisfactorily to orders, although their map-reading ability remained poor, and radio communications to the LCS were inadequate. The informants' performance was not good. They still could not operate their radios properly, and it was discovered that several of the sets issued to villages in January had already broken down because of poor maintenance. The previous inference of informants having forgotten some of the rudiments of their basic instruction was borne out during this exercise, the implication being that there had been too long a gap before the practical field exercises were held. However, it must be remembered that this represented a small sample size, since only a handful of informants participated.

(U) (C) The BC HQ, also operating for the first time, was not rigorously tested, except in communicating with the LCS, and the two officials involved (G2/3, G1/4) demonstrated competence in handling the few problems posed to them.

(2) Hat Hae (U)

(U) (C) With a much longer lead time, and with the Lao Luang CPX experience behind them, the CPM made a thorough job of preparing for the Step Two Hat Hae/BC HQ training. Scenarios were better written (they were similar to those used at Lao Luang but with detailed variations); this time there were official umpires for the Strike Force and village informants as well as the control centers, and comprehensive written staff solutions to each scenario had been prepared. All together there was a much more professional and realistic flavour from the outset of this exercise.

(U) (C) There was no attempt, however, to follow the operational SOP during the Hat Hae exercises. The commander, who had replaced the first one, was completely new to Plan 9 and to the area, and his method of approach to scenario-solving was to do everything himself, with the result that the LCS staff, particularly the S2/3, were not exercised. The performance of the Strike Force and the few informants who participated was of a similar standard to that at Lao Luang.

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(U) (C) Although the Hat Hae exercises were well prepared, they were inadequately supervised; lessons learned in procedures and problem solving were not properly reviewed, the CPM staff by then being involved in preparing for the full-system Step Three exercises that were due to take place just over a week later. Thus the timing of Step Two at Hat Hae was faulty, the LCS was not fully exercised, and its standard of performance still remained below that of Lao Luang.

c. Summary (U)

(U) (C) By the end of Step Two, both LCSs had been individually practiced in command post exercises and so, to a limited extent, had the BC HQ. Communications between the three control elements had been tested and found satisfactory. The whole C<sup>3</sup> system had not been tested, as envisaged for Step Two in the CPM training order, nor had local VSUs, BPP and SOC units participated. It was planned to do this, however, during Step Three.

7. Step Three (U)

a. Preparation and Schedule (U)

(U) (C) The orders setting the stage for Step Three--the finale of Plan 9 formal training--were impressive. A comprehensive plan for the exercises (Nong Khai CPM order 158/2513) was issued on 18 June 1970, the first annex of which assigned 13 Changwat and Amphoe CPM officers (10 of them field-grade) as umpires for the BC HQ, two LCSs and their Strike Forces and village informants.

(U) (C) The second annex covered the names of every individual in the control organizations and operational units that were to participate, including the five Target Area Two strike force squads and the five VSUs in the Plan 9 area; also the names of 131 village informants in the 28 villages of the operational area.

(U) (C) The third annex gave a detailed operational picture of the security threat in and around the Plan 9 area, with emphasis on Communist insurgent activities in the adjoining parts of Laos. This was followed by 14 scenarios to be staged over the three training days exercising both LCSs and the BC HQ, with emphasis on coordinated

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operations and the main headquarters. (Five additional scenarios were inserted into the program by the Chief Umpire as the exercises progressed, mainly to force the BC HQ and the Target Area Two Strike Forces to become more involved.)

(U) The schedule for Step Three is at Table 19. This was generally followed during the exercises and, instead of a confusingly detailed, blow-by-blow account of the individual and joint implementation by the three control elements and their subordinate units and personnel, the discussion that follows will describe the highlights, together with the positive and negative results.

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(U)  
 (C) STEP THREE - FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE SCHEDULE (U)  
 Table A-11

Date	Time		Subject	Place	Reference	Training Aids	Remarks
	From	To					
Monday, 22 June 1970	0800	1200	Orientation - Method of training - Introducing umpires - Issuing equipment - Explaining general situation	BC HQ	CSOC paper and others	Map 1:50,000 sheet Ban Mui Suem, Ban Tha Si Khai. Comm. equipment in unit and in area. One motorcycle Two 3/4 ton trucks Two bicycles Long-shaft boats Organic weapons	BC HQ commander BC HQ staff LCS commanders
	1300	1600	The umpire and trainees travel to their exercise locations.	Hat Hae and Lao Luang LCSs			
Tuesday, 23 June 1970	0800	1200	The umpire hands out scenarios and the trainees conduct exercises.	BC HQ Hat Hae & Lao Luang LCSs	CSOC paper and others	-do-	[3 scenarios]
	1300	2100	-do-				
Wednesday, 24 June 1970	0800	0900	Umpires critique the exercises on June 23.	BC HQ and LCSs	CSOC paper and others	-do-	[7 scenarios]
	0900	1200	Umpires hand out scenarios and trainees conduct the exercise.				
	1300	1600	-do-				
Thursday, 25 June 1970	1600	1700	Umpires critique the day's exercises.	BC HQ and LCSs	CSOC paper and others	-do-	[4 scenarios]
	0800	1200	Umpires hand out scenarios and trainees conduct exercises.				
	1300	1600	-do-				
Friday, 26 June 1970	1600	1700	End of training Umpires critique the day's exercises.	BC HQ	CSOC paper and others	-do-	BC HQ commander, staff and umpires
	0800	1200	Umpires collect the results and reports. The Director critiques and summarizes results.				

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## b. Implementation (U)

### (1) The First Scenario (U)

(U) (C) This first exercise on March 23 gave Step Three a very bad start. A simulated message was scheduled in the CPM order to be sent at 0730 hours, informing the Hat Hae LCS that 5 insurgents were expected to cross the Mekong river from an adjoining village in Laos to the Northern edge of the Lao Luang operational area. But the message was not received until 0815 hours for the simple reason that the exercises were not due to commence until 0800 hours and it took 15 minutes for the LCS staff to get organized. Caught completely off their guard, the LCS staff made a shambles of a rather interesting scenario.

(U) (C) In the first place it took them one hour to decide what to do. At the end of this period a message was sent to the Lao Luang LCS requesting SF interception from there to the expected landing point 15 kms upstream; whereas it would have been only 9 kms downstream, with much more lead time, using the Hat Hae SF. The message also told Lao Luang that the Hat Hae LCS had already ordered two VSUs in the vicinity of the landing point to intercept and ambush the CTs, although both these units were in the operational area and ostensibly under control of the Lao Luang LCS. In addition, the Hat Hae LCS logged a simulated information message to the BPP Platoon situated 10 kms to the north of them, without the slightest idea of how such a message could be sent in reality. (Note: No communications system was established between Plan 9 units and the BPP during Step Three, but had such existed, an information message of this nature should rightly have been channeled through the BC HQ.) About the only thing the Hat Hae LCS did right in this first scenario was to alert its informants in appropriate villages to maintain surveillance.

(U) (C) The LCS did inform the BC HQ of the situation, however, and the fact that it had instructed two Lao Luang VSUs to intercept the CTs and had alerted its own informants. The message mentioned nothing about the request for the Lao Luang Strike Force, nor about the simulated BPP message. The BC HQ reaction was merely to inform the Nong Khai CPM, and instruct the LCSs to report results.

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(U) (C) The LCS Lao Luang fared little better. It took less than 20 minutes to decide on a plan, but then proceeded to send its SF (fortunately, only in theory) on an interception course which took the SF not only well into the Hat Hae operational area but also over the operational boundary controlled by the Seka Amphoe CPM--without informing either of these commands. Accepting without protest the preemption by the Hat Hae LCS of its authority over VSU units (whose unspecified operations in reality could have led to a clash either with each other or with the SF), the Lao Luang LCS then alerted the informants in villages surrounding the expected landing area, but omitted informing those in the one village where the landing was most likely to occur.

(U) (C) Overall, no one came out very well in this first scenario, for which the untimeliness of the message and the complete abnegation of responsibility by the BC HQ were the main causes; and the four umpires concerned (all field-grade officers) did not explain the correct solutions as required under paragraph 3.6 of the Step Three training order.

(2) Developments (U)

(U) (C) In subsequent exercises, procedures and problem-solving never descended to the depths of Scenario One, and, although there continued to be faults in details, the LCS staffs gradually improved. The SF tactical exercises were satisfactorily carried out, although their map reading and communications were unsatisfactory, and the four or five agents practiced in both LCS areas performed quite well except that they were totally unable to read a map. There was some doubt also about the ability of the LCS staffs in the using of maps, which could account for them ordering operations outside their own areas of responsibility. There were certainly several unaccountable discrepancies of UTM coordinate details in the various evaluators' reports and message copies, but whether this was due to poor reporting or poor map reading is impossible to assess. The author's own impression of the trainees' performance at both LCS Lao Luang and the BC HQ was that they were slow in map reading and needed much more practice.

(U) (C) The major requirements in staging field exercises are realism and experience. As mentioned by several of the officials taking part, it is difficult to get men to do their best in a "cold" situation--the infiltration through the Plan 9 area reportedly having virtually ceased nearly a year before Step Three. Notwithstanding this, the exercises could have been

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much more realistic if the umpires had come up to expectations. As it was, they were all inexperienced in CPX/FTX, insufficiently briefed either as to being told what to do or by reading their orders, and some were rather relaxed in their attitude towards the exercises.

(U) (S) The LCS staffs, however, with little correction or advice, went steadily through their scenarios, which tested them quite exhaustively, and often learned from their own mistakes. There was a flavor of ritual attending the message-routing SOPs, although one LCS commander made it quite clear that he would short-circuit the system in the event of a real emergency--which, of course, he should do. Thus, any analysis of average timings from the message being received to a decision being taken (which was in the order of 20 minutes at both LCSs) would apply only to the exercises, and not a live operational situation.

(U) (S) The BC HQ tended to be used as a message channel rather than an operational center. It made no attempt to call in outside forces even when (in Scenario No. 5) 60 CTs in four groups were reported in the area. Its solution to this problem was merely to inform the two LCSs to follow the situation closely and to use very small Amphoe CPM units to intercept. No attempt was made to involve the Target Area Two Strike Forces nor the local BPP platoons. Neither were any attempts made to establish communications with the BPP or Marine Police and, although the latter were reportedly standing by for participation in Step Three, they were never used.

(U) (S) Although delegation of authority to local units is desirable, coordination of their activities and support is required from the BC HQ and this was rarely forthcoming. It was the first time that the HQ had been really tested in its decision-making function, however, and its staff clearly were inexperienced in dealing with the problems posed. The Chief Umpire, who was at the BC HQ, inserted additional surprise scenarios in order to force the staff into action but even when (in the last scenario) combined operations of all LCS and Target Area Two Strike Forces had to be undertaken, the reaction of the BC HQ was to assign the responsibility to the local LCS commander. This resulted in a problem of seniority between the various SF commanders, which the BC HQ should have anticipated by sending one of its own staff as overall commander, or by specifically designating the LCS commander to take charge.

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c. Summary (U)

(1) Debriefing (U)

(U) (C) On 26 June, the CPM Military Advisor held a debriefing meeting at the BC HQ in which all umpires, Plan 9 control staff and unit commanders, and observers participated. The principal umpires for the BC HQ, LCSs, SFs and informants gave their comments individually after which the Military Advisor summed up. The major points made were:

(U) (C) • The radio procedures and map-reading capability of both informants and SFs were below operational requirements. A different method of location finding and reporting was required.

(U) (C) • The operational tactics of all SFs were satisfactory, but patrol discipline was poor. No passwords were used throughout the exercises for any of the patrols and ambushes, nor were radio call-signs for operational units designated. The operational readiness of SF units, particularly at the BC HQ, was slow; SF commanders' briefings to their men were not sufficiently clear and comprehensive; and the SFs were inadequately practiced in emergency stand-to's for base defense, by day and night.

(U) (C) • The decision-making procedures at the BC HQ and the LCSs were too slow for operational requirements. The SOPs required amendment to allow for immediate action for emergency reports. The internal LCS routing procedures were unnecessarily handicapped by poor seating arrangements and untidy handling and filing of messages and orders.

(U) (C) • Communications between BC HQ and LCSs were satisfactory, but they were still not up to standard in regard to SFs and informants.

(U) (C) • Only 4 or 5 informants participated in Step Three and it was agreed that all informants should be included in future exercises. Emphasis of training should be on clear, simple and informal messages that the informants could understand and respond to. Military terminology should be discarded. In future scenarios, care must be taken to avoid overloading the informant communications network.

(U) (C) • It was recognized that the Lao Luang LCS staff was more experienced, efficient and ready for operational responsibility than the one at Hat Hae.

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• (U)  
(C) Overall, the Step Three exercises were deemed to be a success, and a great improvement over Step Two. It was recognized that the exercises could have been much more realistic in their planning, implementation and supervision, but it was felt that they had served a useful purpose in testing the C<sup>3</sup> and operational systems--the many faults of which had been noted and would be rectified in future training. In this regard, the Military Advisor stated that it was his intention to hold similar CPX and FTX for Plan 9 units at intervals of two months or so, not only to improve the system and operations, but also to maintain a satisfactory standard of operational readiness.

(2) Comment (U)

(U)  
(C) Points that were not brought out in the debriefing but could have been discussed are as follows:

• (U)  
(C) None of the umpires--either at the debriefing or during the exercises--took any action to explain or correct the many mistakes and omissions in the operational and tactical decisions made. The umpires were, in fact, required by the CPM training order to make their critiques at the end of each scenario (see item 3.6 of Table 18); and the specific reasons for their failure to do so are not known. However, they had received no training in their role and duties, which is an obvious first requirement. If the umpires had understood and discharged the responsibilities laid down for them, the exercises would undoubtedly have benefited.

• (U)  
(C) As it was, the major responsibility for the planning and implementation of Step Three was borne by the CPM G2/3. This he had also borne in previous Plan 9 training, but now that as many as half a dozen scenes of action were enacted concurrently, it was virtually impossible for him to carry the load all by himself whatever his experience and ability.

• (U)  
(C) There were considerable logistics handicaps to effective exercises in Step Three. First of all, it was the height of the rainy season, which made some roads unusable and particularly those around Hat Hae--thereby considerably curtailing the planned FTX. The 3/4-ton truck assigned to Hat Hae broke down and was unserviceable throughout the exercises, and both the LCS boats were unusable because of faulty engines.

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• (U) (C) Neither the SOC, BPP, nor Marine Police participated in Step Three, although expressly included in the CPM training order. The BPP was preoccupied with training of its own, the Marine Police reportedly standing by at Bung Kan were not used, and no mention was made of the SOC after the issue of the order. The five VSUs in the Plan 9 area did not participate actively either (in the FTX), and there is still considerable doubt about their reporting responsibility--whether it be, variously, to the Target Area HQs, to the BC HQ, to the Amphoe CPM, or to the LCSs. Since their communication channels are still linked with the Target Area Two HQ and the two Amphoe CPSs--as they were in September, 1969--it would appear that the LCSs would have to ask for any VSU operational involvement through the BC HQ in the first instance. Thus the LCSs do not, at the present time, command or control the VSUs. Nor, strictly speaking, does the BC HQ.

• (U) (C) Another point of note was that the BC HQ commander, the new Nai Amphoe of Bung Kan, did not take part in the exercises. He did, however, attend the briefing and debriefing sessions at Sri Vilai on 22 and 26 June. In his absence, the two principal staff officers--the S1/4 and S2/3--acted as commander. Thus the capacity of the BC HQ commander was not tested.

• (U) (C) In summary, Step Three was confined to exercising and testing organic elements of Plan 9 only. It did not cover the full system tests involving all detection, command, and tactical elements as required in CPM order No. 271/2512.

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Third Week

(Tab 1)

Date	Subject	Time		Place	Instructor	Assistant Instructor	Remarks
		From	To				
Monday 2 June 69	Judo	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		
	Communist Propaganda and recruitment	0900	1200	Classroom	Maj. Wichian Prasitchai		
	Compass using	1300	1700	"	MRDC		
	Commander's time	1900	2000	"			
Tuesday 3 June 69	Thai boxing	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		
	Principles in map reading and setting the map	0900	1200	Classroom	RCT 13 )		Sub Lt. Worawit Rawangset
	" "	1300	1400	"	RCT 13 )		
	Map reading	1400	1700	"	RCT 13 )		
	Latest news in area	1900	2000	"	Maj. Wichian Prasitchai		
Wednesday 4 June 69	Thai boxing	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		
	Use of compass in finding direction & for travelling	0900	1200	Classroom	MRDC		
	Sketching	1300	1400	"	"		
	Air planes, helicopters, weapons and uniforms of North Vietnam, Red China and Pathet Lao soldiers	1500	1700	"	Maj. Wichian Prasitchai		
	Commander's time	1900	2000	"			

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(Tab 1)

Date	Subject	Time		Place	Instructor	Assistant Instructor	Remarks
		From	To				
Thursday 5 June 69	Use of silent weapons	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		
	Psychological operations	0900	1200	Classroom	Nai Somphit Loetprasoet		
	Rural development and public rehabilitation	1300	1700	"	Col. Chaiphon Wan Aiam		
	Commander's time	1900	2000	"			

Signed: Maj. Wichian Prasitchai  
G-3, CPM Nong Khai

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(U)

Tab 1

(U) VILLAGE INFORMANT COURSE TIMETABLE (U)

First Week

Nong Khai CPM

Date	Subject	Time		Place	Instructor	Assistant Instructor	Remarks
		From	To				
Monday 19 May 69	Physical Training & Exercise	0600	0700	Playground	Superintendent	Pol. Sgt. Son Yunsuk	
	Opening ceremony	0900	1200	Classroom	CPM Advisor		
	Materiel (Shotgun and ammunitions)	1300	1500	"	Pol. Lt. Ruangsak ) Chualaka )		
	Materiel (carbine and rifle)	1500	1700	"	" )		
	Loyalty	1900	2000	"	Maj. Sakda Khongphatyun		
Tuesday 20 May 69	Physical exercise	0600	0700	Playground	Superintendent	Sgt. Chuan Nakmai	
	SSI and security in communications	0900	1000	Classroom	Maj. Sanat ) Intarapakdi )		
	Use of radio telephone	1000	1100	"	" )		
	Message writing and forms	1100	1200	"	" )		
	Weapon training (aiming and shooting)	1300	1700	Playground	Pol. Lt. Ruangsak ) Chualaka )		
	Endurance and devotion	1900	2000	Classroom	Nai Adirek Phonsak		
Wednesday 21 May 69	Physical exercise	0600	0700	Playground	Superintendent	Sgt. Chuan Nakmai	
	Antenna & Radiation of transmitter waves	0900	1000	Classroom	Maj. Sanat ) Intarapakdi )		
	Use of SSB radio	1000	1100	"	" )		
	Use of CSOC 1-3 radios	1100	1200	"	" )		
	Use of CSOC 1-3 radios	1300	1700	Field (Training)	" )		
	Commander's time	1900	2000	Classroom			

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(Tab 1)

Date	Subject	Time		Place	Instructor	Assistant Instructor	Remarks
		From	To				
Thursday 22 May 29	Physical exercise	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		
	Observation and memory training	0900	1200	Classroom	MRDC		
	Intelligence, definition, information collection and processing	1300	1600	"	RCT 13		
	Use of radio telephone and summary	1600	1700	"	Maj. Sarot Intarapakdi		
	Duty of citizenship	1900	2000	"	Nai Thongkhun Phuthiwong		
Friday 23 May 69	Sports	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		
	Intelligence, definition, information collection and processing	0900	1200	Classroom	RCT 13		
	" "	1300	1700	"	RCT 13		
	Bravery	1900	2000	"	Nai Somphit Loetprasert		
Saturday 24 May 69	Sports	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		
	Intelligence operations	0900	1200	Classroom	Pol. Maj. Piraphon Suksoem		
	Democroctic Administration Commander's time	1300 1900	1700 2000	" "	Sub. Lt. Thaksin Mahasiriphan		

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Signed: Maj. Wichian Prasitchai  
G-3, CPM Nong Khai

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Second Week

(Tab 1)

Date	Subject	Time		Place	Instructor	Assistant Instructor	Remarks
		From	To				
Monday 26 May 69	Sports	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		Capt. Thirawat Premprakhin CPM
	Surveillance	0900	1200	Classroom	Pol. Maj. Pirabhan Kuksoem		
	Camouflage	1300	1700	"	RCT 13		
	Esprit de corps	1900	2000	"	Nai Thawin Potawat		
Tuesday 27 May 69	Use of silent weapons	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		CPM
	Thai History	0900	1100	Classroom	Nai Isara Charanyanon		
	Surveillance	1100	1200	"	Pol. Maj. Piraphon Suksoem		
	Surveillance Discipline	1300 1900	1700 2000	Field Classroom	" Lt. Thawat Raksa, RTN		
Wednesday 28 May 69	Judo	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		Pol. Lt. Thanom Wongnakphet
	Intelligence reporting	0900	1200	Classroom	Maj. Wichian Prasitchai		
	International law in border crossing	1300	1500	"	Immigration		
	Thai history	1500	1700	"	Nai Isara Charanyanon		
	Morals	1900	2000	"	Col. Chaiphon Wan Aiam		

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(S)

(Tab 1)

Date	Subject	Time		Place	Instructor	Assistant Instructor	Remarks
		From	To				
Thursday 29 May 69	Judo	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		
	Intelligence reporting	0900	1200	Classroom	Maj. Wichian Prasitchai		
	Intelligence reporting	1300	1400	"	"		
	Communist Administration	1400	1700	"	Col. Chaiphon Wan Aiam		
	Morals	1900	2000	"	"		
Friday 30 May 69	Tour						
Saturday 31 May 69	Judo	0600	0700	Play ground	Superintendent		Maj. Theb
	Counter-intelligence and security	0900	1200	Classroom	MRDC		
	Comparison between the democratic and communist administrations	1300	1700	"	Col. Chaiphon Wan Aiam		

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Signed Maj. Wichian Prasitchai  
G-3, CPM Nong Khai

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Tab 2

Nong Khai CPM

(U) STRIKE FORCE TRAINING COURSE TIMETABLE (U)  
7 July 1969 - 1 August 1969

First Week

Date	Subject	Time		Place	Instructor
		From	To		
Monday 7 July 69	-Physical exercise	0600	0700	School ground	Admin. instructor
	-Opening ceremony and orientation	0900	1200	Classroom	CPM staff
	-Unarmed drill	1300	1700	School ground	From SAF (Special Action Force)
	-Loyalty	1900	2000	Classroom	Maj. Sakda Kongpatyuen
Tuesday 8 July 69	-Physical exercise	0600	0700	School ground	Admin. instructor
	-Unarmed drill	0900	1200	"	From SAF
	-Arms drill	1300	1700	"	"
	-Loyalty	1900	2000	Classroom	Maj. Sakda Kongpatyuen
Wednesday 9 July 69	-Physical exercise	0600	0700	School ground	Admin. instructor
	-Arms drill	0900	1200	"	From SAF
	-Arms drill	1300	1700	"	"
	-Commander's hour	1900	2000	Classroom	"
Thursday 10 July 69	-Physical exercise	0600	0700	School ground	Admin. instructor
	-Rifle study	0900	1200	Classroom	From SAF
	-Carbine study	1300	1500	"	"
	-Shotgun study	1500	1700	"	"
	-Endurance	1900	2000	"	Mr. Adirek Phonsak
Friday 11 July 69	-Physical exercise	0600	0700	School ground	Admin. instructor
	-Principles & posture of firing (rifle)	0900	1200	Classroom	From SAF
	-Principles & posture of firing (carbine)	1300	1500	"	"
	-Principles & posture of firing (shotgun)	1500	1700	"	"
	-Endurance	1900	2000	"	Mr. Adirek Phonsak
Saturday 12 July 69	-Sports	0600	0700	School ground	Admin. instructor
	-Communications	0900	1200	Classroom	Maj. Snad Intarapakdi
	-Combat intelligence & reporting	1300	1700	"	Maj. Vichian Prasithichai
	-Commander's hour	1900	2000	"	(Ast. Sgt. Maj. Juan Nakmai)

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Second Week

Date	Subject	Time		Place	Instructor
		From	To		
Monday 14 July 69	-Judo Combat drill -Daytime fighting -Nighttime fighting -Bravery	0600	0700	School ground	Admin. instructor
		0900	1200	Classroom	From BPP
		1300	1700	"	"
		1900	2000	"	Mr. Somphit Lertprasert
Tuesday 15 July 69	-Judo Combat formations -Squad formations -Platoon formations -Movie	0600	0700	School ground	Admin. instructor
		0900	1200	Classroom	From BPP
		1300	1700	"	"
		1900	2000	"	"
Wednesday 16 July 69	-Sports Squad and platoon tactics -Offense -Defense -Commander's hour	0600	0700	School ground	Admin. instructor
		0900	1200	Classroom	From BPP
		1300	1700	"	"
		1900	2000	"	Col. Chaiphon Van-iem
Thursday 17 July 69	-Judo Withdrawal -Patrolling -Organization and mission -Unity	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instructor
		0900	1200	Classroom	From BPP
		1300	1700	"	"
		1900	2000	"	Mr. Thavin Potavat
Friday 18 July 69	-Judo Patrols -Patrol preparations -Patrol drills -Commander's hour	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instruction
		0900	1200	Classroom	From BPP
		1300	1700	Field	"
		1900	2000	Classroom	"
Saturday 19 July 69	-Judo Hand-grenade throwing -Kinds of grenades and booby traps -Throwing positions -Entertainment (movie)	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instructor
		0900	1200	Classroom	From BPP
		1300	1700	Field	"
		1900	2000	Classroom	"

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Third Week

Date	Subject	Time		Place	Instructor
		From	To		
Monday 21 July 69	-Thai boxing	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instructor
	<u>Ambush and counter-ambush</u>	0900	1200	Classroom	From BPP
	-Ambush	1300	1700	"	"
	-Counter-ambush	1900	2000	"	Mr. Somphit Lertprasert
Tuesday 22 July 69	-Thai boxing	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instructor
	Raids and surprise	0900	1200	Classroom	From BPP
	<u>Principles and surprise actions</u>	0900	1200	"	"
	-Raids, element of raids	1300	1500	"	From Changwad Education
	-History of Thailand	1500	1700	"	Col. Chaiphon Vaniam
-Development	1900	2000	"	"	
-Commander's hour	1900	2000	"	"	
Wednesday 23 July 69	-Thai boxing	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instructor
	<u>Map and compass</u>	0900	1200	Classroom	From RCT 13
	-Map reading	1500	1700	"	"
	-Use of compass and direction	1900	2000	"	Lt. Thavat
Thursday 24 July 69	-Thai boxing	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instructor
	-Use of compass and direction	0900	1200	Field	From RCT 13
	-Map sketching	1300	1700	"	"
	-Morals	1900	2000	Classroom	Col. Chaiphon Vaniam
Friday 25 July 69	-Sports	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instructor
	-Psychological operations	0900	1200	Classroom	Col. Chaiphon Vaniam
	-Explosives and sabotage	1300	1700	"	From RCT 13
	-Unity	1900	2000	"	Mr. Thavin Potavat
Saturday 26 July 69	-Use of silent weapons	0600	0700	Ground	Maj. Vichian Prasitchai
	-Guerrilla capturing	0900	1200	Classroom	Col. Chaiphon Vaniam
	-Democratic government	1300	1500	"	"
	-Communist government	1500	1700	"	"
	-Civil obligations	1900	2000	"	Mr. Thongkoon Phuthiwong

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**Fourth Week**

Date	Subject	Time		Place	Instructor
		From	To		
Monday 28 July 69	-Use of silent weapons	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. Instructor
	-Guerrilla capturing	0900	1200	Classroom	Maj. Vichian Prasitchai
	-Guerrilla capturing	1300	1500	"	"
	-Guerrilla capturing drill	1500	1700	Field	"
	-Current events	1900	2000	Classroom	"
Tuesday 29 July 69	-Tour				
Wednesday 30 July 69	-Sports	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instructor
	-Firing in the range	0900	1200	Classroom	From SAF
	-Revision for firing positions	1300	1700	Field	"
	-Commander's hour	1900	2000	Classroom	
Thursday 31 July 69	-Sports	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instructor
	-Firing with real ammunition	0900	1700	Range	From SAF
	-Commander's hour	1900	2000	Classroom	
Friday 1 Aug 69	-Sports	0600	0700	Ground	Admin. instructor
	-Nursing and field sanitation	0900	1200	Classroom	From Changwad Health Dept.
	-Closing ceremony	1300	1700	"	CPM staff

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**Appendix B**  
**VILLAGE IMPACT ASSESSMENT (U)**

**B-1**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# UNCLASSIFIED

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## Appendix B VILLAGE IMPACT ASSESSMENT (U)

### A. Objective (U)

(U) (C) The objective of this task was to describe the effects, if any, of the implementation of Plan 9 on the lives of local residents, with respect to the following questions:

1. Is the Plan 9 system visible to villagers?
2. Are economic changes noticeable? Are they good or bad for the community?
3. Does the system change villagers' sense of security?
4. Does census taking or family relocation disturb or reassure "loyal" residents?
5. Other attitude changes?

### B. Scope (U)

(U) (C) Initially, in May 1969, the heads of 25 households in 10 villages in the Plan 9 (restricted area) of Amphoe Seka were selected as respondents for systematic observation of the Plan 9 impact. In September of 1969, 10 householders from 6 villages outside the restricted area, about 40 km inland but still in Amphoe Seka, were included in these interviews, so as to provide a "control" against the opinions and impressions received from villagers inside the restricted area. In both the "restricted area" and "control area," selection of the respondents was made on the basis of providing a community cross-section in terms of ethnic background, age, occupation, education and income.



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C. Method (U)

(U) A senior SRI Research Associate, with long practical experience of rural Thailand, was established in the area. He conducted interviews of respondents in the restricted and control area, on the average 5 and 7 times respectively, over the following periods:

First round - May to November 1969

Second round - Mid-February to March 1970

Third round - May 1970

(U) To reduce the likelihood of villagers giving "desired" answers rather than expressing their real feelings, the following approach was stipulated:

- (1) Use the same respondents. (It was hoped they would become more open and honest in their answers during successive interviews.)
- (2) Do not use a formal approach. (The interviewer did not force answers to questions; instead he would be conversational and friendly, trying to elicit comments in terms of the respondent's concerns and interests. As a result, these responses reflect those aspects of the system that are important to the villager, more than would answers to a formal series of questions.)

D. Sample Description (U)

(U) Tables B-1 and B-2 show the profiles of respondent householders in the restricted and control areas respectively. Table B-3 compares the two areas with respect to the averages of the sample data for each profile category, and notes some additional comparisons with the general population in the restricted area where such data were available.

(U) It can be seen that with the exception of the amount of land owned, the samples compare closely and, in turn, are fairly representative of the general restricted-area population in the aspects noted. (The amount of land owned is typically larger inland than on the river border, and the disparity shown for the sampled households in this respect is to be expected.)

B-2  
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Table B-1  
 (CT INTERVIEW RETURN, RESTRICTED AREA (U)  
 (25 Households / 10 Villages)

Village	Age of Household Head	No. of Household Members	Maximum Education of Household Head					Ethnic Group	Amount of Land Owned (rai)	Household Income (\$/month)	Occupation of Household Head**								Remarks		
			Above Secondary	Secondary Education	Primary Education	None	Not Applicable				Rice Growing	Fishing	Official	Crop Growing	Carpentry	Trading	Timber Cutting	Tailoring		Hand Crafting	
B. The Si Khai (1)	36	8					X	TL	20	1,000											
" (2)	43	8			X			TL	25	100	P										
" (3)	67	8				X		Yao	10	70	P										
B. Thakham (1)	40	5					X*	TL	12	300	P										
" (2)	35	5	X*					TL	-	850			P								* Subject describes himself as literate, he finished with a grade 11 primary teaching certificate
B. Lon Lom (1)	38	6			X			TL	2	500-600											* Coffee soft drink shop
" (2)	40	5				X		TL	40	200	P										
" (3)	60	3				X		TL	7	no income	P										
" (4)	28	8			X			TL	20	100	P										
B. Dong Bang (1)	56	10		X				TL	18	900-1,000			P*								* Headmaster of B. Dong Bang school
" (2)	41	4			X			TL	18	100	P										
" (3)	29	6			X			TL	6	25	P										
" (4)	38	7			X			TL	10	200	P										
B. Loankhlong (1)	67	8				X		Yao	12	200	P										
B. The Rai (1)	34	3			X			TL	7	no income	P										
" (2)	32	8			X			Yao	12	360	P										
B. Poi Lan (1)	33	5			X			TL	7	35	P										
" (2)	36	6			X			TL	6	20	P										
B. Nang Hu (1)	34	5					X	TL	55	500-600	**										* This man also trades in empty bottles. He disappears for days, going around to collect bottles and returning with money. Hobby is photography !!
" (2)	30	5			X			Yao	5	600											* Reported married man the above subject, who had once threatened to kill him, might be a CT agent
B. Dong Than (1)	60	8			X			TL	7	no income	P										
" (2)	33	9			X			TL	23	240	P										
B. Dong Srang (1)	47	3			X			Yao	14	120	P										
" (2)	48	10					X	TL	42	150	P										
" (3)	27	11			X			TL	6	no avail.	P										

\* TL - Thai-Lao

\*\* P - primary occupation, S - secondary occupation

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Table B-2  
(U) INTERVIEW RETURNS, CONTROL AREA (U)  
(10 Households/6 Villages)

Village	Age of Household Head	No. of Household Members	Maximum Education of Household Head					Ethnic Group	Amount of Land Owned (rai)	Household Income (฿/month)	Occupation of Household Head**								Remarks		
			Above Secondary	Secondary Education	Primary Education	None	Not Available				Rice Growing	Fishing	Official	Crop Growing	Carpentry	Laboring	Timber Cutting	Driving		Hand-Crafting	
B. Phantakong (1)	31	3			X			TL	25	100											
" (2)	33	7				X		TL	50	250	P										
B. Dan Klang (1)	31	3			X			TL	-	300											
" (2)	64	4				X		TL	10	not avail.	P										
B. Lao (1)	25	6					X	TL	5	30	P										
" (2)	25	8			X			TL	25	100	P										
" (3)	45	11			X			TL	23	285	P										
B. Nam Song (1)	40	9			X			TL	26	100	P										
B. Huai Phak Kha (1)	46	12	X*					TL	45	1,400			P								*Primary teaching certificate
B. Nam Song (1)	41	8			X			TL	25	not avail.	P										*Family had just migrated from Kela-sin.

\* TL = Thai-Lao

\*\* P = primary occupation

s = secondary occupation

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Table B-3  
(U) COMPARISON OF INTERVIEW RETURNS FOR RESTRICTED  
AND CONTROL AREAS (U)

Item of Information	Restricted Area Sample Households		Control Area Sample Households	
	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
Age of Household Head (Avg)	41.9 years		44 years	
No. of Household Members (Avg)	6.6*		7.1	
Maximum Education of Household Head (% distribution)				
None	20%		30%	
Primary	72%		60%	
Beyond Primary	8%		10%	
Amount of Land Owned (Avg)	15.4 rai**		24.2 rai	
Monthly Income (Avg)	282 baht		269 baht	
Occupations (% distribution)	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
Rice Growing	80%	8%	70%	-
Crop Growing	-	64	10	50%
Lumbering	-	12	-	10
Tailoring	4	-	-	-
Trading	8	16	-	-
Carpenter/Hand Crafting	-	8	-	10
Driving	-	-	-	10
Laboring	-	-	10	10
Official	8	-	10	-
Fishing	-	20	-	-

\* (U) Average household per general population in restricted area is 7.5 persons.

\*\* (U) Average land holding for general population in restricted area is also 15.4 rai.

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E. Base Case Interviews (May to November 1969) (U)

(U) During a 6-month period, beginning in May 1969, several rounds of interviews were conducted with villagers in the sample households. Approximately six took place with each sample household in the restricted area, and four per sample household in the control area.

1. Control Area (U)

(U) (C) Security-related responses in the control area during this period can be characterized by the word "neutral." Interviewees, in general, did not react strongly one way or the other relative to their sense of security or to the presence of security forces in their village. Some indicated a greater feeling of safety and essentially none of the responses were negative to the presence of security forces, but the majority felt that little was changed by the presence of the paramilitary or police in their villages. Military presence was favored over that of the police or paramilitary when such a comparison was drawn. The only negative response encountered was a left-handed compliment to the effect that, "...despite the way the security people have behaved, the villagers feel safer than last year."

2. Restricted Area (U)

(U) (C) Responses by the interviewees in the restricted area followed almost the identical pattern as reported above in the control area, although more extreme views were expressed (probably due, in part, to the larger sample size increasing the chances of including some with more definite attitudes). Also, civic action was frequently discussed in connection with the security forces. Village informants of Plan 9 were mentioned on many occasions, although often referred to as VSU (Village Security Unit).

(U) (C) Again, when comparisons were made between military and police or paramilitary, the military were considered superior because of their greater discipline, fairness to the villagers, and organized approach to civic action. Some individual comments regarding the police, VDC (Volunteer Defense Corps), and VSU specified that they misdirected their power--e.g., arresting a hunter, but keeping the meat or obtaining money from gamblers and letting them continue.

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(U) (C) Still, coming through consistently is the attitude that the security forces, in general, offer more advantages to the villager and his sense of security than disadvantages, and he is glad to have them there.

3. Summary Comparison of Areas (U)

(U) (C) The control area and restricted area were remarkably similar with respect to the security-related attitudes of the inhabitants at the interviews. Those in the restricted area tended to be slightly more polarized in their opinions, but the flavor was the same. At that point in time, Plan 9 per se was making little, if any, impact on the villager-- beyond the fact that Plan 9 personnel represented additional security within his village, for which he was grateful.

F. Follow-up Interview Round (February - March, 1970) (U)

(U) (C) During the period November 1969 to February 1970, little had changed in the restricted area with respect to Plan 9 except that some additional training (Step One and One-and-a-Half) had been held at Lao Luang and Hat Hae. This training involved village informants and LCC headquarters personnel. Inasmuch as many in the sample households had previously indicated an awareness of the security role of the village informants, if not their exact relationship to the RTG, this information presumably is now common knowledge to all the villagers in the restricted area. During the period, the general situation in Laos had worsened, with greatly increased activity across the river from the restricted area.

1. Control Area (U)

(U) (C) In two villages, each of four sample households located there mentioned that more official visits had occurred and that security forces (unspecified) had stayed with them a short time; all reacted positively to this. Another commented that the PP and VDC had been observed on patrol through his village more often lately, and that he felt safer. The first actual negative comment from the control area relative to the PP was made by a sample householder in a different village who observed that while his sense of security was unchanged (he still felt quite safe), the PP often visited the village and "caused trouble." Other respondents had little change in the nature of their comments.

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2. Restricted Area (U)

(U) (C) The main difference in the general comments of interviewees in the restricted area is an awareness and appreciation of larger numbers of security forces and their more frequent visits to each of the villages. Some observations underscored their interest, for example: (1) the present security personnel, having no weapons (presumably, Plan 9 observers mistaken as VSU), could not take action if something happens, and that (2) the effectiveness of the Strike Force shotguns was doubtful. Occasionally individuals complained of unfairness of the police, but, on balance, the presence of these and other security forces was welcomed.

3. Summary Comparison of Areas (U)

(U) (C) The difference in attitude relative to security, as reflected in the comments of the two samples, is only a matter of degree. Both sensed a greater security force presence in recent months and both appreciated this increase. The trend was more pronounced in the restricted area, where sample householders were more vocal in affirming that this helped their peace of mind. Accompanying this was a higher complaint rate, also.

G. Final Interview Round (May 1970) (U)

(U) (C) During the period March to May considerable Plan 9 activity had taken place. The Step Two field exercises had been carried out at Lao Luang. CPX tests were staged in the Plan 9 area throughout May, including many C- Team simulated infiltrations. These involved the Strike Force, some village informants and also some ordinary villagers. There was ample opportunity for the villagers to observe these goings-on.

1. Control Area (U)

(U) (C) There was no change in respondents' attitude to security. More instances were reported of negative reaction to the PP. Two respondents stated positively that they did not like PP personnel in the village because of their levying (food, money) from the people. Two more were angered over PP failure to take effective action against miscreants who had shot their cows. Two other respondents were concerned over the departure of a SOC 21 team, which to them meant losing access to free medicines and medical attention.

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## 2. Restricted Area (U)

(U) (C) All respondents were aware in varying degrees of the Plan 9 activities that had taken place in their area. One respondent stated that the Strike Force made regular patrols around his village, mentioning that they had a penchant for visiting households containing girls. Several respondents felt that the security forces in the area were better coordinated than in the past, and that the Strike Force performance had generally improved. Most respondents who volunteered opinions on security forces felt, however, that they should concentrate their efforts more on the protection of villagers' property.

## 3. Summary Comparison of Areas (U)

(U) (C) On balance, the respondents in the restricted area were more positive in their attitude to security than those in the control area. They were also less bothered by objectionable PP activities.

## H. Plan 9 Impact Summary (U)

(U) (C) To date, the discernible impact of Plan 9 on villagers in the restricted area has been small but positive with respect to their attitudes. The substantial increase in security force personnel in the area meets with no disapproval and often results in positive comments. Most complaints are directed at the police, which might be expected considering their law-enforcement role. Table B-4 is a summary of the major topics raised and opinions expressed by respondents--in regard to knowledge of the security situation, attitudes toward security personnel, and their own personal concerns. Data for both the restricted and controlled areas are given.

(U) (C) In answer to the other questions originally posed for this task, it can be said that the Plan 9 system is visible to the villagers in the Plan 9 area; and it has not produced any economic changes. Possible reactions to the proposal relocation or census measures are unknown since these have not been carried out.

(U) (C) Plan 9 personnel, not having a law enforcement mission, are in a position to achieve an even better image, particularly if they emphasize civic action activities to the extent demonstrated by the military. On the other hand, their current appreciated acceptance might change with possible implementation of controls (such as curfews, check-points, and river traffic restrictions) under the Plan 9 aegis.



14 KEY WORDS	LINK A		LINK B		LINK C	
	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT
	Border control Counterinsurgency Northeast Thailand Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) Village volunteers					

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(U)

Table B-4

TOPICS DISCUSSED IN VILLAGE IMPACT ASSESSMENT INTERVIEWS (U)

Village	Household Number	Security Situation						Attitude Towards Local Security Forces						Village Life																														
		CT in Laos		CT in Local Area		Banditry		Police		Border Patrol Police		Amphoe Official		Military		LCS Strike Force		Village Informant		VSU/RCP		Roads	Rice Situation	Family Problems																				
		Aware/Unaware	N.V. 3	Aware/Unaware	N.V.	Same/Quiet Area	N.V.	Good/Satisfactory/Poor	N.V.	Good/Satisfactory/Poor	N.V.	Good/Satisfactory/Poor	N.V.	Good/Satisfactory/Poor	N.V.	Good/Satisfactory/Poor	N.V.	Good/Satisfactory/Poor	N.V.	Good/Satisfactory/Poor	N.V.	Good/Poor	Good/Poor 10	Existing 11	N.V.																			
PLAN 9 RESTRICTED AREA	B. Lee Luang	1																																										
	B. Dong Suang	2																																										
	B. Nang Ho	3																																										
	B. The Dakkham	4																																										
	B. Fai Lam	5																																										
	B. The Roi	6																																										
	B. Dong Than	7																																										
	B. Lao Mak Phang	8																																										
	B. The Si Khai	9																																										
	B. Dong Bang	10																																										
CONTROL AREA	B. Don Klang	11																																										
	B. Pho Mak Khong	12																																										
	B. Lao	13																																										
	B. Nong Sang	14																																										
	B. Huai Phak Kha	15																																										
	B. Nong Savang	16																																										
	TOTAL	17	18	-	6	20	1	5	20	10	1	18	9	7	1	1	-	33	3	14	9	9	10	16	2	7	4	3	-	20	4	5	5	21	2	25	3	5	20	1	14	21	12	2

1 Aware--positive indications expressed by interviewees  
 2 Unaware--subject discussed, but interviewees ignorant  
 3 Not volunteered--interviewees did not raise the subject  
 4 Same--areas with banditry record, but not for past 3-5 years  
 5 Quiet area--no bandit problems  
 6 Good--positive expressions made by interviewees  
 7 Satisfactory--sample expressions included "They are alright", "They don't trouble us"  
 8 Poor--clear negative opinion expressed  
 9 Good--enough rice to eat but still necessary to sell some for cash  
 10 Fair--less rice than previous year, but no question of starvation  
 11 Existing--family problems, such as poverty and sickness, raised. Two of the interviewees who are village informants also complained of non-payment of their salaries.

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5 AUTHOR(S) (Last name, first name, initial)  
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13 ABSTRACT

(U) An evaluation is made of a border control operations plan as initiated by the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) and implemented from January 1969 through June 1970 in a restricted area along the Mekong River border of North-east Thailand.

(U) A major portion of the evaluation covers basic and field training, with emphasis on the training of selected village volunteer personnel, whose use in conjunction with existing security units is a key feature of the plan. Other aspects examined include the command and support functions insofar as these were instituted during the research period. Also presented are the results of a survey to ascertain the impact of the system on the attitudes of villagers in the area, and test data developed for further analysis.

(U) Recommendations are made for improvement of the Plan 9 system with respect to the functions examined, including revisions of the training program.

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